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The structure of wages and employment has dramatically shifted in many
countries in recent years. There has been a clear increase in demand for bet-
ter educated workers throughout the Western economies. In United States
this has taken a form of an increasingly unequal distribution in earnings,
whereas in continental Europe it has resulted in dramatic rise in joblessness.
The sources of these trends have been the subject of much study. Many
researchers believe that the shift in labour demand is explained by recent
changes in firms’ production technology, such as the adoption of new ma-
chinery and information technology in firms’ production processes. The main
idea behind this explanation is that skilled workers have a better capacity to
adapt to changing economic conditions and that new technologies are more
complementary to skilled workers than to unskilled workers. There are num-
ber of studies which show empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis
of skill-biased technological change1.
Skill-biased technological change is not the only possible explanation for
the increase in the demand for skilled labour. There are a growing number
of studies that examine whether increased globalization can be oﬀered as an
alternative explanation for the rapid rate of skill upgrading found in the US
1See e.g. Berman et al., 1994, 1998, Machin et al., 1998, and for a survey, Chennels
and Van Reenen, 1999.
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and elsewhere2. A traditional trade theory suggests that increased trade of
final products can lead to changes in production share between countries so
that countries that are abundant in skilled labour would specialize in the pro-
duction of skill-intensive products and hence the demand for skilled labour
would increase as the employment within skill-intensive sectors grows3. In-
ternationalization can also aﬀect the demand for skills through intermediate
input markets by foreign outsourcing4. Firms in industrial countries facing
higher relative wages for unskilled labour than that found abroad, outsource
activities that use a large amount of unskilled labour. Moving these activities
overseas will reduce the relative demand for unskilled labour in the country,
in much the same way as replacing these workers with automated production.
One aspect of globalization is the growing number of foreign-owned firms
in domestic markets. Several studies have found that foreign-owned firms dif-
fer substantially from domestic firms. Foreign-owned firms are larger, more
productive, more skill-intensive and pay higher wages.5 This might be sim-
ply the result of selection of high wage or skill-intensive establishments for
acquisition by foreign firms, or the acquisition itself might have an eﬀect on
the skill demand and wages of domestic establishments. The modern the-
ory of multinational enterprises (MNEs) suggests that foreign-owned firms
are diﬀerent from domestic-owned firms simply because they need to be dif-
ferent. If foreign multinational enterprises are exactly identical to domestic
firms, they will not find it profitable to enter the domestic market. Foreign
firms presumably operates against disadvantages such as inferior knowledge
of local markets and tastes and inferior connections with local politicians
and financial institutions. In order to overcome these drawbacks, the foreign
firm must possess some firm-specific advantages, such as superior technol-
ogy, marketing and managing skills, or export contacts, that overcome the
2See Feenstra and Hanson (2001), for a survey.
3See e.g. Ethier, 1984.
4See e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996.
5See e.g. Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright, 2002.
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inherent advantages of local firms6
If multinationals do indeed possess such assets, then we would expect
the recent increase in the foreign direct investments and foreign-owned firms
to have important contributions on employment and wages of diﬀerent skill
groups in domestic market. Most of the foreign investments flows are between
pairs of developed countries (Markusen, 1995). Theory does not provide a di-
rect answer to the question what is the eﬀect foreign-ownership on the relative
wages and skill demand between countries of similar skill-mix. So far only a
few empirical studies have examined directly how increased foreign-aﬃliate
activity has contributed to changes in skill demand and wage inequality7.
Globalization and technological change might lead to important restruc-
turing, which causes many workers to loose their current jobs8. This is espe-
cially likely to happen in countries with lower degree of downward flexibility
in wages. The costs of this restructuring depend on how long lasting are
the consequences of job loss for displaced workers. Several studies have tried
to quantify the costs imposed on workers who are displaced from their jobs
in United States9. Majority of the studies (e.g. Jacobson, Sullivan and
Lalonde, 1993, Stevens, 1997) indicate that the earnings and employment
losses of displaced workers are large and persistent. Less sure is, however,
what explains these losses and whether they are equal to all workers. The
number of studies on displaced workers in Europe is much more limited and
the results less clear (e.g. Bender et al. 2002). There is however a clear
need to understand whether the experiences of displaced workers in US are
typical for other developed countries and whether the possible diﬀerences be-
6See e.g. Caves, 1996, Markusen 1995, Aitken and Harrison, 1996, and Bloningen and
Slaughter, 2001.
7See Feenstra and Hanson, 1997, Bloningen and Slaughter, 2001, and Taylor and
Driﬃeld, 2004
8Addison et al. (2000) provide evidence that workers employed in industries with
elevated import shares and high levels of investment in computers appear to have increased
rates of job loss. White (2002) finds that increased import competition has significant
eﬀects on industry-level displacement rates in US manufacturing.
9See surveys by Fallick, 1996, and Kletzer 1998.
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tween diﬀerent countries reveal some fundamental information of functioning
of diﬀerent type of economies.
The job displacement might have very diﬀerent consequences for diﬀerent
type of people. Older workers and workers with longer pre-displacement job
tenure are expected to loose more since their human capital is mostly firm-
specific. Education might play important role as well. Highly educated
workers are assumed to have more transferable human capital and so they
may loose less from displacement and recover more rapidly. So far only few
studies have examined how worker’s educational level aﬀect the magnitude
of these losses10.
The costs of job displacement also depend on the fact, whether a worker
has time and possibility to react before the job is destroyed11. When entire
plant is being closed down both workers and the firm have normally time to
react before the actual closing down occurs. The knowledge of future closure
will influence both firm’s hiring and firing decisions, as well as the workers’
quitting decisions. The firm chooses to retain its most productive workers,
while workers with relatively better external market opportunities and lower
proportion of firm-specific human capital are more likely to quit. This means
that there is an important selection process going on in the firm before the
actual closing down occurs. This selection process is likely to aﬀect the post-
displacement outcomes of the workers: The ones who leave voluntarily from
these plants are not expected suﬀer any losses at all, while the ones who are
laid oﬀ before the closure occurs, or the ones who choose to remain with their
plant until the end are expected to be worse oﬀ. One reason why the type of
job loss might matter, is that market makes inference on worker’s unobserved
ability by the behavior of their former employer12. Firm’s desire to retain
10See Stevens (1997), Farber (1997) Kletzer (1989, 2001).
11Several studies have shown that advance notice reduces workers post-employment
earnings and employment losses. See e.g. Addison and Portugal (1987), Ruhm (1994) and
Friesen (1997).
12See Gibbons and Katz, 1991 and Farber and Gibbons, 1996.
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a worker signals to the market that worker is of high ability. Consequently,
the market infers that laid-oﬀ workers are of low ability. Assuming that no
such negative inference is warranted if workers are displaced in plant closing,
post-displacement wages should be lower for those who were laid oﬀ before
the plant closing down occurred, than for those who remained with the dying
plant until the end.
This doctoral dissertation examines in detail the consequences of techno-
logical change and globalization on Nordic labour markets. The goal is to
provide evidence how these changes aﬀect employment and wages of diﬀer-
ent skill groups. In addition we analyze what happens to the workers who
loose their jobs in this process. That is, we analyze how severe earnings
and employment reductions workers suﬀer after being displaced from their
jobs. The thesis consists of four independent essays. The first two essays
use plant-level panel data with detailed worker characteristics from Finland.
These two essays examine the eﬀect of technological change and globaliza-
tion on skill demand and wages in Finland during 1988-2001. The third and
fourth essay utilize unique linked employer-employee panel data from Norway
for 1988-2000. These essays examine the consequences of job displacement.
The aim is to explore how severe earnings and employment losses workers
suﬀer after job displacement in Norway, and how these losses diﬀer between
diﬀerent type of workers.
2 Contents of the Dissertation
2.1 R&D-activity, Exports, and Changes in the Skill
Demand in Finland
The first paper of my thesis examines empirically whether the increased
export- and R&D-activity were associated with changes in the skill struc-
ture of labour demand in Finland during 1988-2001. During this period Fin-
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land went trough significant changes. The early part of 1990’s was marked
by exceptionally severe recession. A recovery period was associated with a
rapid re-structuring of the economy, which was induced by a growth of new
export-oriented more technologically advanced industries. These changes are
assumed to reflect higher rate of technological change and increased global-
ization of the economy. This period in Finland provides us thus an interest-
ing case to examine the eﬀects of technological change and globalization on
labour market.
Worker’s skill level is defined by both education and age. Technologi-
cal change and trade are expected to increase the demand for highly edu-
cated workers. Technological progress might also change the relative demand
for workers in diﬀerent age groups: If the skills of older workers are of an
older vintage, the technological process is likely to make them obsolete more
quickly. If this is true, the hypothesis of highly educated having a better
capacity to adapt to recent changes in production would not hold for older
workers.
The study uses unique establishment-level panel data with linked infor-
mation on worker characteristics from Finland for 1988-2001. The empiri-
cal analysis consists of two parts. In the first part we rely on panel data
on Finnish private sector establishments and analyze the recent changes in
the wage bill and employment shares of diﬀerent skill groups. The aggre-
gate change is further decomposed into changes that have occurred within
establishments, between establishments, and due to entry and exit of estab-
lishments. In the second part we regress the establishment level wage bill
share equations of diﬀerent skill groups on observable trade and technology
indicators. This method provides us with a way to examine the direct impact
of these variables on the changes in the skill mix of labour demand that have
occurred within establishments.
The analysis provides evidence that the skill structure of the Finnish pri-
vate sector establishments’ work force has shifted towards highly educated
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and older workers, closely reflecting the changes in the skill structure of
the population. The increase in the share of both highly and less educated
older workers has mainly occurred within establishments while the increase
in the share of highly educated younger workers has occurred between estab-
lishments and by the entry of new establishments. The estimation results
without plant controls show that plants with high level of R&D and exports
employ more highly educated younger workers, while the impact of these
variable is much less pronounced or even insignificant for highly educated
older workers. However, the fixed eﬀects estimation results provide no evi-
dence that an increase in the level of R&D intensity and export share would
aﬀect the changes in skill demand within establishments.
2.2 The Eﬀect of Foreign Acquisition on Wages and
Skill Composition
The second study of the thesis examines the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on
employment and wages of diﬀerent skill groups in Finland. The aim is, in
particular, to examine whether there are significant diﬀerences on the eﬀect
of foreign acquisition on wages and employment of workers from diﬀerent skill
groups. Moreover, we aim to put significant eﬀort to examine whether the
relationship between foreign ownership and wages or employment is simply
a correlation or whether foreign acquisition itself has an eﬀect on the wages
and on the skill mix of plant’s work force.
We use plant-level panel data with matched information on worker char-
acteristics from Finnish manufacturing for the years 1988-2001. During this
period Finland experienced a high increase in the share of foreign-owned
plants. This increase might reflect both the global increase in foreign direct
investments and acquisitions, and the big changes that Finnish economy went
trough the period: exceptionally severe recession in early 1990’s, that was
associated with a rapid re-structuring of the economy, and the joining of the
European Union in 1995.
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We aim to improve the previous literature in three ways: First, we use
unique plant-level panel data with matched information on employee char-
acteristics by skill groups. These data allow us to examine whether the eﬀect
of foreign acquisition on employment and wages varies by the educational
level of the workers. In addition, the data allow us to control for rich set
of pre-acquisition characteristics of the plants, including a large number of
employee characteristics, and thus to study whether the change in the own-
ership might influence the changes in the average characteristics of plant’s
employees. We can thus disentangle the eﬀect of foreign ownership on wages
from the eﬀect on the quality of the labour force.
Second, in addition to standard regression techniques we use various
propensity score matching methods, including diﬀerence-in diﬀerences match-
ing introduced in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). The central idea in
the matching methods is to base the estimation on a very careful matching of
cases and controls using a rich set of observable characteristics. This is a way
to make sure we use a suitable comparison group and take into account all
the possible factors that aﬀect the possible selection of plants for acquisition
by foreign firm.
Third, the changes in employment and wages that are caused by foreign
acquisition might not happen instantaneously. It is well known that there are
important costs in both hiring and firing of workers, and these costs might
vary by the skill level of the workers. These adjustment costs mean that
changes in labour demand or in average wages do not happen instantly. We
take this into account and examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages
and employment in diﬀerent periods after acquisition.
The results from both matching and regression indicate that foreign ac-
quisition has a positive eﬀect on wages of all skill groups in domestic plants.
The wage increase is not immediate, but happens within 1-3 years from the
acquisition. The magnitude of this eﬀect increases with the level of school-
ing of the workers. The result of the employment eﬀect are less clear. The
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regression analysis using the whole sample indicates that foreign acquisition
does not have an eﬀect on the share of highly educated workers in plant’s
workforce. However, the matching results indicate that acquired plants re-
duce, although slightly and slowly, the share of highly educated workers in
their employment. Thus, it seems that foreign owners decrease the number
of highly educated workers in their new plants, but the ones who remain are
paid clearly more than the ones whose plants remained domestically-owned.
2.3 How Destructive is Creative Destruction? The
Costs of Worker Displacements
The third paper of the thesis analyzes the costs of worker displacement in
Norway. Specifically, we seek to determine how severe and long-lasting are
the employment and earning losses of people who loose their jobs due to plant
closing down or significant downsizing. We use large administrative matched
employer-employee data set for the years 1986-2000.
One novelties in the paper is that we can follow workers and their earn-
ings even if they leave the labour force. We argue that in order to examine
the true costs of displacement, it is important to work on population data,
because displacement might have an impact on the probability of leaving
the labour force permanently. It is also important to allow workers in the
comparison group to leave the labour force. This group represents the “on-
going economy”, and a significant number of workers leave the labour force
for reasons other than having been displaced.
In addition to estimating the average eﬀects of displacement, we analyze
heterogeneity in displacement eﬀects by observable pre-displacement worker,
plant, and labour market characteristics. Are old workers more vulnerable
than young workers? What happens to workers displaced from plants in in-
dustries with negative long term growth? What happens to workers that are
displaced from firms which are dominant in a local labour market? When
examining eﬀects by pre-displacement characteristics, we can better under-
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stand the reasons behind displacement costs. Furthermore, we also allow
the displacement eﬀects vary by the type of separation. That is, we divide
our "treatment group", displaced workers, into three diﬀerent subcategories:
workers who were laid oﬀ when the plant closed down, workers who separated
from these plants in a period before the closure occurred, and workers who
were displaced due to significant downsizing of a continuous plant.
We find that displacement significantly increases the probability of leaving
the labour force. Those displaced workers who find re-employment work on
average 3.2 months less in the following year as compared to similar workers
who were not displaced. Seven years after displacement the average employ-
ment reduction is only a few days per year. Earnings is on average reduced by
2-5 percent in the first year after displacement. This eﬀect decreases slowly,
and is 1-2 percent seven year after displacement. The negative employment
eﬀect is in the short run weaker for workers that were displaced by plant
closure than for those displaced from downsizing firms. This is consistent
with the latter group searching less intensely for a new job because they
hope to be recalled. We find that workers with less than 10 years of school-
ing, and workers displaced from small plants are more vulnerable than other
groups. Age and tenure have surprisingly little impact on the consequences
of displacement.
2.4 Worker Turnover in Dying Plants and Re-employment
Wages
The fourth paper of the thesis examines worker turnover in dying plants using
matched employer-employee data from Norway for 1988-2000. The aim is to
find out whether there are diﬀerences in the re-employment wages and post-
displacement earning losses of the workers who leave the firm at diﬀerent
stages. The hypothesis is that the knowledge of future economic distress
will influence both firm’s hiring and firing decisions, as well as the workers’
quitting decisions. The firm chooses to retain its most productive workers,
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while workers with relatively better external market opportunities and lower
proportion of firm-specific human capital are more likely to quit. This process
will make the skill distribution of plant’s workforce more compressed, as the
worse and best workers are more likely to separate from these plants.
The empirical analysis can be divided into two parts. First, we examine
whether there are significant changes in the workforce skill distribution before
the plant closure and whether workers who leave the dying plants in diﬀer-
ent stages diﬀer significantly by their observable characteristics. Second, we
examine whether there are significant diﬀerences in the post-displacement
earning losses of workers who leave the dying plant in diﬀerent stages. This
allows us to study whether this selection process in dying plants aﬀects the
magnitude of post-displacement earnings losses.
The theoretical framework is based on the assumption that when a nega-
tive shock arrives both workers and firms engage in strategic behavior. The
market infers their behavior and assign the re-employment wages accordingly.
The framework yields two empirically testable predictions: (1) In the period
before the plant is shut down there are significant changes in the workforce
skill distribution. (2) Workers’ re-employment wages and post-displacement
earning losses diﬀer between workers who leave the dying plant in diﬀerent
stages.
The results are consistent with the theoretical framework. There are
significant changes in the workforce skill distribution before the plant closure.
Workers who decide to leave the dying plant early suﬀer no wage losses
in their re-employment jobs, while the ones who stay until the end suﬀer
significant earning losses. On the other hand, workers who are laid oﬀ in the
period before the plant’s death suﬀer even more severe earnings reductions,
than the ones who were laid oﬀ during the period when the closure occurred.
11
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II R&D-activity, Exports, and Changes in the
Skill Demand in Finland
Abstract
During 1990’s Finnish economy experienced a rapid increase in
exports and R&D activity. This paper investigates the impact of these
phenomena on the skill structure of labour demand, using panel data
on Finnish establishments for 1988-2001. The worker’s skill level is
defined by both education and age. The results indicate that despite
the general shift in employment towards highly educated and older
workers, the selected technology and trade indicators, R&D intensity,
and export share, did not have significant eﬀect on the changes in the




It has been well established that there is a clear shift in demand towards
better educated workers throughout the Western economies. The size and
timing of labour demand shifts have led many researchers to believe that the
shift is explained by recent changes in firms’ production technology, such as
the adoption of new machinery and information technology in firms’ produc-
tion processes. There are number of studies which show empirical evidence
that supports this hypothesis of skill-biased technological change (see Chen-
nels and Van Reenen, 1999, for a survey). Another often used explanation
for skill upgrading is the increase in international trade, generating a shift
in product demand towards more skill-intensive products (e.g. Feenstra and
Hanson, 1996).
Finnish economy has gone through significant changes during the last 15
years. The early part of 1990’s was marked by exceptionally severe reces-
sion, where unemployment rate rose from 3 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in
1994. The recovery period was associated with a rapid re-structuring of the
economy, which was induced by a growth of new export-oriented more tech-
nologically advanced industries. These changes are assumed to reflect higher
rate of technological change and increased globalization of the economy. This
period in Finland provides us thus an interesting case to examine the eﬀects
of technological change and globalization on labour market.
This study examines empirically whether the increase in exports and R&D
activity were associated with changes in the skill structure of labour demand
in Finland during the period. The major diﬀerence between this study and
the previous studies is that worker’s skill level is defined by both education
and age. Most of the previous studies that examine the impact of techno-
logical change on skill demand use a very crude definition of skill: typically
labour is divided into only two groups by some educational level or by divi-
sion of labour into production and non-production workers. However, human
capital theory suggests that a worker’s productivity depends on both his edu-
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cational level and work experience. In addition, technological progress might
have a diﬀerent impact on diﬀerent skill groups’ productivity: If the skills
of older workers are of an older vintage, the technological process is likely
to make them obsolete more quickly. If this is true, the hypothesis of highly
educated having a better capacity to adapt to recent changes in production
would not hold for older workers.
The study uses unique establishment-level panel data with linked infor-
mation on worker characteristics from Finland for 1988-2001. The empiri-
cal analysis consists of two parts. In the first part we rely on panel data
on Finnish private sector establishments and analyze the recent changes in
the wage bill and employment shares of diﬀerent skill groups. The aggre-
gate change is further decomposed into changes that have occurred within
establishments, between establishments, and due to entry and exit of estab-
lishments. In the second part we regress the establishment level wage bill
share equations of diﬀerent skill groups on observable trade and technology
indicators. This method provides us with a way to examine the direct impact
of these variables on the changes in the skill mix of labour demand that have
occurred within establishments.
The analysis provides evidence that the skill structure of the Finnish pri-
vate sector establishments’ work force has shifted towards highly educated
and older workers, closely reflecting the changes in the skill structure of
the population. The increase in the share of both highly and less educated
older workers has mainly occurred within establishments while the increase
in the share of highly educated younger workers has occurred between estab-
lishments and by the entry of new establishments. The estimation results
without plant controls show that plants with high level of R&D and exports
employ more highly educated younger workers, while the impact of these
variable is much less pronounced or even insignificant for highly educated
older workers. However, the fixed eﬀects estimation results provide no evi-
dence that an increase in the level of R&D intensity and export share would
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aﬀect the changes in skill demand within establishments.
The paper is organized as follows: Next section briefly describes the the-
oretical background for the analysis. Third section presents the data sets.
Fourth section provides descriptive information on changes of the skill struc-
ture of labour demand and supply in Finland and the results of the decom-
position analysis. Fifth section presents the estimated model. Sixth section
provides estimation results of regressions on the eﬀect of observable tech-
nology and trade variables on establishments’ skill structure. Last section
concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
The analysis is based on the assumption of a profit-maximizing firm, which
chooses the level of employment in a static framework. Workers with diﬀerent
levels of education and experience diﬀer in their productivity and they are
imperfect substitutes in production. The cost function can be written as
C = c(Y,W11, ...Wnm,K,T) (1)
where C is total cost, Y is output,Wij is the relative wage of the worker in
the age group i with the educational level j, K is capital, andT a vector of all
‘structural variables’ that shift the production function and therefore aﬀect
costs. Capital is assumed to be fixed in the short run. The associated optimal
skill mix M, which describes the optimal combination of diﬀerent labour
inputs in production, can be determined by short run cost minimization for
the given level of production Y , while treating capital and the structural
factors included in T as exogenous. The optimal skill mix can be written as
M = m(T, K,W, Y ) (2)
where W is the vector of relative wages for labour inputs. T describes
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technological change. It captures all structural factors that change the op-
timal skill mix within firms. That is, it can reflect both the changes in
firm’s production process (i.e. adoption of new technology and organiza-
tional changes in production) as well as the factors that reflect changes in
product demand (i.e. increased trade).
This study uses a very broad definition of technological change: it is
viewed as a process that encompasses a broad range of changes in the pro-
duction and organizational structure of a plant, such as the adoption of new
machinery, changes in the organization structure of a firm and changes in job
requirements (see Bresnahan et al., 2002). How does technological change
aﬀect the relative demand for workers from diﬀerent age and educational
groups? We assume that technological progress has a diﬀerent impact on the
productivity of workers with diﬀerent age and educational levels. Following
Nelson and Phelps (1966), we suggest that the rate of return to education
is greater, the more technologically progressive the economy is. The ba-
sic explanation behind this idea is that education enhances one’s ability to
receive, decode, and understand information. As explained above, techno-
logical progress is assumed to involve various firm-level changes and better
educated individuals are assumed to have a better capacity to adapt to these
changes. Hence, technological progress is likely to raise the relative produc-
tivity of highly educated workers.
Furthermore, we assume that technological change has a diﬀerent impact
on the productivity of workers from diﬀerent age groups with the same level
of education. This idea can be related to vintage human capital literature
(Chari and Hopenhayen, 1991, Mac Donald and Weisbach, 2001). The basic
assumption behind the vintage human capital model is that skills are acquired
by working in a firm using a particular technology and that technology is
vintage specific. Human capital that is acquired by working with certain
technology is also vintage specific as it is specific to existing technology. As
technology evolves, the value of human capital of older workers is eroded as
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the human capital of older workers is specific to pre-existing technology. In
other words, the more rapid the rate of technological change is, the more
rapidly older workers skills become obsolete. In addition, by the similar
logic as in the vintage human capital literature, technological progress might
erode the skills acquired by education as well. That is, as stated in Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1987), there might be depreciation of the value of education, so
that individuals educated a long time ago do not have a better capacity to
adjust to changes in production than their less educated age mates.
Putting these assumptions together, we expect technological change to
increase the relative productivity of highly educated workers, but the rise is
lower among older age groups, because technological change increases the rate
of depreciation of human capital. In other words, if skills of older workers
are of an older vintage, technological process is more likely to make them
obsolete. This would imply that the hypothesis regarding the superior ability
of educated workers to adapt to new technology does not hold for older
workers in the same way as it does for younger workers and for the total
population.
3 Data
The study uses four diﬀerent data sources. The main data source is the Plant
Level Employment Statistics Data on Average Characteristics (PESA). It is
a longitudinal data on Finnish establishments, with linked information on
worker characteristics aggregated on the establishment level by skill groups.
The linked worker-establishment data are constructed by linking data on
workers in the Employment Statistics database of Statistics Finland to data
on plants of Business Registers and Industrial Statistics. The data set covers
all the private sector establishments (except traﬃc and construction) with
more than two workers. The time period is 1988-2001. The number of estab-
lishments is around 50 000 each year. Employees are aggregated into 70 dif-
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ferent skill groups by education, age and sex. The data contains information
on aggregate worker characteristics for each skill group. The most important
variables at the establishment level by skill groups (average in skill group)
are: number of people, monthly wage, general working experience, tenure and
education. The data set does not have any specific information on establish-
ment characteristics. However, each enterprise and its plant, has a unique
identification code, which can be used to match additional information from
other statistics and registers on the linked worker-plant database.
Another major data source used in the analysis is the Longitudinal Data
on Plants in Manufacturing (LDPM), which is constructed especially for
research purposes from Annual Industry Statistics. For the period 1974-1994
it covers all manufacturing sector plants with more than 5 workers and for the
period 1995-2001 it covers the plants of firms employing at least 20 persons.
The number of plants varies between 8000 and 3000 each year. Because of the
diﬀerent plant coverage the number of plants in the sample is considerable
smaller in the years 1995-2001. The data set contains information on various
plant characteristics, such as size, real value added, gross output, real capital
stock, sales, exports and the share of foreign ownership.
Information on R&D investments is collected from two diﬀerent sources.
The first source is the R&D statistics of Statistics Finland. R&D statistics
is formed by linking together R&D surveys from the years 1991-2001. The
R&D surveys contain information on the R&D activities of firms, such as
expenditure and number of R&D personnel. The sampling varies from year
to year. Basically it covers most of the larger firms, which employ at least
100 persons and the firms which are expected to have R&D activity. The
number of establishments each year varies from 1000 to 2000.
For the purpose of our analysis we form two diﬀerent data sets by linking
the diﬀerent data sources described above. The first data set is formed by
linking the PESA data set with LDPM data. As the LDPM data set for
the years 1995-2001 consists only the plants of firms that employ at least 20
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persons, the number of observations per year is considerably smaller after
1994. For the estimations we restrict the sample to cover only plants of
the firms which employ at least 20 workers. The linked data set covers the
years 1988-2001 and consists of 41 164 observations. The second data set is
formed by linking PESA, LDPM and R&D statistics together. The number
of observations in this R&D sample is 18 319. The data set covers the years
1991-2001.
The main variables describing the employee characteristics are obtained
from the PESA data set. The focus is on three variables: the monthly wage,
employment and the wage bill share. Employment describes the number of
workers in a skill group working in an establishment during the last week of
the year. The average monthly wage is calculated as the skill group average
of the average monthly wages of individual workers who were employed in
the establishment during the last week of the year. The average monthly
wage for each individual employed is calculated by dividing the annual wage
income by months of employment. The monthly wage bill for each skill group
is formed by multiplying the average monthly wage of the skill group by the
number of workers in the skill group employed in the establishment during
the last week of the year.
Variables describing the plant characteristics are from the LDPM data
set. The general plant characteristics variables needed in our analysis are
real value added and real capital stock. As a real value added variable we
use a variable that describes the real industrial value added. It is obtained
by subtracting all the material inputs and the industrial services from the
gross industrial output and deflating with the industry-level price indexes
(1995 prices). The real capital stock variable is an estimated real value of
capital and equipment. Nominal investments are deflated (1995 prices) using
the perpertual inventory method by implicit industrial price indexes from
National accounts (see Maliranta, 1997). The export-share ratio is used to
proxy internationalization. It is formed by dividing the value of exported
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shipments by total shipments. Both of these plant level variables are obtained
from the LDPM database. The major variable for the ”technology level” is a
firm-level R&D/sales ratio obtained from the R&D statistics. It is calculated
by dividing the firm’s R&D expenditure by the firm’s total sales.
4 Recent Trends in Finland
4.1 Aggregate Changes
The period from 1988 to 2001 was marked with several exceptional phenom-
ena in Finland. During the early 1990 Finland experienced several adverse
economic shocks, including the end of eastern trade induced by the collapse
of Soviet Union, which led to exceptionally severe recession. The recession
hit all the industries and regions and aﬀected workers in all skill groups. The
total unemployment rate rapidly from 3 % to 18% within three years (see
figure 1.). The period was also marked by a significant changes in the produc-
tion structure. The recovery period was marked a growth of new industries:
namely of export oriented high-tech manufacturing sector. Both the level of
exports and R&D activity increased rapidly during the period (see figures 2.
and 3.).
During the period, the skill structure of both supply and demand for
labour changed. Figures 1-3 plot aggregate shares of four diﬀerent skill groups
in the Finnish working age (15-64-year old) population and in the total wage
bill and employment of Finnish private sector establishments1. Information
on population shares comes from Statistics Finland’s population statistics.
1Throughout this study, we use a fraction of the wage bill going to diﬀerent skill groups
as a primary measure of labour demand, as it is assumed to reflect changes in net demand
better. Changes in net demand for diﬀerent skill groups lead to changes in both wages and
employment. An increase in net demand for a certain skill group can generate an increase
in the relative wage for this skill group, which in turn could mitigate or even eliminate
the positive impact of net demand changes on employment. Similarly, an increase in the
relative supply of one group can lead to a reduction in the relative wage of that group and
to an increase in employment -without any real changes in the net demand.
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Information on wage bill and employment shares of private sector establish-
ments comes from the PESA data set. Workers are divided into four diﬀerent
skill groups by age and education as follows: 1) less educated younger, 2)
highly educated younger , 3) less educated older , 4) highly educated older.
”Less educated” refers to people with basic, vocational and lower secondary
education. ”Highly educated” refers to people with educational qualifications
from colleges, polytechnics or universities. ”Younger” refers to 15-44-year old
people and ”older” to 45-64-year old people. Figures 1-3 presents clear ev-
idence that the shares of older and highly educated people in population,
in private sector employment and in aggregate private sector wage bill have
steadily increased in 1988-1998. Evidently, among the diﬀerent skill groups
the share of ”highly educated older” has increased most dramatically.
4.2 Decomposition Analysis
The observed aggregate changes in the skill mix of employment and the
wage bill can reflect general changes in the skill mix of establishments’ work
forces within all establishments, a reallocation of employment between es-
tablishments with diﬀerent skill structures or entering establishments with a
diﬀerent skill mix replacing exiting establishments with a diﬀerent skill mix.
In what follows we decompose the shifts in each skill group’s (j) share in the
aggregate wage bill and employment between (t-s) and (t), ∆Sj, into within-












+ (Sjt − SCjt)
entry
+ (SCjt−s − Sjt−s)
exit
for i=1,...,n establishments. Sj = EjE is the share of skill group j in em-
ployment or the aggregate wage bill, and superscript C denotes continuing
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establishments, that is the establishments which appear in both the initial
(t-s) and the end year (t). Pi = EiE is the proportion of establishments i
in total employment or wage bill and Sji = EjiEi is the share of skill group j
in employment (or the aggregate wage bill) at establishment i. A bar over
a variable indicates the average of the variable over the initial and the end
year. The first term on the right-hand side is the within-eﬀect. It reports
how much of the aggregate change in the share of skill group j in employment
or the total wage bill, ∆Sj, is due to the changes in the skill mix that occur
within establishments. The second term is the between-eﬀect. It describes
how much the aggregate change in the share of skill group j is due to the
changes in the relative employment shares of establishments with a diﬀerent
skill structure (i.e. reallocation of the employment from low-skill to high-skill
establishments). The third term describes the entry-eﬀect, which reports the
change in a group’s share attributable to the entry of new establishments.
The last component of the right-hand-side equation is the exit-eﬀect, describ-
ing the change that is due to diﬀerences in the skill structure of surviving
and exiting establishments.
Results of the decomposition analysis can shed light on a variety of com-
peting hypotheses. It has been often argued (e.g. Berman et al., 1994)
that the within-establishment changes support the hypothesis of skill-biased
technological change. This argument rests on the idea that skill-biased tech-
nological change leads individual establishments to replace unskilled workers
with skilled workers, which leads to within-establishments changes in the
skill mix. Trade is assumed to lead to between-establishments changes in
the skill mix: Trade is expected to generate a shift in product demand to-
wards skill-intensive products, which causes an increase in employment in
skill-intensive establishments. Finally, the entry can reflect both of these
reasons: It has been argued that entry is a primary way in which a new
technology is introduced into the economy, as entering establishments dis-
place outmoded exiting plants (e.g. Dunne, et al, 1996, and Cabellero et al,
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1994). On the other hand, demand shifts towards skill-intensive products
have contributions to the entry of new establishments.
Table 1 reports the decomposition results for changes in the employment
and wage bill shares of four diﬀerent skill groups in Finnish private sector
establishments from the PESA data set in 1988-20012. The change is in
absolute terms, meaning that the magnitude of the change also reflects the
initial share of type j labour in establishments’ work force. The results imply
that the work force of the Finnish private sector establishments is becoming
older and more educated. The increase in the share of highly educated older
workers has mainly happened within establishments, while the increase in
the share of younger highly educated workers is mostly due to the entry
of new establishments and to the increase in employment of establishments
which employ relatively more highly educated younger workers. The results
provide evidence that new and enlarging establishments employ relatively
more younger highly educated workers. The exit-eﬀect for both less and
highly educated older workers is negative, which implies that the exiting
establishments hire more older workers than the surviving ones. The within-
eﬀect for highly educated younger workers is negative, implying that their
share has diminished within establishments. The results for two subperiods,
recession (1988-1994) and recovery (1995-2001), show clear evidence that the
change in the skill structure of establishments happened mainly during the
recession.
To interpret the results, it is essential to keep in mind that the increase
in the share of older workers within plants might simply reflect the overall
ageing of establishments’ work force. That is, if a relatively large share of
workers passes the 45-year-old mark, as the middle age cohorts are relatively
2It is worth emphasizing that the data set consists of all Finnish private sector estab-
lishments with more than two workers in the years 1988-2001, so that there should not
be significantly artificial disappearences and appearences of plants in the data set (due
to diﬀerent sampling or changes in identification codes). This makes it possible to create
reliable measures of plant entry and exit.
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much bigger in Finland than the young ones (see figure 7), then the relative
share of workers turning into ”older workers” is much bigger than the share
of workers that enter or exit the work life. The increase in the share of older
workers within establishments might simply reflect the fact that during the
recession few people were hired and the ones who were already employed
were getting older. There is no reason, however, to reject the hypothesis
that there might be changes in firms’ hiring and firing decisions.3.
5 Empirical Model
To examine empirically whether technological change is biased towards cer-
tain skill groups we relate the optimal skill composition of establishments’
work forces into observable technology variables. The empirical counterpart
of the equation (2) that describes the optimal skill mix in production is a
model that describes the share of diﬀerent labour inputs in labour demand.
In order to derive the optimal labour demand equations we follow the ap-
proach taken in a number of previous studies (e.g. Bartel et al., 1987), where
the long-run wage bill share equations are derived from the trans log cost
function. The cost function is a function of total labour costs, rather than
total costs of production. Ignoring raw materials is acceptable, if they are
assumed to be separable from capital and labour. The only variable factors
of production are the labour inputs, since capital and technology stocks are
assumed to be quasi-fixed. To keep the model as simple as possible, the
labour force is divided into four groups by their age and education. Taking
the second order Taylor series expansion of the cost function (2) we obtain
the trans log cost function
3i.e. Lilja (1996) provides evidence that during a recession the new hires in the Finnish
manufacturing sector were on average more experienced and educated than in other peri-
ods. Piekkola and Böckermann (2000) find that the adjustments of labor demand during
the recession were mainly carried out with younger workers (last in, first out).
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Where T is a vector of variables describing the state of technology and
K is capital. Diﬀerentiating by each skill groups wage Wj and using the








δji lnWi + δjk lnK + δjy lnY + δ0jtT (4)
where S∗j is the long run optimal share of type j labour in total labour
costs. The model implies that the skill structure of a firm’s work force, given
the level of output Y , depends on the prices of all labour inputs Wj, capital
K and the ”state of technology” T, which is assumed to capture all the
structural factors that aﬀect the optimal skill mix within a given firm, that
is, both the changes in product demand as well as technological change.
The main object in the study is to examine the impact of technological
change and trade on the skill structure of labour demand. Hence, the primary
variables of interest are the structural variables, T, that are used to measure
these phenomena. We use R&D/sales ratio as a variable that describes the
”technology level” of firm. The main argument is that firms investing rela-
tively more in R&D activities are more technologically advanced. The major
explanation for this is that the nature of R&D work varies fundamentally
from that of other forms of work -the tasks are non routine and there is a
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need for continuous learning. The R&D variable has also been widely used
in literature to describe those firms or industries that have a high tech sta-
tus (e.g. Berman, et al., 1994, Allen 2001). The obvious drawback of R&D
intensity is that it is only an input, and it describes where the innovation
is originated, not where it is used. That is, unlike computer investments, it
does not directly measure the use of new technology in production process.
However, there are a number of studies that provide evidence that R&D
activities are clearly complementary to various other changes in firms’ pro-
duction technology, such as the adoption of new machinery in production,
and that it does a reasonably good job of proxying the outputs of innovative
processes4.
As a measure of internationalization we use a plant’s exports related to
total shipments. This export-share is assumed to capture the changes in de-
mand for final goods, and hence it is mainly assumed to aﬀect the reallocation
of employment between plants or industries. However, as argued by Bernard
and Jensen (1997), the changes in product demand might represent switches
from production of one good to another even at the plant level. Hence, export
intensity might have an impact on both between- and within-establishments
changes in labour demand.
Imposing homogeneity restrictions the stochastic counterpart of the wage
bill share equation for skill group j is
Sjit = βji + δj1 ln(
W1it
W4it
) + δj2 ln(
W2it
W4it




+δj5 lnKit + δj6 lnYit + δ0jtTit + jit
where j indicates the skill group, i the establishment, and t the time
period, Sjit is the wage bill share of type j labour, Wjit is the wage for
4There are increasing number of studies which use alternative, and more direct measures
of technology, such as "implementation of new automation technologies" (see e.g. Doms,
Dunne, and Troske, 1997, Entorf and Kramarz, 1998 and Siegel, 1998).
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skill group j, Kit is the capital, Yit is the level of output (value added),
Tit is a vector of technology and demand shift variables, and βji represents
unobservable establishment specific time invariant eﬀects. Vector Tit can
be decomposed into observable technology or demand shift variables, and
into time trend, which reflects common shifts in skill mix across establish-
ments, as Tit = (export/salesit, R&D/salesit, t). In our empirical analysis
we replace time trend by a full set of year dummies. The primary focus
of our estimations is on the impact of R&D-intensity and export share on
the wage bill share of diﬀerent skill groups. The output variable is included
to capture possible non-homothecity. The coeﬃcient of the capital stock
variable is assumed to reflect complementarity of capital with certain skill
groups. We would, hence, expect it to be positive for skilled (highly edu-
cated) workers. The dependent variable (wage bill share) is constructed as:
Sjit =WjitEjit/
P4
j=1WjitEjit, where Wjit is the wage for the skill group j in
establishment i at time t, Ejit is employment of skill group j in establishment
i at time t.
As we are estimating the impact of the variables on the wage bill share of
diﬀerent skill groups, the estimated coeﬃcients total zero,
P4
j=1 δjv = 0, for
all variables v in the model. The above restrictions imply that row sums equal
zero. The model provides a set of seemingly unrelated regression equations,
where the error terms of diﬀerent share equations are correlated. In order
to capture the eﬃciency due to the correlation of disturbances, the system
should be estimated jointly by generalized least squares as a standard SUR
-model. However, each share equation can be estimated consistently, if not
eﬃciently, by OLS (assuming the OLS assumptions hold). We estimate the
model separately for each skill group5.
There are a number of issues that must be addressed before estimating the
model. First, there is the treatment of wage variables. As there is a direct
5For comparison the model was also estimated as a system of seemingly related regres-
sion equations (SUR) by feasible generalized least square. The system estimations of the
model did not significantly increase the eﬃciency of the estimates.
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relation between the explained variable (wage bill share) and the wages,
there is no reason to believe that relative wages would not be correlated
with unobservable factors that influence the group’s share in the total wage
bill. Hence, it is not plausible to treat relative wages as exogenous variables.
Furthermore, the wage variation across establishments can be confused with
variation in unobservable labour quality diﬀerences. In other words, there
is assumed to be little useful exogenous variation in wages for the purpose
of this type of analyses. Following the major part of the previous studies
that use a similar framework (e.g. Berman et al., 1994, Dunne et al., 1996)
we exclude the relative wage variables from the model and assume that the
relative wage variation in time dimension is equal across all establishments, so
that the time dummies capture the wage variation in time dimension6. Time
invariant establishment-specific diﬀerences in relative wages are assumed to
be captured in establishment-specific fixed eﬀect.
Another issue is the endogeneity of technology variables. If R&D itself is
chosen on the basis of economic incentives, it is unlikely to be independent
of the factors that influence the firm’s decision to employ workers from dif-
ferent skill groups. Hence, the unobservable factors that influence the skill
structure of the establishment’s work force are likely to be correlated with
the R&D/sales-ratio and the estimated coeﬃcient is likely to suﬀer from the
endogeneity bias. However, as we were not able to come up with an ap-
propriate instrument, the analysis is carried out by assuming exogeneity of
explanatory variables. In the interpretation of the results one should keep
in mind that the estimated impact of R&D does not necessarily represent a
causal impact of this variable on the skill demand.
Finally, the overall ageing of the population complicates our analysis
somewhat: As the middle-aged cohorts are relatively bigger than the en-
tering ones, the share of over-45-year-old workers seems to be continuously
6The inclusion of relative wage variables did not change the results. See table 5 in
appendix.
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growing, even if there are no real changes in firms’ employment (no hiring
or firing). How are we able to control for changes in the skill mix that are
due to within-plant ageing? If the increase in the share of older workers
within a plant is mainly due to the ageing of the plant’s current employees,
the average share of older workers is expected to grow the same rate in all
plants. Hence, we assume that the inclusion of the full set of time dummies
will net out the eﬀect of ageing and measure the impact of the variables on
the changes in the skill mix apart from overall ageing.
6 Estimation Results
The model is estimated using two diﬀerent samples: the linked LDPM-PESA
sample covering years 1988-2001 and the R&D sample for 1991-2001. The
table 2 shows the mean values of the main variables in the model. The labour
force is disaggregated into four diﬀerent skill groups by age and education
as previously. The first three columns indicate that there is not a significant
diﬀerence in the share of diﬀerent skill groups between exporting and non ex-
porting plants. The exporters seem, however, to pay higher wages, especially
for highly educated workers. They are also bigger, more capital-intensive and
more likely to have R&D activity. The next three columns show the descrip-
tives for the R&D sample. Plants with R&D activity seem to be less likely
to employ less educated younger workers, while there is no diﬀerence in the
share of older less educated ones between R&D and non-R&D plants. Plants
with some R&D activity employ also more highly educated workers in both
age categories, pay higher wages (especially for highly educated workers), are
bigger, more capital-intensive, and export more.
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the wage bill share equations
for LDPM sample. Models (1) and (2) have the export share as the only
additional ”demand shift” variable. In addition the model controls for real
capital stock, real value added and for fixed regional- and two-digit industry
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eﬀects. The model includes a full set of time dummies to rule out the eﬀects
of common shifts in establishments’ skill mix, such as ageing, and to control
for over time variation in relative wages. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The OLS estimation results of model (1) indicate that increase
in the exports/shipments-ratio has a positive impact on the share of highly
educated workers. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is bigger for younger
highly educated workers. Model (2) controls for the establishment-specific
fixed eﬀects. The results show that allowing for establishment-specific fixed
eﬀects greatly reduces the explanatory power of the export-variable. The
results indicate that increase in the relative level of exports does not have
a significant eﬀect on the changes on the skill mix within establishments.
Contrary to the model without fixed eﬀects, the results suggest that physical
capital and younger workers are complements. The positive eﬀect of the cap-
ital stock variable seems to be stronger for highly educated, younger workers.
For both highly and less educated older workers the impact of capital appears
to be negative. Thus, the findings indicate that the hypothesis of capital-skill
(education) complementarity fails to hold for older workers.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for R&D sample for 1991-2001. The
specification (1) includes export-intensity as the only demand shift variable.
The model controls for region, industry and time-eﬀects. The OLS esti-
mation results of model (1) clearly show significant and positive impact of
the export/shipments-ratio on the share of highly educated workers. The
magnitude of the coeﬃcient is bigger for younger highly educated workers.
Specification (2) includes also R&D/sales-ratio as a "technology variable".
The inclusion of R&D-variable decreases the coeﬃcient on the export-share
variable a bit, but it remains significant indicating that exports increase the
demand for highly educated workers, especially for the younger highly edu-
cated ones. The result show significant and positive impact of the firm-level
R&D/sales ratio on the share of highly educated workers and negative eﬀect
on the less educated workers. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is bigger for
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younger highly educated workers. Hence, with respect to technology vari-
ables, the pooled OLS regressions provide expected results: an increase in
the R&D intensity significantly increases the demand for highly educated
younger workers while the impact of this variable is much less pronounced
for older highly educated ones.
However, this results does not hold if we control for plant-fixed eﬀects in
the model. Columns 3 and 4 in table 4 report the results for specification
which allows plant-fixed eﬀects. As before, the inclusion of plant fixed eﬀects
greatly reduces the explanatory power of selected technology and demand
shift variables. In most cases the estimated coeﬃcients on these variables
seem to be statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, the last specification (4)
provides some evidence that increase in the relative share of R&D expenditure
increases the demand for less educated younger workers and decreases the
demand for highly educated younger workers. The eﬀect on the relative share
of older workers is insignificant.
We carried out a significant number of robustness checking and tried dif-
ferent specifications of the model. Table 6 in appendix shows some of these
results. The second column in the table shows the results for a specification
with relative wage variables. We report only the results of the fixed eﬀects
model. The sample size is somewhat smaller since we include only the plants
for which the information on relative wages for all skill groups could be found.
The result indicate that inclusion of wages did not change the results signif-
icantly. It seems that neither export-share nor R&D-variable significantly
influence the skill demand within establishments. In order to take into ac-
count the endogeneity problem of the explanatory variables also estimated
the model using lagged values of all the explanatory variables instead the
current ones. In addition we also estimated the model in first-diﬀerence form
and used the lagged level of explanatory variables as instruments. These
estimations did not yield significantly diﬀerent results, and provided no ev-
idence that the selected proxies for technological change and trade would
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significantly influence the within-plant changes in skill demand.
Why do we get so diﬀerent results when controlling for plant-fixed ef-
fects? One explanation for this finding might be that, at the plant level, the
correlation between technology use and skill structure is primarily due to the
fact that plants with more skilled workers are more likely to adopt new tech-
nologies, invest in R&D and export. Thus, neither level of R&D nor exports
itself influences the demand for skills within plants. Another reason for the
”too low” and insignificant coeﬃcients of the variables in estimations with
fixed eﬀects might be, that these variables are subject to measurement errors,
which causes OLS to underestimate the true parameters and this bias may
exacerbated when controlling for fixed eﬀects (see Griliches and Hausman,
1986)7.
In summary, our cross sectional results are consistent with the view of
skill biased technological change and trade: the selected technology and trade
indicators, R&D intensity and export-share, are correlated with higher share
of highly educated workers. The impact of these variables is much less pro-
nounced or even insignificant for older highly educated workers, which might
indicate that these changes are likely to make worker’s skills obsolete more
quickly. However, when controlling for the unobservable time invariant diﬀer-
ences between plants, the results show little correlation between the changes
in plant-level R&D activity or exports-ratio, and the changes in workforce
composition of the plant. Plants that increase their level of R&D activity
or exports do not appear to increase their relative share of highly educated
workers8.
These results do not mean that R&D activity or exports would not have
7To explore this possibility the model was also estimated in long diﬀerence form. The
argument is that when one assumes that measurement errors are stationary and uncorre-
lated and that the serial correlation is between true regression variables is declining, the
errors of measurement will bias the long diﬀerence estimators less than they will bias first
diﬀerence or within-estimators. The result, using the sample of continuing plants did not
change the results significantly.
8Doms et al. (1997) got similar results with US plant-level data.
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any eﬀect on the aggregate skill structure in the economy. Huttunen (2002)
using decomposition methods similar as in Bernard and Jensen (1997) pro-
vide evidence that the relative employment share of highly educated workers
has increased due to the relative growth of the R&D plants and exporters
in Finnish economy. There has not been significant diﬀerences in the skill
mix changes that have occurred within plants between exporting and non-
exporting plants, or between R&D-plants or non-R&D plants. She concludes
that exports and R&D intensity had significant contributions to changes in
skill mix of labour demand by influencing the changes that happen between-
plants, but not necessarily to the within-plant changes. We should also bear
in mind, that we might still use too crude measure of skill9. Vainiomäki
(1999) using Finnish data for 1988-1994, found no eﬀect of R&D activity
or export intensity on the relative share of highly educated workers within
plants. However, when disaggregating the educational categories further he
finds that R&D intensity had a positive impact for the higher university
and vocational groups, but a negative one for the lower university and basic
groups. The regression results show that R&D intensity seems to contribute
to ”within-group” educational upgrading from lower university to higher uni-
versity and from basic to vocational education.
7 Conclusions
This study has examined the changes in the skill structure of Finnish pri-
vate sector establishments during 1988-2001 and the impact of observable
technology and trade variables on the manufacturing sector establishments’
skill mix. The findings suggest that at the aggregate level establishments’
skill structure has changed towards older and more educated workers, closely
reflecting the changes in the skill mix of the population. The decomposition
9There seems to be a rising recent literature which are examine the eﬀect of techno-
logical change on more detailed workforce skill compositions. See Morrision and Siegel
(2001), and Autor, Levy and Murmane (2003).
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analysis reveals that the increase in the share of older workers has mainly oc-
curred within establishments, while the increase in the share of the younger
highly educated has occurred between establishments and by entry of new
establishments. The pooled OLS estimation results indicate that the selected
technology indicators, firm-level R&D intensity, and plant-level export share,
increase the demand for highly educated workers, but the impact is much less
pronounced for older highly educated ones. However, these results do not
hold after controlling for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity between
plants. The fixed-eﬀects OLS estimation results provide no evidence that
increase in the level of R&D-activity or exports would aﬀect the structure of
the workforce within plants. With respect to capital-stock variable we find
evidence that increase in the level of capital stock within plants increases the
demand for younger workers in both educational categories, and decreases
the demand for older workers respectively. In general, there seem to be signif-
icant diﬀerences in the sign and the magnitude of the coeﬃcients within the
same educational category. This suggests that the disaggregation of labour
by educational level only might hide substantial heterogeneity within edu-
cational groups and, thus, provides support for our method to disaggregate
labour by age as well.
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Table 1 Decomposition of the change in employment and wage bill shares of skill groups during 1988-2001 
 
Period Employment Wage bill 
1988-2001 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Total -0.168 0.049 0.056 0.063 -0.172 0.046 0.039 0.086
Within -0.181 -0.002 0.113 0.069 -0.165 -0.027 0.101 0.091
Betw. 0.001 0.024 -0.020 -0.005 -0.010 0.041 -0.026 -0.006
Entry 0.013 0.026 -0.038 -0.002 0.005 0.032 -0.036 -0.001
Exit -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
1988-1994        
Total -0.123 0.031 0.054 0.038 -0.116 0.016 0.048 0.053
Within -0.114 0.005 0.072 0.036 -0.103 -0.011 0.065 0.049
Betw. -0.004 0.009 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.001
Entry 0.002 0.013 -0.014 0.000 -0.001 0.015 -0.014 0.000
Exit -0.007 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.008 0.004 0.001 0.003
1995-2001        
Total -0.040 0.013 0.004 0.022 -0.049 0.028 -0.009 0.030
Within -0.061 -0.014 0.041 0.034 -0.059 -0.017 0.033 0.043
Betw. 0.011 0.017 -0.020 -0.008 0.001 0.034 -0.026 -0.009
Entry 0.008 0.014 -0.020 -0.002 0.005 0.017 -0.018 -0.003
Exit 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.003 -0.001
The skill groups are: 1. less educated younger workers, 2. highly educated younger workers, 3. less educated older workers,  
4. highly educated older workers. 
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Table 2 Mean values of the main variables in the data sets 
 
 LDPM sample R&D sample 
 All plants Exporting plants Non-export. plants All plants R&D plants Non-R&D plants 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Size (n) 41095 91.28 26220 114.65 14875 50.09 30798 93.00 12479 142.18 18319 59.49 
n1  41095 43.62 26220 54.42 14875 24.57 30798 42.05 12479 62.09 18319 28.41 
n2 41095 15.01 26220 19.51 14875 7.09 30798 15.86 12479 25.51 18319 9.28 
n3 41095 26.17 26220 32.62 14875 14.80 30798 27.72 12479 42.31 18319 17.77 
n4 41095 6.48 26220 8.10 14875 3.64 30798 7.37 12479 12.27 18319 4.03 
Emp. share1 40768 0.50 26064 0.50 14704 0.51 30638 0.47 12392 0.44 18246 0.50 
Emp. share2 40768 0.15 26064 0.16 14704 0.14 30638 0.16 12392 0.18 18246 0.15 
Emp. Share3 40768 0.28 26064 0.28 14704 0.29 30638 0.29 12392 0.29 18246 0.29 
Emp. Share4 40768 0.06 26064 0.06 14704 0.06 30638 0.07 12392 0.09 18246 0.06 
Wb.share1 40768 0.47 26064 0.46 14704 0.48 30638 0.44 12392 0.41 18246 0.46 
Wb.share2 40768 0.17 26064 0.18 14704 0.15 30638 0.17 12392 0.19 18246 0.16 
Wb.share3 40768 0.27 26064 0.27 14704 0.28 30638 0.28 12392 0.28 18246 0.29 
Wb.share4 40768 0.09 26064 0.09 14704 0.09 30638 0.10 12392 0.28 18246 0.09 
Log. wage 40768 9.26 26064 9.27 14704 9.24 30638 9.34 12392 0.28 18246 9.30 
Log. wage1 40071 9.15 25767 9.16 14304 9.14 30065 9.23 12082 9.27 17983 9.20 
Log. wage2 36870 9.41 24573 9.43 12297 9.37 28047 9.46 11413 9.51 16634 9.43 
Log. wage3 38987 9.21 25124 9.22 13863 9.21 29381 9.29 11861 9.33 17520 9.27 
Log. wage4 28987 9.70 20244 9.72 8743 9.66 23268 9.74 10236 9.78 13032 9.71 
Log. capital 33344 7.56 21455 7.87 11889 7.01 24481 7.62 10446 8.23 14035 7.16 
Log. Value added 37895 12.41 23741 12.71 14154 11.90 28613 12.47 11192 13.00 17421 12.13 
R&D/sales 41095 0.01 26220 0.01 14875 0.00 30798 0.01 12479 0.02 18319 0.00 
R&D-dummy 41095 0.34 26220 0.38 14875 0.26 30798 0.41 12479 1.00 18319 0.00 
Export/shipments 38679 0.20 23804 0.33 14875 0.00 29134 0.22 11526 0.29 17608 0.17 
Log. sales 38673 8.68 23804 9.06 14869 8.06 29128 8.76 11526 0.29 17606 8.41 
nj refers to number of employees in skill group j in the plant. The skill groups are: 1. less educated younger workers, 2. highly educated younger workers, 3. less educated older workers,  
4. highly educated older workers. 
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Table 3 Regressions: LDPM-sample 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s. e. 
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of young less educated workers 
Constant 0.509*** (0.056) 0.305*** (0.030) 
Log. Capital -0.006*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.010*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.001) 
Export-share -0.026*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
R-sq. 0.244  0.263  
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of young highly educated workers 
Constant -0.037 (0.044) 0.117*** (0.024) 
Log. Capital -0.003*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. 0.013*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
Export-share 0.033*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
R-sq. 0.196  0.012  
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of old less educated workers 
Constant 0.567*** (0.050) 0.456*** (0.027) 
Log. Capital 0.005*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.009*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
Export-share -0.011*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
R-sq. 0.157  0.189  
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of old highly educated workers 
Constant -0.039 (0.031) 0.123*** (0.019) 
Log. Capital 0.004*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. 0.007*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 
Export-share 0.004** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
R-sq. 0.226  0.119  
Time dummies yes  yes  
Region dummies yes  yes  
Industry Dummies yes  no  
Plant fixed effects no  yes  
Observations 30936  30936  
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 Regressions: R&D -sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 coeff. s.e. coeff.  coeff. s.e. coeff. s. e. 
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of young less educated workers 
Constant 0.620*** (0.077) 0.617***    (0.077)     0.262*** (0.038) 0.263*** (0.038) 
Log. Capital -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004***     (0.001)   0.006*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.011*** (0.001) -0.011***    (0.001)     0.015*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.001) 
Export-share -0.020*** (0.004) -0.017***    (0.004)    -0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
R&D/sales   -0.236***    (0.031)       0.062*** (0.023) 
Rsq. 0.200  0.202  0.168  0.169  
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of young highly educated workers  
Constant -0.046 (0.061) -0.043 (0.061) 0.158*** (0.031) 0.157*** (0.031) 
Log. Capital -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. 0.013*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
Exp-share 0.034*** (0.003) 0.029*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 
R&D/sales   0.356*** (0.025)   -0.043**    (0.018)    
Rsq. 0.207  0.214  0.014  0.015  
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of old less educated workers  
Constant 0.440*** (0.072) 0.438*** (0.071) 0.424*** (0.035) 0.423*** (0.035) 
Log. Capital 0.006*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.009*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
Exp-share -0.018*** (0.003) -0.016*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
R&D/sales   -0.191*** (0.029)   -0.027     (0.021)     
Rsq. 0.144  0.146  0.122  0.122  
Dependent variable: Wage bill share of old highly educated workers  
Constant -0.013 (0.046) -0.013 (0.046) 0.156*** (0.025) 0.157*** (0.025) 
Log. Capital 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) -0.002** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
Exp-share 0.005** (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
R&D/sales   0.071*** (0.018)   0.008    (0.015)      
Rsq. 0.219  0.219  0.0811  0.081  
Time dummies yes   yes   yes   yes   
Region dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Dummies yes  yes  no  no  
Plant fixed effects no  no  yes  yes  
Observations 22859   22859   22859   22859   
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Tables 5 Additional Regressions (R&D sample) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Young.less ed. coef se coef se 
Log(w1/w4)   0.112*** (0.007) 
Log(w2/w4)   -0.052*** (0.004) 
Log(w3/w4)   -0.029*** (0.007) 
Log. Capital 0.009*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. 0.015*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.001) 
Export-share -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
R&D/sales 0.036 (0.019) 0.034 (0.019) 
Rsq. (within) 0.262  0.288  
young.highly  ed.     
log(w1/w4)   -0.059*** (0.005) 
log(w2/w4)   0.100*** (0.003) 
log(w3/w4)   -0.031**** (0.005) 
Log. Capital 0.003*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Export-share -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
R&D/sales -0.021 (0.015) -0.022 (0.015) 
Rsq. (within) 0.028  0.106  
old less ed.     
log(w1/w4)   -0.036*** (0.006) 
log(w2/w4)   -0.010*** (0.003) 
log(w3/w4)   0.079*** (0.006) 
Log. Capital -0.008*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
Export-share 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
R&D/sales -0.021 (0.017) -0.019 (0.017) 
Rsq. (within) 0.188  0.209  
old highly ed.     
log(w1/w4)   -0.017*** (0.005) 
log(w2/w4)   -0.037*** (0.003) 
log(w3/w4)   -0.019*** (0.005) 
Log. Capital -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
Log. Value add. -0.007*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
Export-share 0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
R&D/sales 0.006 (0.014) 0.006 (0.013) 
Rsq. (within) 0.134  0.229  
Time dummies Yes  Yes  
Region dummies Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies No  No  
Plant fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Observations. 16653  16653  
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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III The Eﬀect of Foreign Acquisition on
Wages and Skill Composition
Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages
and employment of diﬀerent skill groups using panel data on Finnish
establishments for the years 1988-2001. Exploiting the availability
of rich set of pre-acquisition controls, we use various regression and
propensity score matching methods, including diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
matching. The results indicate that foreign acquisition has a positive
eﬀect on wages. The magnitude of this eﬀect increases with the level of
schooling of the workers. The wage increase is not immediate, but hap-
pens within 1-3 years from the acquisition. The results with respect
to employment eﬀects are less clear. While regressions provide evi-
dence that there is no eﬀect on plant’s skill mix, the matching results
indicate that acquired plants reduce, although slightly and slowly, the
share of highly educated workers in their employment.
49
1 Introduction
Several studies have found that there is a positive relationship between firm’s
ownership status and its performance. Foreign-owned firms are larger, more
productive, more skill-intensive and pay higher wages (see e.g. Feliciano and
Lipsey, 1999, Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and
Wright, 2002). Less sure is, however, in what direction the causal relationship
between foreign ownership and the wages works. That is, foreign-owned firms
may be exceptional because foreign firms acquire high wage skill-intensive
firms, or because foreign acquisition has a positive eﬀect on firm’s wages and
skill-intensity. In addition, the possible eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages
might be diﬀerent for workers from diﬀerent skill groups.
This study examines the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on employment and
wages in Finland. The aim is, in particular, to examine whether there are
significant diﬀerences on the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages and em-
ployment of workers from diﬀerent skill groups. Moreover, we aim to put
significant eﬀort to examine whether the relationship between foreign own-
ership and wages or employment is simply a correlation or whether foreign
acquisition itself has an eﬀect on the wages and on the skill mix of plant’s
work force.
We use plant-level panel data with matched information on worker char-
acteristics from Finnish manufacturing for the years 1988-2001. During this
period Finland experienced a high increase in the share of foreign-owned
plants. This increase might partly reflect the global increase in foreign direct
investments and acquisitions. In addition, the period is marked with two
phenomena which might have influenced the increase of the foreign-owned
firms in Finnish labour market. First, Finland experienced a very severe
recession in early 1990’s, where unemployment rate rose from 3 percent in
1990 to 17 percent in 1994. The recession was associated with a rapid re-
structuring of the economy. Second, Finland joined the European Union in
1995.
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We aim to improve the previous literature in three ways: First, we use
unique plant-level panel data with matched information on employee char-
acteristics by skill groups. These data allow us to examine whether the eﬀect
of foreign acquisition on employment and wages varies by the educational
level of the workers. In addition, the data allow us to control for rich set
of pre-acquisition characteristics of the plants, including a large number of
employee characteristics, and thus to study whether the change in the own-
ership might influence the changes in the average characteristics of plant’s
employees. We can thus disentangle the eﬀect of foreign ownership on wages
from the eﬀect on the quality of the labour force.
Second, in addition to standard regression techniques we use various
propensity score matching methods, including diﬀerence-in diﬀerences match-
ing introduced in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). The central idea in
the matching methods is to base the estimation on a very careful matching
of cases and controls using a rich set of observable characteristics. This is
a way to make sure we use a suitable comparison group and take into ac-
count all the possible observable factors that aﬀect the selection of plants for
acquisition by foreign firm.
Third, the changes in employment and wages that are caused by foreign
acquisition might not happen instantly. It is well known that there are im-
portant costs in both hiring and firing of workers, and these costs might vary
by the skill level of the workers. These adjustment costs mean that changes
in labour demand or in average wages do not happen instantly. We take
this into account and examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages and
employment in diﬀerent periods after acquisition.
The results from both matching and regression indicate that foreign ac-
quisition has a positive eﬀect on wages of all skill groups in domestic plants.
The wage increase is not immediate, but happens within 1-3 years from the
acquisition. The magnitude of this eﬀect increases with the level of school-
ing of the workers. The result of the employment eﬀect are less clear. The
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regression analysis using the whole sample indicates that foreign acquisition
does not have an eﬀect on the share of highly educated workers in plant’s
workforce. However, the matching results indicate that acquired plants re-
duce, although slightly and slowly, the share of highly educated workers in
their employment. Thus, it seems that foreign owners decrease the number
of highly educated workers in their new plants. However, the highly educated
workers who remain in acquired plants are paid clearly more than identical
workers in domestically-owned plants.
The paper is organized as follows: Next section briefly describes the the-
oretical background for the analysis and reviews some previous empirical
findings. Third section describes the statistical framework. Fourth section
presents the data sets. Fifth section provides the results. The last section
concludes the paper.
2 Background and Previous Literature
2.1 Theoretical background
The modern theory of multinational enterprises (MNEs), the so called in-
dustrial organization -approach to international trade, suggests that foreign-
owned firms are diﬀerent from domestically-owned firms simply because they
need to be diﬀerent. If foreign multinational enterprises are exactly identi-
cal to domestic firms, they will not find it profitable to enter the domestic
market. Foreign firms presumably operates against disadvantages such as
inferior knowledge of local markets and tastes and inferior connections with
local politicians and financial institutions. In order to overcome these draw-
backs, the foreign firm must possess some firm-specific advantages, such as
superior technology, that overcome the inherent advantages of local firms1.
If multinationals do indeed possess such assets, then we would expect
1See e.g. Caves, 1996, Markusen 1995, Aitken and Harrison, 1996, Bloningen and
Slaughter, 2001 and Barrell and Nigel, 1997
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foreign-ownership to aﬀect wages in several diﬀerent ways. First, these as-
sets are assumed to raise the productivity of the firms. Assuming that work-
ers can bargain over any surplus generated, higher productivity would be
expected to generate a greater surplus and hence higher wage rates. Sec-
ond, workers employed by the multinational enterprise acquire knowledge
of the superior technology and can spread their knowledge to local firms by
switching employers. Foreign-owned firms might pay higher wages in order to
prevent workers from moving to local competitor and spillover this superior
knowledge2.
A firm-specific human capital accumulation model by Görg (2001) of-
fers a third explanation for higher wages paid by foreign-owned firms. The
knowledge-based assets that foreign-owned firms are assumed to have, re-
quire better trained workers. This implies that firm-specific training is more
productive in foreign firms relative to domestic firms. As a result workers in
foreign-owned firms are assumed to have steeper wage profiles than workers
in domestic firms. Fourth, foreign-firms might have size and communication
problems compared to domestic firms. Foreign firms might seek industrial
relations peace with higher wages (see e.g. Conyon et al., 2002).
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for higher wages paid by foreign
firms is that these firms employ higher quality workers than domestic-owned
firms. Theoretical work on multinational enterprises and skill demand to
date has been based largely upon general equilibrium trade models with
endownment-driven comparative advantage. These models provide mixed
results, variously suggesting that greater MNE activity can either raise
or lower the skill mix3. It is well-established fact, however, that most of
the foreign investments flows are between pairs of developed countries (e.g.
Markusen, 1995). Theory does not provide a straight-forward answer to the
question what is the eﬀect foreign-ownership on the relative wages and on
2See Fosfure et al. 2001.
3see e.g. Markusen, 1995, Markusen and Venables, 1998, and Feenstra and Hanson,
1997.
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the skill demand between countries of similar skill-mix. There are, however,
indirect ways how multinational enterprises can influence the skill demand
within a country, industry or a plant. Foreign firms entering an industry will
accelerate the rate of technological progress. This, in turn, will increase the
relative demand and wages for highly skilled workers in that industry4. One
argument for the plant-level changes in relative wages and demand for skills,
is that foreign acquisition is assumed to be associated with reorganization of
existing capacity and introduction of new ideas (Markusen, 1995). The or-
ganizational change is expected to raise the demand for skilled labour, since
skills raise the ability to handle new information, and thus, the skill level of
workers tends to reduce the costs of decentralization5.
2.2 Previous empirical evidence
There exits a growing body of literature, which examine empirically the re-
lationship between foreign ownership and wages. Among the first ones is the
study by Aitken et al. (1997), which examines the relationship between wages
and foreign investments in Mexico, Venezuela and United States using data
at industry-district-level. They found that a higher level of foreign ownership
in an industry and location was associated with higher wages in all of these
countries. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) replicate the results of significant pos-
itive wage premium of foreign ownership for US using also industry-regional
level data. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001) use cross-section plant-level data from
Indonesia manufacturing and find that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages
even after controlling for plant characteristics, industry and location.
However, without establishment-level panel data it is impossible to exam-
ine, whether this finding is due to unobservable diﬀerences between foreign-
and domestically-owned plants, or whether the ownership status itself influ-
ences wages. Foreign-owned establishments might pay higher wages than
4see Barrel and Pain, (1997), and Taylor and Driﬃled, (2004).
5see Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2001
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domestically-owned establishment simply because foreign firms took over
high-wage local establishments. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) attempt to deal
with the problem by using panel data on Indonesian establishments. They
find strong increase in both white- and blue- collar wages after foreign takeovers.
The regression results without establishment- fixed eﬀects show that foreign-
owned establishments paid 29 percent more for blue-collar workers and 43
percent more white- collar workers than domestically- owned establishment
with similar characteristics. If plant fixed eﬀects were introduced, and thus,
the permanent establishment-specific unobserved heterogeneity controlled
for, the remaining diﬀerentials are 10 per cent and 21 per cent.
Conyon et al. (2002) examine the productivity- and wage- eﬀects of for-
eign acquisitions in the United Kingdom using establishment-level panel data
for the period 1988-94. They use the foreign-ownership change (acquisition)
to control for unobserved diﬀerences between plants. They find that firms
which are acquired by foreign companies pay in average 3,4% higher wages
than domestic firms. However, when productivity is added in the vector of
control variables, the wage premium due to foreign-acquisition disappears.
Almeida (2003) use the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on domestic firms’
wages and skill composition using firm-level panel data with matched worker-
information for Portugal for the period 1991-98. She finds that there exists an
important selection eﬀect as foreigners "cherry pick" the domestic firms that
pay higher wages and employ more educated workers. Wages did however
increase somewhat after the acquisition The increase was highest for highly
educated workers (13%), compared to that for medium-and low educated
ones (5% and 3% respectively). These values are again substantially smaller
than the ones she got from cross section.
Girma (2003) investigate the eﬀects of the foreign takeovers on domestic
skilled and unskilled wages using establishment-level panel data for UK. He
finds that skilled workers, on average, experience a post-acquisition increase
in the wage rate following an acquisition by a US firm, while no such eﬀect is
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found following acquisition by EU firms or other nationalities. For unskilled
workers, there are positive post acquisition wage eﬀects from takeovers by
EU firms in the electronics industry and US firms in the food industry.
Very recent study by Martins (2004) examine the eﬀect of foreign owner-
ship on wages using matched worker-establishment panel data for Portugal
from 1991-99. Using OLS, he finds that foreign firms pay higher wages, even
when firm and worker controls are added. However, this results does not hold
with diﬀerent econometric methods. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis,
both regression and matching, provide evidence that workers in firms that
were acquired by foreign investors experience lower wage growth than the
ones who were employed in firms that did not change their ownership status.
Studies which examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on relative demand
for diﬀerent skill groups are much less numerous and results less clear. Blonin-
gen et Slaughter (2001) examine the impact of inward FDI flows and rising
foreign-aﬃliate presence on US skill upgrading using four-digit industry-level
data for manufacturing from 1977 to 1994. They results suggest zero or even
negative correlation between increases in foreign-aﬃliate activity and skill up-
grading in the United States during the period. Taylor and Driﬃeld (2004)
use similar framework with industry-level panel data to examine the role of
foreign direct investment on wage inequality in UK. They find that FDI has
significantly contributed to increase in the skilled wage bill share.
Interestingly, the studies that use establishment level-panel data seem
to find either negative or zero eﬀect of foreign ownership on demand for
highly educated workers. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) examine the changes
in employment after takeovers and find a decrease in number of white-collar
workers and a strong increase in blue-collar workers. Almeida (2003) find
no significant changes in the workforce’s skill composition following a foreign
acquisition for Portuguese establishments.
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3 Statistical Framework
The goal in this study is to examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on the
employment and wages of diﬀerent skill groups in the acquired plants. We
borrow the terminology from program evaluation literature (see e.g. Heck-
man et al., 1999). We define foreign acquisition as the ”treatment”, D.
D = 1 denotes the treatment state, plant was acquired by a foreign firm,
and D = 0 denotes the non-treatment state, plant was not acquired by for-
eign firm. Y (D) is the outcome associated with each state, e.g. wages and
the employment share of diﬀerent skill groups. Treatment group consist of
plants that were acquired by foreign firm. Control group consist of plants
that remained domestically-owned. We use various regression and matching
methods to examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on the outcomes.
3.1 Regression model
We begin by estimating the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on post-acquisition
outcome using a linear regression model. The regression model can be de-
scribe as
Yi,t = Xi,tβ +
2X
j=0
Di,t−jδj+1 + αi + ζt + µi,t (1)
where Yi,t,is the variable that describes the outcome of the plant i in period
t (e.g. log. wages or employment share of diﬀerent skill groups), Xi,t is a
vector of observable plant, industry and local labor market characteristics,
and Di,t−j is dummy variables indicating plant’s foreign ownership status at
t−j, αi is the plant-fixed eﬀect, and ζt is the year dummy. The interpretation
of the estimated coeﬃcients on the foreign ownership status, δ1 to δ3, is
the following. Since the model includes plant-fixed eﬀects, we are using
the within-plants variation only, and thus the coeﬃcient on the ownership
variable can be interpreted as the eﬀect of foreign acquisition. The eﬀect
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of acquisition that happened within one year from the observation date is
captured by the variable Di,t, the eﬀect of acquisition that happened two
years ago is captured by the variable Di,t−1, and the eﬀect of acquisition
that happened three years ago is captured by the variable Di,t−2. Thus the
estimated regression model gives an estimate for the foreign acquisition on
outcome immediately after acquisition, 1-2 years after acquisition, and 2-3
years after acquisition. This allows us to see whether the possible changes
in wages and employment of acquired plants happen instantly or after some
adjustment period.
3.2 Matching estimators
Next we estimate the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on employment and wages
using diﬀerent propensity score matching methods. The central idea in
matching methods is that the bias, which arises due to diﬀerences in the
characteristics of treatment and control group, is reduced when the compar-
ison of outcomes is performed using treated and control subjects who are
as similar as possible on their observable characteristics. The key assump-
tion is the conditional independence assumption. This assumption requires
that conditional on observables characteristics, X, the treatment and non-
treatment outcomes, Y (1), Y (0), and the treatment status, D, are indepen-
dent. The propensity score matching method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)
proposes a way to summarize the vector of pre-treatment characteristics, X,
into single-index variable. The propensity score is the conditional probability
of receiving treatment given the pre-treatment variables
We begin by estimating the propensity score. In this study the propensity
score is the conditional probability for a plant of being acquired by a foreign
firm. The binary-choice model which describes the probability of foreign
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if βXit−1 + ζt + γj + ηr + εit > 0
otherwise
(2)
where Dit is a binary variable which defines plant’s acquisition status at
year t. D = 1, if a plant which was domestically-owned in year t − 1 is
foreign-owned at year t, and D = 0 if which was domestically-owned in year
t − 1 is not foreign-owned at year t. Xit−1 is a vector of factors that aﬀect
plant’s probability of being acquired by a foreign firm6. Since the acquisition
happens between t and t− 1 we use the characteristics from period t− 1 as
the pre-treatment variables. In order to control for unobservable common
industry, region and time eﬀects the model also includes full set of controls
for fixed industry (γj), region (ηr), and time-eﬀects (ζt).
The next step is to use the estimated propensity score in order to estimate
the average eﬀect of foreign acquisition7. The idea is to use the outcome
of the non-treated observations (plants that remained domestically-owned)
with similar propensity score to proxy, what would have happened to treated
observations (acquired plants) in the non-treatment situation. The Average
eﬀect of Treatment on Treated (ATT) for all type of cross section -matching
estimators can be written as












where Y (1)i is the treatment outcome for unit (plant) i, Y (0)j is the non-
treatment outcome for unit j (comparison group outcome), NT is the number
of units in treatment group, T , and C denotes the set of control units, SP
6The sample consists only of plants which were domestic-owned in year t-1. Thus, the
acquisition status is the same as ownership-status.
7This is after testing that the balancing property holds, i.e. whether observations
with the same propensity score have the same distribution of observable characteristics
independently of treatment status. We use algoritm silimar to Ichino and Becker (2003).
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denotes the region of common support and ωij is the weight that is used to
match control units with each treatment unit.
Matching methods rely crucially on the assumption that there are no un-
observable factors which aﬀects both the selection into treatment and the
outcome. In order to control for the possible bias that is due to selection
on unobservables we compute the average eﬀect of treatment on treated us-
ing the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching estimator (Heckman, Ichimura and
Todd, 1997). The diﬀerence-in diﬀerences matching estimator compares the
diﬀerence in the outcome before and after the treatment of treated units with
the diﬀerence in the outcome of the non-treated units in the same period.
This estimator allows for the existence of unobserved time-invariant factors
that aﬀect the selection. The assumption that is required for the consistency
of the estimator is that conditional on observables the growth in the out-
come for the non-treatment units is the same as the growth in the outcome
for the treatment units would have been in the absence of the treatment.










(Y (0)jt − Y (0)jt−1)
#
(4)
where t is the post acquisition time period and t − 1 is the pre-acquisition
time period.
In both the cross section and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching we use
two diﬀerent methods to match the treatment and control group observa-
tions. These methods diﬀer in the weights, ωij,they attach to members of
the comparison group. The nearest neighbor matching method finds for each
treated unit, T , the control unit, C, which propensity score is nearest. The
matching is done with replacement, i.e. the same nearest control unit can be
used many times (to be matched with several treatment units). The Kernel
matching estimator matches every treated unit with a weighted average of
all control units with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance
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between treated and control units8.
4 Data
4.1 Description of the data sources
The main data source in this study is the Plant Level Employment Sta-
tistics Data on Average Characteristics (PESA). It is a longitudinal data
on Finnish establishments, with linked information on worker characteristics
aggregated on the establishment level by skill groups. The linked worker
characteristics-establishment data are constructed by linking data on work-
ers in the Employment Statistics database of Statistics Finland to data on
plants of Business Registers and Industrial Statistics. The data set covers
all the private sector establishments (except traﬃc and construction) with
more than two workers. The time period is 1988-2001. The number of es-
tablishments is around 50 000 each year. Employees are aggregated into 70
diﬀerent skill groups by education, age and sex. The data contains informa-
tion on aggregate worker characteristics for each skill group, such as number
of people, average monthly wage, general working experience, tenure and
education. The data set does not have any specific information on establish-
ment characteristics. However, each enterprise and its plant, has a unique
identification code, which can be used to match additional information from
other statistics and registers on the linked worker-plant database.
Another major data source used in the analysis is the Longitudinal Data
on Plants in Manufacturing (LDPM), which is constructed especially for
research purposes from Annual Industry Statistics. For the period 1974-1994
it covers all manufacturing sector plants with more than 5 workers and for the




, where G(.) is a kernel
function and hn is a bandwidth parameter.
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period 1995-2001 it covers the plants of firms employing at least 20 persons.
The number of plants varies between 9000 and 3000 each year.
For the purpose of our analysis we form data set by linking the PESA
data set with LDPM data. The linked data set covers manufacturing plants
from the years 1988-2001. As the LDPM data set for the years 1995-2001
consists only the plants of firms that employ at least 20 persons, the number
of observations per year is considerably smaller after 1994. In order to have
consistent data set we thus restrict the sample to cover only plants of the
firms which employ at least 20 workers. This sample consists 46 290 plant-
year observations.
The variables describing the employee characteristics are obtained from
the PESA data set. All this variables are skill-group averages in the establish-
ment. The main variables describing employee characteristics are: monthly
wage, employment, wage bill share, tenure, age, and education. Employment
describes the number of workers in a skill group working in an establishment
during the last week of the year. The average monthly wage is calculated as
the skill group average of the average monthly wages of individual workers
who were employed in the establishment during the last week of the year. The
average monthly wage for each individual employed is calculated by dividing
the wage income by months of employment. The monthly wage bill for each
skill group is formed by multiplying the average monthly wage of the skill
group by the number of workers in the skill group employed in the estab-
lishment during the last week of the year. Age is the average age of workers
in the skill group employed in the establishment during the last week of the
year. Average education is calculated as the average of the years of schooling
for each skill group, and average tenure is calculated as the average of the
months of tenure in the skill group.
Variables describing the plant characteristics, including the foreign own-
ership status, are from the LDPM data set. The variable defining foreign
ownership status is created using the information on the share of foreign
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owners of the plant. An establishment is labeled as foreign-owned if the
share of foreign ownership is at least 20%9. The other main establishment
characteristics used in the analysis are sales, real value added, real capital
stock and exports.
We use two diﬀerent samples in this analysis. In the basic regressions (de-
scribed in section 3.1.) we use all the observations from the matched PESA-
LDPM data for which we have information on the characteristics needed
in regressions. These include the information on plant’s foreign ownership
status in the current year, and in the two previous observation years. This
sample consists of plants from the years 1990-2001. In the matching analysis
we use diﬀerent sample. The construction of this sample is described below.
4.2 Matching Sample Construction
The sample of plants that was used in the matching analysis in this article is
constructed as follows. From the overall data base, we first identify plants,
which we can observe in the data set at least two consecutive years before the
current year, and which were domestically-owned in those years. We label
the current year as the period 1. The previous years are labeled as 0 and
−1, and the following years 2 and 3. We divide these plants into treatment
and control groups. The treatment group is the plants which were acquired
by foreign firms in the period between 0 and 1. The comparison group
is the plants which remained domestically-owned until the period 3. We
remove from the sample all the plants that do not have information on all the
observational characteristics that are used in matching and regressions. Since
in matching we are using information from two years before the acquisition,
and examine the outcome until the third year after acquisition, we can use
9We have two main reasons to us the 20 % threshold. First, Most of the previous
studies label establishment as foreign-owned if 10 % or 20% of its ownership is foreign
(e.g. Bloningen and Slaughter, 2001, Aitken Harrisen and Lipsey, 1995, Almeida, 2003).
Second, most (88 %.) of the plants in our data with at least 20 % foreign ownership have
more than 50% foreign ownership. We use 50% threshold for robustness checking.
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only information on plants that we can observe for at least five consecutive
years. The final matching sample consists of 14 762 observations. It covers
the years 1990-1999. The number of foreign-acquired plants is 355. The
number of observations in control group is 14 407 .
5 Results
5.1 Aggregate Trends in Finland during 1988-2001
The period from 1988 to 2001 was marked with several exceptional phenom-
ena in Finland. During the early 1990 Finland experienced several adverse
economic shocks, including the end of eastern trade induced by the collapse
of Soviet Union, which partly led to exceptionally severe recession in early
1990’s. The recession hit all the industries and regions and aﬀected workers
in all skill groups. The total unemployment rate rose rapidly from 3 % to
17% within three years. The period was also marked by a significant changes
in the production structure. The recovery period was marked by a growth of
new industries: namely of export oriented high-tech manufacturing sector.
In the beginning of 1995 Finland joined the European Union. The foreign
direct investments to Finland increased significantly during the whole period.
Most of these investments were from other EU countries (see figure 1).
5.2 Descriptive Evidence
The results are reported in appendix. Table 1 reports the share of foreign-
owned plants in the LDPM/PESA in 1989-2001 and the share of workers
employed in foreign-owned plants in the data set. The share of foreign-owned
plants has increased significantly during the period in Finland. While in the
late 1980’s only around 4% of plants were foreign-owned, in 2001 the share
is 19%. Table 1 also shows how much of this increase is due to takeovers of
domestic plants by foreign firms (acquisitions), and how much due to new
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plants started-up by foreign firms. Most of the increase in the number of
foreign-owned plants is due to acquisitions. Table 2 shows that the increase
in the share in the employment of foreign-owned plants has been even more
rapid than the increase in the number of plants, from 5 to 22%. Acquisitions
contribute for most of the increase.
Before presenting the matching and regression results it is interesting to
see whether there are significant diﬀerences between wages and other ob-
servable characteristics of foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants in
Finnish manufacturing. Table 3 reports the mean values of the main charac-
teristics for the foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants in the sample.
The results imply that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages for both highly
and less educated workers than domestically-owned plants10. But they also
have other observable characteristics which can explain higher wages: they
are bigger, older, employ more skilled workers, are more likely to export, or
to have R&D activity. The average employee characteristics of these plants
vary as well. Foreign-owned plants employ workers who are older, have more
years of schooling, and who have a longer tenure.
Evidently, this does not tell us whether the foreign-owned plants were
diﬀerent from the domestic-owned plants already before the acquisition hap-
pened. Table 4 describes the diﬀerences in the observable characteristics of
acquired and non-acquired plants from the pre-and post-acquisition periods.
The sample consists of plants for which we can find information on observ-
able characteristics 2 years before the possible acquisition and 3 years after
the acquisition. The pre-acquisition periods are marked as -1,0, and post-
acquisition periods, 1,2, and 3. The acquisition happens between 0 and 1.
The result shows that the plants which were acquired by foreign firms had
characteristics which are associated with higher wages even before the acqui-
sition happened. They are bigger, have higher sales, they have larger share of
10”Less educated” refers to people with basic, vocational and lower secondary educa-
tion. ”Highly educated” refers to people with educational qualifications from colleges,
polytechnics or universities.
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exports from they total sales, they employ workers that are older, have more
schooling and longer tenure. In addition they employ less females and are
more capital-intensive and productive. The diﬀerence in the characteristics
remains after acquisition.
Next rows in table 4 report the diﬀerences in the four diﬀerent outcome
measures from the two periods preceding acquisition until the third year af-
ter acquisition. The outcome measures are: 1) logarithm of average wage of
less educated workers in the plant, 2) logarithm of average wage of highly
educated workers in the plant, 3) share of highly educated workers in em-
ployment, and 4) share of highly educated workers in total wage bill. The
result show that foreign acquired plants pay higher wages for both highly
and less educated workers even before the acquisition occurs. The diﬀerence
in the wages increases after acquisition and continues increasing until second
year after acquisition for less educated workers, and until third year after ac-
quisition for highly educated workers. The acquired plants also employ more
highly educated workers before they become foreign owned. The diﬀerence
remains after acquisition, but diminishes in time.
5.3 Regression results for the whole sample
As shown in table 3, foreign-owned plants in Finland pay higher wages than
domestically-owned plants, but also have other characteristics that are re-
lated to higher wages. We now ask whether foreign-owned plants pay higher
wages given these characteristics, industry, and location. We begin our analy-
sis by running an OLS regression on wages of diﬀerent skill groups. Results
are reported in table 5. The first column (model 1) is an OLS specification,
where we control for various plant-, and worker-characteristics11. In addition
the specification includes controls for common time-, region-, and two-digit-
industry- eﬀects. Consistently with previous studies, the pooled OLS result
show that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages even after controlling for
11The worker characteristics are skill-group averages at plant level.
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the plant-, and worker-characteristics, and for industry, region and common
time eﬀects. The foreign wage premium is higher for highly educated workers
than for less educated workers: 0,054 and 0,032 respectively.
Regression analysis with rich set of controls for plant- and worker- char-
acteristics within regions and within industries is likely to eliminate some
of the bias that arises from the result of the possible selection of high-wage
establishments for acquisition by foreign-firms. However, one possible source
of bias remains. That is that there may be some unmeasured characteristics
that are associated with both high wages and foreign ownership. In order
to control for these characteristics model 2 includes plant-specific fixed ef-
fects. If plant fixed-eﬀects are introduced the remaining foreign-ownership
wage premium is reduced to 0,011 for less educated workers and to 0,014 for
highly educated workers.
The last columns in table 5 (model 3) report the results for a specifi-
cation which includes plant fixed-eﬀects and foreign ownership dummies for
current period, and for two previous periods. This means that plant’s foreign-
ownership status is allowed to aﬀect wages in the current year, and also in
the two years after the change in ownership (acquisition) has happened. The
results indicate that the eﬀect of foreign ownership grows in time. For less
educated workers the eﬀect of foreign ownership is strongest in the second
year after acquisition, and for the highly educated workers on the third year.
Table 6 reports the results of the eﬀect of foreign ownership on the share
of highly educated workers in plant’s employment and total wage bill. The
results of the diﬀerent specification, with or without plant fixed eﬀects, indi-
cate that foreign-owned plants do not employ more highly educated workers,
once we take into account various plant-, and workers-characteristics, and the
fixed location-, industry- and time-eﬀects that might aﬀect the skill demand.
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5.4 Matching and regression results for the matching
sample
The next important issue is whether the eﬀect of foreign acquisition is hetero-
geneous with respect to observational characteristics. If this is the case, we
must make sure a suitable comparison group exits. One way to address this
problem is to use propensity score matching methods. The crucial require-
ment in matching is, that we take into account all the possible observational
characteristics that might aﬀect both the probability of being acquired by
foreign firm and the outcome. In order to ensure this we will use rich set of
worker, plant and region characteristics from diﬀerent pre-acquisition peri-
ods. Since we want to examine how the eﬀect of foreign acquisition evaluates
in time we need to have information of the outcome variables from 3 post-
acquisition periods. These requirements mean that the sample that can be
used in matching is considerable smaller, as described in section 4.2. In
this section we report the regression and matching results for this matching
sample.
The propensity score, the conditional probability of being acquired by
foreign firm, is estimated by parametric probit model. The results of the
probit estimations are presented in table 7. The dependent variable gets
value one if the plant was acquired by foreign firm between periods 0 and
1. The variables which are use to predict the probability of being acquired
by a foreign firm, i.e. pre-treatment variables, are from the pre-acquisition
periods 0 and −1. The pre-acquisition characteristics from period 0 include
plant size (number of employees), squared plant size, logarithm of total sales
of the plant, export/sales ratio and its square, share of exporting plants in
two-digit industry, and share of foreign-owned plants in the two-digit indus-
try, and total sales in the region (to control for the size of the market). The
information from plant average characteristics are from period −1. These
include the average years of schooling of plant’s employees, average age of
plant’s employees, average tenure of plant’s employees and the square of aver-
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age tenure12. In addition the specification includes two-digit region controls,
one-digit industry controls and full set of time dummies.
The estimation results indicate that plant size has a negative eﬀect on the
probability of being acquired by a foreign firm, once plant’s total sales in the
period are taken into account. Plant’s sales have a significant positive impact
on the acquisition probability. If the sales variable is excluded from the re-
gression the plant size variable gets highly positive and significant coeﬃcient.
Plant’s export/sales ratio is positively related to the acquisition probability.
However, the share of exporting plants in an industry is negatively related to
acquisition probability once plant’s own exports are taken into account. This
might indicate that these industries have higher transport costs, and firms
are more likely to acquire plants directly from these industries rather than
decide to trade. The share of foreign-owned plants in industry predicts pos-
itively the likelihood of being acquired. This is expected, since this variable
might capture many unobservable industry-specific factors that lead foreign
firms to acquire plants from these industries. The variable describing sales in
the region, i.e. market size, gets positive but insignificant coeﬃcient. Next
we look at the eﬀect of plant’s average employee characteristics on the acqui-
sition probability. Plants that pay high wages in period −1 are more likely
to end up being foreign owned between 0 and 1. Also plants with highly ed-
ucated and high tenure workers seem to be more attractive for foreign firms.
Workers’ average age decreases the probability of foreign acquisition.
Next we estimate the eﬀect of foreign acquisition using the estimated
propensity score. We begin by estimating the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on
average wages of less educated workers in a plant. The first rows in table
8 show the eﬀect of acquisition on the average wages of the less educated
workers in a plant in the period just following the acquisition, t =1. The
first columns show the results from cross-section matching. That is, the
12_0 in end of the variable refers to period just before acquisition (0), and _1 to period
1-2 years before acquisition (-1).
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dependent variable is the level of the wages in diﬀerent post-acquisition time
periods. As a benchmark we report a results from a regression in the first
column, where the outcome variable is regressed on all the X’s that are used
to estimate the propensity score, and on a dummy which explains whether the
plant is foreign-owned or not. Since the sample only includes the plants that
are domestically-owned or were acquired by foreign firm during the period,
this dummy can also be interpreted as an eﬀect of foreign acquisition. We
impose the common support condition, i.e. include only the observations,
which have the propensity score within the common support region. The
estimated coeﬃcient on foreign-acquisition is again negative -0.009 and not
significantly diﬀerent from zero.
The next two columns present the estimated eﬀects of foreign acquisition
on average wages using diﬀerent matching estimators. The nearest-neighbor
estimator with replacement gives slightly stronger negative eﬀect (-0.028),
but it is still not statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero. Next column
reports the results from Kernel matching. While nearest neighbor matching
uses only those control group observations that are closest to treated units,
Kernel matching uses all the control group observations, but weights each
observation according to its distance from the treated unit. Kernel matching
estimator shows strong positive eﬀect (0.060)13.
The last three columns report the results from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
regression- and matching estimations. The dependent variable is the diﬀer-
ence of the wages between the pre-acquisition period (0) and the diﬀerent
post-acquisition time periods (1 in the first row). The fourth column shows
13We use here Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth 0.06. We also tried other bandwidths,
such as 0.01 and 0.02. With smaller bandwidth choices the kernel estimates became smaller
and less significant and thus, more closer to the nearest neighbour estimates. This makes
sense, since the smaller the bandwidth choice, more weight is put on the control group
observations which have propensity score that is closest to the treated units. The fact that
the bandwidth choice makes a diﬀerence might indicate that the cross-section matching
assumptions do not hold. The bandwidth choice did not have significant eﬀect to the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching estimator.
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the result from regression, where the change in the logarithm of monthly
wages of less educated workers from 0 to 1 is regressed on foreign-ownership
dummy and on all the controls that were used to estimate the propensity
score. The next columns report the results from nearest-neigbour and kernel
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching. The results again provide evidence that
foreign acquisition does not have any significant eﬀect on average wages of
less educated workers. The estimated eﬀect varies from 0.006-0.008. There
seems to be much less diﬀerences between regression, kernel and nearest
neighbor estimates than with cross-section matching estimators. This indi-
cates that the cross-section matching assumptions (conditional independence
assumption) might not hold for our sample, and once the permanent diﬀer-
ences between the plants are taken into account by diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
matching or regression, the result seem to be more robust.
These result do not necessary mean that acquisition does not have any
eﬀect on wages of less educated workers. The changes in employment and
wages that are caused by foreign acquisition might not happen instanta-
neously. Next rows in table 8 report the results on the eﬀect on the wages
of less educated workers in the second year following the acquisition. The
cross-section matching results are still quite unrobust, although clearly more
positive than in the first year. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching and
regression indicate that the foreign acquisition has a positive and highly sig-
nificant eﬀect on the wages of highly educated workers in the second year
after acquisition. The magnitude of the eﬀect varies between 0,029-0,030.
When looking at the wages at the third year after acquisition the result re-
main robust. Less educated workers in plants which were acquired by foreign
firms earn significantly more in the third year after acquisition than workers
in plants that remained domestic during that time. The diﬀerence in the
wages has, however, decreased a bit from the previous year.
Table 9 reports the results of the eﬀect of foreign acquisition for highly
educated workers. Now both the matching and regression indicate positive,
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although mostly not significant eﬀect on the wages already at the year imme-
diately after acquisition. The eﬀect vary from 0,013 to 0,036. As in previous
table, the diﬀerence-in diﬀerences results are more robust to diﬀerent esti-
mation methods. In the second year, this eﬀect is clearly stronger, varying
from 0.019 to 0.046 and often statistically significant. The results for the
third year indicate more robust results. The eﬀect of foreign acquisition on
wages of highly educated workers in the third year after acquisition is between
0.026-0.056. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models indicate highly significant
and robust eﬀect that varies between 0,031-0,035. Thus, it seems that ac-
quisition raises the wages of highly educated workers, but this raise is not
immediate.
Table 10 shows the results of the eﬀect of the acquisition on the share
of highly educated workers in plant’s employment. The result indicate that
foreign acquisition does not have any eﬀect on the skill composition of plant’s
workforce in the first two years after acquisition. In the third year, the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results indicate significant and negative eﬀect of the
foreign acquisition. Table 11 replicates the results using the share of highly
educated workers in total wage bill as the outcome variable. The result
indicate again no significant eﬀect on the first two years, but negative eﬀect
on the third year. The magnitude of the eﬀect is slightly lower than for the
employment share, which might indicate that the relative increase in high
skilled wages compensates the drop in total employment share.
Finally we look whether there is even more heterogeneity in wage eﬀects
according to the educational level of workers. Table 12 reports the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences matching results for the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages
of four diﬀerent educational categories: basic, vocational, lower university,
and higher university. The results again indicate that the magnitude of the
eﬀect depends on worker’s educational level. There is a clear increase in the
magnitude of the eﬀect by the level of schooling of the workers.
All in all, the result indicate that there is a clear positive eﬀect of foreign
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acquisition on the wages, but this raise in wages is not immediate. The eﬀects
seems to be stronger, and more long-lasting for highly educated workers. This
might not indicate that acquisition increases demand for skills, since the
acquired plants are decreasing the share of highly educated workers in their
workforce. The decrease in the employment share is however very modest.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages and employ-
ment of diﬀerent skill groups using panel data on Finnish establishments for
the years 1988-2001. Exploiting the availability of rich set of pre-acquisition
controls, we use various regression and propensity score matching methods,
including diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching.
Both regression and matching results indicate that foreign acquisition
has a positive eﬀect on wages. The magnitude of this eﬀect increases with
the level of schooling of the workers. Moreover, the wage increase is not
immediate, but happens within 1-3 years from the acquisition. This can be
due to various reasons. First, part of the foreign wage premium might be
explained by the fact that foreign-firms do more on-the-job-training, and thus
the wage growth in foreign-owned firms is higher. This indicates that wages in
plants that are acquired by foreign-owned firms do not raise immediately, but
within some years after acquisition. The finding that wages seem to rise more
rapidly for highly educated workers might indicate bigger returns to training
for highly educated workers14. Second reason for the fact that wages do not
rise immediately, is that acquisition can involve organizational changes within
plant, and the implementation of new work practises might take time. Third,
the changes in average wages can be associated with changes of employment
composition of plant’s workforce. Since there are adjustment costs associated
with these employment changes, they are not likely to be immediate. Finally,
14See e.g. see Altonji and Spletzer (1991).
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due to possible measurement problems, the exact timing of the acquisition
might be uncertain.
The result on employment eﬀect are less clear. The regression analysis
using the whole sample indicates that foreign acquisition does not have any
eﬀect on the share of highly educated workers in plant’s workforce. However,
the matching results indicate that acquired plants reduce, although slightly
and slowly, the share of highly educated workers in their employment. This
finding, although quite surprising, is in line with findings from the few earlier
studies that have examined the changed in skill mix after acquisition (Lipsey
and Sjöholm (2002), Almeida (2003)). It seems that foreign owners decrease
the number of highly educated workers in their new plants, but the highly
educated workers who remain are paid clearly more than identical workers in
domestically-owned plants. The fact that these changes do not show before
the third period after acquisition might indicate that there are important
adjustment costs related to hiring and firing of workers.
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APPENDIX TO SECTION III 
 
Figure 1 Foreign direct investment in Finland in 1991-2001, stock of investment at 
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Table 1 Number and share of foreign-owned plants in the sample of Finnish manufacturing plants in 1989-2001 
 
 All plants Foreign-owned plants 
 All All foreign owned Foreign owned at t-1 New plants Acquired plants 
Year  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  
1989 3775 154 4.08 114 3.02 32 0.85 8 0.21 
1990 3941 173 4.39 126 3.20 27 0.69 20 0.51 
1991 3758 174 4.63 138 3.67 23 0.61 13 0.35 
1992 3390 148 4.37 120 3.54 13 0.38 15 0.44 
1993 3263 290 8.89 116 3.56 52 1.59 122 3.74 
1994 3364 323 9.60 246 7.31 33 0.98 44 1.31 
1995 2951 294 9.96 261 8.84 20 0.68 13 0.44 
1996 2994 298 9.95 261 8.72 18 0.60 19 0.63 
1997 2966 410 13.82 261 8.80 23 0.78 126 4.25 
1998 3036 467 15.38 298 9.82 47 1.55 122 4.02 
1999 3000 492 16.40 342 11.40 29 0.97 121 4.03 
2000 3016 469 15.55 395 13.10 47 1.56 27 0.90 
2001 3028 585 19.32 412 13.61 65 2.15 108 3.57 
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Table 2 Employment in foreign-owned plants in the sample of Finnish manufacturing plants in 1989-2001 
 
 All plants Foreign-owned plants 
 All All foreign owned Foreign owned at t-1 New plants Acquired plants 
Year  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  
1989 299516 14020 4.68 10398 3.47 3400 1.14 222 0.07 
1990 313516 17708 5.65 12456 3.97 1492 0.48 3757 1.20 
1991 274683 13823 5.03 11533 4.20 599 0.22 1691 0.62 
1992 255073 10597 4.15 8631 3.38 577 0.23 1389 0.54 
1993 244972 14982 6.12 9156 3.74 1347 0.55 4476 1.83 
1994 257383 19720 7.66 14527 5.64 1524 0.59 3669 1.43 
1995 253064 19818 7.83 17783 7.03 554 0.22 1481 0.59 
1996 255878 21063 8.23 16907 6.61 1036 0.40 3120 1.22 
1997 269185 43647 16.21 21006 7.80 994 0.37 21647 8.04 
1998 275450 40728 14.79 27556 10.00 2051 0.74 11118 4.04 
1999 257901 49861 19.33 32097 12.45 1496 0.58 16268 6.31 
2000 263745 50370 19.10 44338 16.81 2068 0.78 3964 1.50 




Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for the sample  
 
 Domestic-owned Foreign-owned 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
     
Plant size 35017 90.51 3337 100.40 
Plant age 19019 8.74 1986 9.12 
Wage 34730 11821 3312 13406 
Wage less ed. 33349 10822 3107 11882 
Wage highly ed. 16112 16363 2014 17951 
Wage bll 35017 1145986 3337 1349801 
Av. Schooling 34730 11.54 3312 11.77 
Av. Tenure 34730 10.53 3312 11.63 
Av. Age of employees 34730 39.54 3312 40.32 
Share of highly educated 34730 0.21 3312 0.26 
Share of high.ed. in wage bill 34730 0.25 3312 0.31 
Share of female 34730 0.31 3312 0.29 
Sales 38618 17244 3769 20245 
Capital/Labour- ratio 29892 153.59 2904 118.13 
Value Added 34620 11177 3298 14497 
Export share 36037 0.20 3584 0.25 
R&D unit 39382 0.00 3880 0.01 
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Table 4 Difference in the characteristics of Acquired and Non-acquired plants 
before and after acquisition   
 
 Acquired plants Non-acquired plants Difference 
Variable  Obs Mean Obs Mean  % 
Pre-acquisition characteristics (from t=0) 
Size_0 355 177.07 14407 116.91 60.16 33.98 
Log(sales)_0 355 9.57 14407 8.91 0.66 6.86 
K/L_0 325 188.11 12902 144.40 43.71 23.24 
Y/L_0  354 17825 14357 10570 7254 40.70 
Export/sales_0 355 0.33 14407 0.24 0.09 28.20 
Av. age_0 354 40.47 14362 39.67 0.80 1.97 
Av. school_0 354 11.76 14362 11.48 0.29 2.43 
Av. tenure_0  354 12.37 14362 11.17 1.20 9.71 
Female-share_0 354 0.29 14362 0.32 -0.02 -8.41 
Post-acquisition characteristics (from t=1) 
Size 355 172.14 14407 117.03 55.11 32.02 
Log(sales) 355 9.64 14330 8.95 0.69 7.12 
K/L 325 138.18 12925 141.88 -3.70 -2.68 
Y/L  355 20372 14396 10776 9596 47.11 
Export/sales 355 0.32 14330 0.24 0.09 26.87 
Av. Age 355 40.50 14407 40.04 0.46 1.14 
Av. School 355 11.77 14407 11.52 0.25 2.15 
Av. tenure  355 12.36 14407 11.49 0.87 7.05 
Female-share 355 0.28 14407 0.31 -0.03 -10.70 
Wages of less educated from -1 to +3 
Log. Wage_1 352 9.35 14118 9.25 0.10 1.03 
Log. Wage_0 343 9.36 14087 9.27 0.09 0.92 
Log. Wage1 344 9.38 14125 9.29 0.09 0.99 
Log. Wage2 350 9.42 14120 9.30 0.12 1.26 
Log. Wage3 352 9.43 14075 9.32 0.11 1.13 
Wages of highly educated from -1 to +3 
Log. Wage_1 251 9.70 7558 9.66 0.04 0.43 
Log. Wage_0 243 9.70 7705 9.66 0.04 0.40 
Log. Wage1 250 9.72 7894 9.67 0.05 0.54 
Log. Wage2 249 9.75 8044 9.68 0.07 0.72 
Log. Wage3 249 9.77 8100 9.69 0.07 0.74 
Share of highly educated workers in employment from -1 to +3 
Empl.share_1 355 0.24 14407 0.20 0.04 16.74 
Empl.share_0 354 0.25 14362 0.20 0.05 18.87 
Empl.share1 355 0.24 14407 0.21 0.04 15.70 
Empl.share2 355 0.25 14407 0.21 0.04 14.77 
Empl.share3 355 0.24 14407 0.21 0.02 10.04 
Share of highly educated workers in total wage bill from -1 to +3 
Wb.share_1 355 0.29 14407 0.24 0.04 15.46 
Wb.share_0 354 0.30 14362 0.25 0.05 16.87 
Wb.share1 355 0.29 14407 0.25 0.04 14.17 
Wb.share2 355 0.30 14407 0.26 0.04 13.82 
Wb.share3 355 0.29 14407 0.26 0.03 10.43 
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Table 5 Effect of foreign ownership on average wages  
 
 Wages of less educated workers Wages of highly educated workers 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. T 
Foreign  0.032 (10.01) 0.011 (4.08) 0.002 (0.72) 0.054 (12.27) 0.014 (2.28) 0.003 (0.53) 
Foreign_1     0.019 (4.94)     0.010 (1.53) 
Foreign_2     0.000 (0.15)     0.017 (2.69) 
Plant size 0.000 (25.69) 0.000 (7.55) 0.000 (7.59) 0.000 (9.14) 0.000 (5.55) 0.000 (5.62) 
Av. School  0.768 (11.59) 0.302 (4.23) 0.302 (4.23) 1.673 (10.85) 2.239 (11.34) 2.227 (11.29) 
Av. Sch. ^2 -0.033 (-10.64) -0.014 (-4.08) -0.014 (-4.08) -0.052 (-10.15) -0.072 (-10.95) -0.071 (-10.89) 
Av. Age  0.031 (8.15) 0.011 (3.05) 0.010 (2.99) 0.079 (12.20) 0.052 (7.61) 0.051 (7.59) 
Av. Age ^2 -0.000 (-7.95) -0.000 (-3.03) -0.000 (-2.97) -0.000 (-10.68) -0.000 (-6.07) -0.000 (-6.05) 
Av. Tenure  0.000 (1.33) 0.000 (1.67) 0.000 (1.75) 0.001 (3.80) 0.000 (0.77) 0.000 (0.77) 
Av. Tenure^2 -0.000 (-9.11) 0.000 (0.70) 0.000 (0.62) -0.000 (-0.36) -0.000 (-0.33) -0.000 (-0.31) 
Female-share -0.264 (-56.71) -0.106 (-9.28) -0.106 (-9.28) -0.139 (-18.27) 0.168 (7.08) 0.167 (-7.03) 
K/L 0.000 (13.82) 0.000 (0.86) 0.000 (0.92) 0.000 (1.70) -0.000 (10.36) -0.000 (10.34) 
 Export-share -0.005 (-1.79) -0.002 (-0.77) -0.002 (-0.74) 0.013 (3.71) -0.007 (-1.44) -0.007 (-1.44) 
Constant 4.439 (12.25) 7.366 (19.16) 7.372 (19.19) -5.506 (-4.69) -8.991 (-6.41) -8.902 (-5.96) 
Time Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Region Effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Plant Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Number of obs. 21630  21630  21630  12186  12186  12186  
R-sq  0.491  0.501 within 0.502 within 0.366  0.255 within 0.256 Within 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average monthly wage of the skill group in the plant. Schooling, age and tenure are measured as averages in the skill group in the 
plant. Foreign is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant is foreign-owned in current year, Foreign_1 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant was foreign 
owned in the previous year, and Foreign_2 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant was foreign owned two periods before.  
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Table 6 Effect of foreign ownership on share of highly educated workers in employment/total wage bill  
 
 Share of highly educated workers in employment Share of highly educated workers in wage bill 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t 
Foreign  0.007 (1.84) 0.004 (1.53) 0.003 (0.86) 0.011 (2.54) 0.004 (1.42) 0.002 (0.69) 
Foreign_1     0.002 (0.74)     0.003 (0.83) 
Foreign_2     0.000 (0.03)     0.000 (0.09) 
Log(Whed/Wled) -0.010 (-1.29) -0.037 (-6.34) -0.037 (-6.35) 0.156 (18.66) 0.130 (20.80) 0.130 (20.78) 
Log(K) -0.029 (-22.49) 0.001 (0.37) 0.001 (0.38) -0.030 (-21.77) 0.001 (0.41) 0.001 (0.42) 
Log(Y) 0.007 (3.31) -0.004 (-3.62) -0.005 (-3.62) 0.006 (2.57) -0.006 (-3.95) -0.006 (-3.94) 
Log(sales) 0.024 (11.39) 0.001 (0.63) 0.001 (0.62) 0.027 (11.75) 0.001 (0.80) 0.001 (0.78) 
Export-share 0.017 (3.59) 0.013 (3.49) 0.013 (3.49) 0.019 (3.74) 0.014 (3.32) 0.014 (3.32) 
Constant 0.043 (0.45) 0.287 (15.43) 0.287 (15.42) -0.023 (-0.22) 0.293 (14.84) 0.293 (14.83) 
Time Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Region Effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Plant Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Observations 11533  11533  11533  11533  11533  11533  
R-sq  0.209  0.084  0.084  0.227  0.091  0.091  
The dependent variable is the employment or wage bill share of highly educated workers in a plant. Foreign is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant is foreign-owned in 
current year, Foreign_1 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant was foreign owned in the previous year, and Foreign_2 is a dummy variable which indicates whether 
plant was foreign owned two periods before. 
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Table 7 Probit model to estimate the propensity score  
 
Dependent variable: Probability of foreign acquisition 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Plant size_0 -0,001 0,000 0.005 
(Plant size_0)2 0,000 0,000 0.008 
Log(sales)_0 0,126 0,028 0.000 
Export/sales_0 0,880 0,296 0.003 
(Export/sales _0)2 -0,624 0,318 0.050 
Industry exporter-share_0 -1,015 0,198 0.000 
Industry foreign-share _0 1,731 0,252 0.000 
Log(Yregion)_0 0,041 0,027 0.131 
Log(wage)_1 0,229 0,188 0.224 
Av. School_1 0,058 0,033 0.081 
Av. Age_1 -0,011 0,012 0.346 
Av. Tenure_1 0,092 0,025 0.000 
(Av. Tenure_1)2 -0,002 0,001 0.021 
Ind. Dummies Yes   
Region dummies Yes   
Year dummied Yes   
Pseudo r-square 0.1643   
LR chi2(31) 550.17   
Observations 14762 100%  
Treated 355 2,40%  
Control 14,407 97.60%  
The explanatory variables are from pre-acquistion periods. _0 in end of the variable refers to period just before the 
acquisition (0), and _1 to period 1-2 years before the acquisition (-1). 
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Table 8 Effect of foreign acquisition on average wages of less educated workers: matching sample 
 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT -0.009 -0.028        0.060        0.006   0.008        0.006            
t-stat (-1.50) (-1.97) (6.79) (1.24) (0.76) (0.73) 
Treated  333 333  333 333 
Controls (obs.) (13499) 307 13276 (13499) 307 13276 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.015     -0.006        0.084            0.029 0.029        0.030        
t-stat (2.57) (-0.47) (7.22) (5.71) (2.98) (3.91) 
Treated  333 333  333 333 
Controls (obs.) (13499) 307 13276 (13499) 307 13276 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT 0.007    -0.018        0.074        0.022 0.018 0.020        
t-stat (1.25) (-1.33) (6.82) (3.99) (1.77) (2.72) 
Treated  333 333  333 333 
Controls (obs.) (13499) 307 13276 (13499) 307 13276 
First 3 columns report the results of regression and matching analysis where the dependent variable is the level of outcome (e.g. wages of the skill group) in the period right after 
possible acquisition (t=1), 1-2 years after possible acquisition (t=2) and 2-3 years after the possible acquisition (t=3). Next 3 columns report the results of regression and matching 
analysis where the dependent variable is the difference between the outcome in the year just before the possible acquisition (0) and in different post-acquisition years (1,2, and 3).  
The explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are reported in table 7. 
Common support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. For matching results we report the boostrapped t-statistic. 
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Table 9 Effect of foreign acquisition on average wages of highly educated workers: matching sample 
 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT 0.013  0.026        0.036        0.017 0.013        0.015        
t-stat (1.29) (1.60) (3.41) (1.95) (0.83) (1.02) 
Treated  212 212  212 212 
Controls (obs.) (6726) 198 6031 (6726) 198 6031 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.019    0.034        0.046        0.024 0.021        0.025        
t-stat (1.97) (2.25) (5.62) (2.51) (1.30) (1.61) 
Treated  212 212  212 212 
Controls (obs.) (6726) 198 6031 (6726) 198 6031 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT 0.026 0.044        0.056        0.031 0.032        0.035            
t-stat (2.65) (2.92) (5.74) (3.06) (1.93) (2.08) 
Treated  212 212  212 212 
Controls (obs.) (6726) 198 6031 (6726) 198 6031 
First 3 columns report the results of regression and matching analysis where the dependent variable is the level of outcome (e.g. wages of the skill group) in the period right after 
possible acquisition (t=1), 1-2 years after possible acquisition (t=2) and 2-3 years after the possible acquisition (t=3). Next 3 columns report the results of regression and matching 
analysis where the dependent variable is the difference between the outcome in the year just before the possible acquisition (0) and in different post-acquisition years (1,2, and 3).  
The explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are reported in table 7. 




Table 10 Effect of foreign acquisition on the share of highly educated workers in employment:  matching sample 
 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT 0.004 0.000        0.027        -0.007 -0.004        -0.007        
t-stat (0.74)    (0.02) (4.01) (-1.58)    (-0.55) (-1.16) 
Treated  354 354         354 354 
Controls (obs.) (14086) 329 13704 (14086) 329 13704 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.002 0.002        0.025        -0.008 -0.002        -0.009        
t-stat (0.45)    (0.20) (3.22) (-1.79)    (-0.27) (-1.43) 
Treated  354 354         354 354 
Controls (obs.) (14086) 329 13704 (14086) 329 13704 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT -0.010 -0.014        0.013            -0.020 -0.018        -0.022        
t-stat (-1.64)    (-1.11) (2.06) (-3.94)    (-2.26) (-3.17) 
Treated  354 354         354 354 
Controls (obs.) (14086) 329 13704 (14086) 329 13704 
First 3 columns report the results of regression and matching analysis where the dependent variable is the level of outcome (e.g. wages of the skill group) in the period right after 
possible acquisition (t=1), 1-2 years after possible acquisition (t=2) and 2-3 years after the possible acquisition (t=3). Next 3 columns report the results of regression and matching 
analysis where the dependent variable is the difference between the outcome in the year just before the possible acquisition (0) and in different post-acquisition years (1,2, and 3).  
The explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are reported in table 7. 
Common support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. For matching results we report the boostrapped t-statistic. 
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Table 11 Effect of foreign acquisition on the share of highly educated workers in wage bill: matching sample  
 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT 0.004 0.001        0.030        -0.007 -0.004        -0.007        
t-stat (0.72)    (0.06) (3.99) (-1.46)    (-0.48) (-1.11) 
Treated  354 354         354 354 
Controls (obs.) (14086) 329 13704 (14086) 329 13704 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.004 0.005        0.029        -0.007 0.000        -0.008        
t-stat (0.61)    (0.36) (3.19) (-1.43)    (0.06) (-1.09) 
Treated  354 354         354 354 
Controls (obs.) (14086) 329 13704 (14086) 329 13704 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT -0.008 -0.011        0.017            -0.019 -0.016        -0.020        
t-stat (-1.28 )    (-0.82) (2.46) (-3.46)    (-1.84) (-2.88) 
Treated  354 354         354 354 
Controls (obs.) (14086) 329 13704 (14086) 329 13704 
First 3 columns report the results of regression and matching analysis where the dependent variable is the level of outcome (e.g. wages of the skill group) in the period right after 
possible acquisition (t=1), 1-2 years after possible acquisition (t=2) and 2-3 years after the possible acquisition (t=3). Next 3 columns report the results of regression and matching 
analysis where the dependent variable is the difference between the outcome in the year just before the possible acquisition (0) and in different post-acquisition years (1,2, and 3).  
The explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are reported in table 7. 
Common support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. For matching results we report the boostrapped t-statistic. 
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Table 12 Effect of foreign acquisition on average wages by educational category: difference-in-differences matching results  
 
Difference-in-differences matching/regression results: 
 Regression (OLS) Nearest-neigbour matching Kernel matching 
Education: ATT t-stat Obs. ATT t-stat Treat/contr ATT t-stat Treat/contr 
Basic education          
T=1 -0.001     (-0.10)    13612 0.001        (0.15) 338/318 0.001        (0.07) 338/13269 
T=2 0.030    (4.91)    13612 0.036        (3.68) 338/318 0.031        (4.01) 338/13269 
T=2 0.019 (2.94)    13612 0.016        (1.52) 338/318 0.017        (2.38) 338/13269 
Vocational education 
T=1 0.007 (1.29)    13862 0.008        (0.79) 345/319         0.006        (0.81) 345/13657 
T=2 0.036 (6.27)    13862 0.039        (3.85) 345/319 0.037        (4.76) 345/13657 
T=2 0.023 (3.73)    13862 0.029        (2.76) 345/319 0.022        (3.08) 345/13657 
Lower university education 
T=1 0.007 (0.87)    13272 0.010        (0.73) 327/309 0.007 (0.62) 327/12405 
T=2 0.030    (3.30)    13272 0.026        (1.67) 327/309 0.033        (3.32) 327/12405 
T=2 0.031 (3.19)    13272 0.032        (2.21) 327/309 0.041        (4.18) 327/12405 
Higher university education 
T=1 0.029 (1.81)    6826 0.044        (1.77) 214/198         0.024            (1.10) 214/6070 
T=2 0.040    (2.28)    6826 0.059        (2.04) 214/198         0.036        (1.90) 214/6070 
T=2 0.037 (1.94)    6826 0.069        (2.14) 214/198         0.036        (1.62) 214/6070 
Common support restriction imposed in all regressions and matching. The dependent variables is the pre-and post acquisition difference in the average earnings of the educational 
category in a plant. T=1 refers to difference between the pre-acquisition wages and the wages at the period just after acquisition (1). T=2 refers to difference between  the pre-
acquisition wages and the wages at the period  1-2 years after acquisition (2).  T=3 refers to difference between  the pre-acquisition wages and the wages at the period  2-3 years 
after acquisition (3). The explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are 





IV How Destructive is Creative Destruction?
The Costs of Worker Displacement∗
Abstract
This study analyses the costs of worker displacements using a
matched employer-employee database spanning the entire Norwegian
economy. We find that workers who are displaced from their jobs work
on average 3.2 months less in the following year as compared to similar
workers who were not displaced. Seven years after displacement the
average employment reduction is only a few days per year. Earnings
are on average reduced by 2-5 percent in the first year after displace-
ment. This eﬀect decreases slowly, and is 1-2 percent seven year after
displacement. The negative employment eﬀect is in the short run
weaker for workers that were displaced by plant exit than for those
displaced from troubled firms. This is consistent with the latter group
searching less intensely for a new job because they hope to be recalled.
We find that workers with less than 10 years of schooling, and workers
displaced from small plants are more vulnerable than other groups.
∗Joint work with Jarle Møen and Kjell G. Salvanes.
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1 Introduction
In competitive markets there is continuos entry and exit of firms. Produc-
tive and innovative firms expand and less productive firms downsize. This is
the process of creative destruction, widely thought to be the most important
source of long term economic growth.1 If creative destruction is to be more
“creative” than “destructive”, large amounts of productive inputs must suc-
cessfully be reallocated between firms. Such reallocation is not frictionless.
In particular, there might be significant costs related to worker realloca-
tion. How large are these costs and who bears the burden of restructuring?
More precisely, how long are workers unemployed after loosing their job due
to plant exits or downsizing? How are their future earnings aﬀected? What
characterize workers who are quickly reemployed and what characterize those
that end up as long term unemployed? These are important questions for
policy makers when firms, unions and local communities lobby for subsidies
to save threatened jobs.
The majority of US studies analyzing the costs of involuntary job loss, in-
dicate that earnings and employment losses of displaced workers are large and
persistent.2 Earnings losses are estimated to be up to 25 percent four years
after loosing the job. Studies of displaced workers in European countries
are fewer and the results less clear.3 The bulk of previous studies, whether
European or US, use individual or household level survey data. Usually, only
workers still in employment are included in such surveys, and this will bias
the results if displacement is correlated with the probability of leaving the
labour force. Most surveys also lack a longitudinal dimension, and hence
cannot follow workers over time.
This paper analyzes short term and long term costs of worker displace-
ment using a large administrative matched employer-employee data set. The
1See e.g. Haltiwanger et al. (2000).
2See surveys by Hamermesh (1987), Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998).
3Cf. the studies in Kuhn (2002).
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data are a census of the Norwegian population of workers and plants for the
years 1986-2000.
In order to measure the causal eﬀect of displacement, we would ideally
compare the displaced workers’ earnings and employment histories with what
would have happened without displacement. Obviously, we do not have infor-
mation about workers as displaced and in a job at the same time. The general
solution to this problem is to use comparison groups to construct the coun-
terfactual situation, i.e. use information about the non-displaced workers
to approximate the outcome for displaced workers in the non-displacement
situation. We follow the standard approach in the literature and start out
using plant exits to identify exogenous separations. However, exiting plants
are not a random sample of plants, and we exploit the richness of our data to
construct what can be thought of as “twin firms” contrasting, within a regres-
sion framework, the labour market experience of workers from plants that
are similar along many observable dimensions such as plant size, industry
and local labour market conditions. The diﬀerence in outcomes for similar
workers in exiting plants, the treatment group, and in continuing plants, the
control group, identifies the eﬀect of displacement. We also look at alter-
native treatment groups, distinguishing between workers who lost they jobs
at the moment when their plant closed down, those who separated from the
plant in the period before it closed down, and incidents of mass-layoﬀs i.e.
workers leaving plants that downsize significantly from one year to the next
without exiting. Based on descriptive evidence on the pattern on earnings
and employment, we include workers leaving plants that are about to exit as
wells workers leaving plants during a mass-layoﬀ incident in the treatment
group.
We can follow workers and their earnings even if they leave the labour
force. This is possible because we have data on all 16-74 year old Norwe-
gians for 1986-2000. We argue that in order to examine the true costs of
displacement, it is important to work on population data, because displace-
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ment might have an impact on the probability of leaving the labour force
permanently. It is also important to allow workers in the comparison group
to leave the labour force. This group represents the “ongoing economy”, and
a significant number of workers leave the labour force for reasons other than
having been displaced.
In addition to estimating the average eﬀects of displacement, we analyze
heterogeneity in displacement eﬀects by observable pre-displacement worker,
plant, and labour market characteristics. Are old workers more vulnerable
than young workers? What happens to workers in “sunset” industries, i.e.
industries with negative long term growth? What happens to workers that
are displaced from firms which are dominant in a local labour market? When
examining eﬀects by pre-displacement characteristics, we can better under-
stand the reasons behind displacement costs. This may aid policy makers in
designing policies that promote growth and restructuring.
We find that displacement significantly increases the probability of leav-
ing the labour force. Those displaced workers who remain in the labour force
work on average 3.2 months less in the following year as compared to similar
workers who were not displaced. Seven years after displacement the average
employment reduction is only a few days per year. Earnings are on average
reduced by 2-5 percent in the first year after displacement. This eﬀect de-
creases slowly, and is 1-2 percent seven year after displacement. The negative
employment eﬀect is in the short run weaker for workers that were displaced
by plant closing down than for those displaced from troubled firms. Workers
with less than 10 years of schooling, and workers displaced from small plants
are more vulnerable than other groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
previous literature. Section 3 describes the data and our definition of key
variables. Section 4 gives details on the sample construction. Section 5 gives
details on our identification strategy. Section 6 discusses selection issues.
Section 7 presents descriptive evidence. Section 8 describes the results from
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our regression analysis, and the last section concludes the paper.
2 Previous literature
The costs of displacement have been studied intensively for the last 25 years4.
Until recently most of these studies analyzed displacement in the US labour
market. The results indicate substantial negative earnings eﬀects both in the
short and long term. The earnings loss starts at least three years before dis-
placement and persist many years after. 4-5 years after the displacement the
loss is still 10-25%. The approach of using comparison groups for measuring
the eﬀect of displacement, i.e. the loss is measured as the earnings change
for the displaced workers as compared to an earnings change for a control
group that was not displaced, started in the early 1990s with papers by Ruhm
(1991) and Jacobson et al. (1993). The previous literature compared earn-
ings for the same workers before and after being displaced. Jacobson et al.
(1993) define workers as displaced if they left a firm that experienced a sig-
nificant downsizing. As a comparison group they used workers who did not
separate from their firms. Their findings suggest that displaced workers suf-
fer large and long-lasting earnings reductions after displacement. Five years
after displacement, average quarterly earning losses were 25%. One limita-
tion of the analysis is its use of data from one single state, Pennsylvania.
Displacement in a state dominated by traditional manufacturing industries
may not be representative of the nation as a whole.
Ruhm (1991) and Stevens (1997) avoid this problem by using a nationally
based sample of displaced workers from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). Ruhm (1991) examines the eﬀect of job displacement on unemploy-
ment. The treatment group are the workers who were displaced during a
“base year”. The comparison group consists of workers loosing jobs at a
later date. This allows him to control for unobservable heterogeneity between
4See overviews by Hamermesh, 1987; Fallick, 1996; Kletzer, 1998 and Kuhn, 2002.
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displaced and non-displaced workers (to the extent that persons displaced in
diﬀerent periods are similar). The results indicate that displaced workers
suﬀer significant reduction in employment after displacement, but this eﬀect
is not permanent. The diﬀerence seems to fade away within 4 years.
Stevens (1997) examines the long-term eﬀects of job displacement on
earnings. A worker is labeled displaced if he or she left the previous job due
to plant or business closing or due to being laid oﬀ or fired. The compari-
son group consists of never-displaced workers. She found that the eﬀects of
displacement are quite persistent, with earnings and wages remaining approx-
imately 9% below their expected levels six years or more after displacement.
She also shows that much of this persistence can be explained by additional
job losses in the years following displacement. Workers who avoid additional
separations have earnings and wage losses 1-2 % six or more years after the
initial displacement.
Kletzer at al. (2001) use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NSLY) to study the long-term eﬀects of job displacement for young
workers. They define a worker as displaced if he or she was no longer working
at a reported job and the reason for the job ending was “layoﬀ” or “plant
closing”. They include only the first observed job displacement for each
individual during the survey period. Thus, the future job displacements
are not controlled for and potential future displacements are viewed as a
cost of the initial displacement. They found that the earnings and wage
losses associated with job displacement for young workers are large, although
somewhat smaller and less persistent than the losses found by others for older
and more established workers.
In contrast to the large supply of US studies, studies on European data on
the costs of job displacement have been more scarce. Like in the US studies,
the main focus has been on the earnings losses following displacement. The
results of these studies are hard to summarize as they appear to be rather
mixed. On average smaller short term and long term earnings losses have
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been reported than in the US. The European studies support the finding that
those who experience further job losses following displacement experience
larger earnings losses than those who do not.
Borland et al. (2002) examine the consequences of job loss for displaced
workers in Britain utilizing the British Household Panel Survey. Workers
are defined as displaced if they left their previous job due to redundancy
or dismissal. In order to calculate the earning loss of displaced workers the
authors compare displaced workers’ earnings in the current job with their
earnings in the previous job. They found that weekly wages of the average
displaced worker is around 10 percent lower in the new job than in the job
lost. Part of the loss is due to the fact that displaced workers are more likely
to end up in part time jobs. If the displaced worker moves from one full time
job to another, the wage loss is only 4%, and for those who move directly to
a new job the wage loss is 2%.
Bender et al. (2002) examine the eﬀects of worker displacement in France
and Germany. They exploit large administrative based data from both coun-
tries, that match workers to their employers. They focus on prime-age males
with more than four years of seniority. Displacement is defined as a sep-
aration that results from the closure of the employing firm. In Germany
they also define worker as displaced if he or she separates from a downsiz-
ing plant. Using the French data they found no negative post-displacement
earnings eﬀects, while in Germany the displacement seem to lead to 1-2 per-
cent wage decrease in the years after its occurrence. Burda and Mertens
(1998) also report on average small wage eﬀects following displacement in
Germany, although highly paid workers experience an earnings reductions
prior to displacement that is more similar to the US results.
Albaek et al. (2002) examine the eﬀects of job displacement in Belgium
and Denmark. For both countries, displaced worker’s earnings drop more
than those of the worker’s in two comparison groups in the year immediately
following job displacement. The diﬀerence is smaller when using the non-
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displaced worker in downsizing firms as the comparison group.
In a very recent paper, Carneiro and Portugal (2004) use administra-
tive matched employer-employee data to analyze earnings losses of displaced
workers in Portugal. In contrast to most European studies they find sub-
stantial earnings losses following displacement. The earnings loss is 8-11%
after four years. This is within the lower bound of the US results. They also
find that the losses depend on spells of unemployment as well as on worker
and firm characteristics.
Most data sets used in displacement studies cover only workers that are
in the labour force5. This may lead to a serious underestimate of the costs
of displacement since an obvious consequence of job displacement is that
workers might be pushed out of labour force permanently. Chan and Stevens
(2001) focus on this question. They examine the employment patterns of
older workers (50+) after job loss using US data from the Health and Re-
tirement Study. They focus on workers who have lost their jobs due to plant
closing or due to layoﬀ, and find that a job loss results in large and lasting
eﬀects on future employment probabilities. Four years after a job loss, at
age 55+, the employment rate of displaced workers remains 20 percent point
below the employment rate of similar non-displaced workers.
Studies examining employment consequences of job displacement in Eu-
rope are very scarce. The few ones that analyze the joblessness after dis-
placement mainly provide descriptive information on the duration of non-
employment, or study the determinants which aﬀect this duration. Abbring
et al. (2002) report that most of the displaced workers in the sample of
workers in Netherlands move directly to new jobs, and very few suﬀer a pe-
riod of joblessness that lasts for more than one year. Bender et al. (2002)
found that displaced workers are less likely to have non-employment spells
after separation than other separators in France and Germany. They are also
5One of the commonly used data sets in the US, for example, the PSID, has only
information on houshold heads (thus mostly men) with positive earnings in every year.
97
leave non-employment faster. Albaek et al (2002) find that in Belgium, re-
employment is significantly more likely for high-wage workers, young workers
and for high tenure-workers. This positive eﬀect of tenure may reflect greater
advance notice and other re-employment assistance provided to senior work-
ers.
3 Data and definition of key variables
The data on workers used in our study comes from administrative registers
and are prepared for research by Statistics Norway. It covers all 16-74 year
old Norwegian residents in the years 1986-2000. There is information about
employment relationships, taxable income, educational attainment, labour
market status, and a set of demographic variables such as gender, age and
marital status. We work only on males in this paper. A unique person
identification code allows us to follow workers over time. Likewise a unique
plant code allows us to identify each employed worker’s plant and examine
whether the plant is downsizing or closing down. Plant and local labour
market characteristics such as industry, size and the rate of unemployment
is also available. The match between workers and plants is in May in the
observation year.6
The data allow us to distinguish clearly between stayers and separators.
We define a worker as a separator at time t if at time t+ 1 he no longer has
the same plant identification number. Following the previous literature, dis-
placed workers are understood to be individuals, who involuntary separate
from their jobs by exogenous shocks. Hence, workers fired for cause are not
included.7 As mentioned in the introduction, we define displaced workers as
workers separating from a plant that closes down or goes through significant
employment reduction in the period when the separation occurs. We distin-
6November from 1996.
7Cf. e.g. Fallick (1996).
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guish between three diﬀerent categories of displaced workers: “Exit-layoﬀs”,
“early-leavers” and “downsizing plant separators”. A worker is classified as
an exit-layoﬀ if he works in an exiting plant at the time the plant is last
observed.8 A worker is classified as an early-leaver at time t if he separates
between t and t+1 from a plant that exits between t+1 and t+2. A workers
is classified as a downsizing plant separator at time t if he separates from a
plant with more than five employees that reduce employment by 30 percent
or more from t to t+ 1.9
The main analysis examine the average eﬀect of displacement on employ-
ment and earnings. In order to account for unemployment spells and part
time jobs, employment is measured as months of full time equivalent em-
ployment over the year.10 Earnings is measured as annual taxable labour
income.
8A plant is defined as an exiting plant in year t if it is present in year t but absent in
t+ 1 and in t + 2. If possible, we also check that the plants do not reappear after t+ 2.
We drop all workers in plants that reappear. Furthermore, we check whether the workers
whose plant exited between t and t + 1, work in a new plant at time t + 1 with a new
identification code, but with exactly the same workers as in the exiting plant. All workers
in such plants are also dropped. Such “false” plant exits appear when a plant moves to a
diﬀerent municipality.
9A similar downsizing plant definition has been used in many previous studies, e.g.
Albaek et al. (2002). The downsizing category does not include early-leavers who separate
from downsizing plants that are exiting in the future. Note also that for small plants, a
30 percent reduction is not a “mass layoﬀ”. We have decided, however, that an approach
without a special size restriction for defining downsizing plants is better than having an
arbitrary size cut and including all workers leaving smaller plants in the non-displaced
comparison group. We are using 5 employee size cut (i.e. including only plants with at
least 5 workers) for all plants in the base year sample.
10Part time employment is handled as follows: Yit = months of employment if a worker
is working more than 30 hours a week, Yit = (months of employment)∗0, 5 if a worker is
working 20-29 hours a week and Yit = (months of employment)∗0, 1 if a worker is working
less than 20 hours a week.
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4 Sample construction
The sample used in our main analysis is constructed by first identifying
all male workers between age 25 and 55 who were full-time employed in
manufacturing plants with at least five workers in 1991, our “base year”.
Next, we keep only the workers that were in the labour force and did not
experience a displacement incident between 1988 and 1991.11 The sample
obtained in this way consists of 103 240 workers. We trace these workers’
employment history three years before and seven years after 1991. This gives
us an 11 year long balanced panel.12
Using the definitions explained in the previous section, workers are di-
vided into five categories based on what happens between 1991 and 1992:
Exit-layoﬀs, early-leavers, downsizing-plant-separators, other separators and
non-separators (stayers). The first three categories define our treatment
group: Workers who were full-time employed in manufacturing in May 1991
and were displaced from their jobs between May 1991 and May 1992. These
workers will be referred to as displaced in 1991. The comparison groups are
those working full-time in manufacturing in May 1991 that were not dis-
placed from their jobs between May 1991 and May 1992, i.e. stayers and
other separators.
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the plant exit rate and the share of workers
experiencing a displacement incident along with unemployment and growth
for the Norwegian economy in 1986-2000. Plant exits and displacement are
positively correlated, and they are both negatively correlated with growth
and positively correlated with the change in the unemployment rate. Hence
displacements are counter cyclical.13 Note that our base year 1991 is in the
11In section 8.5 we also use other years than 1991 as base year, checking robustness and
analysing business cycle eﬀects.
12The reason we do not use the years 1986, 1987, 1999 and 2000 is that information
about months of unemployment is missing.
13The correlation between plant exit and displacement is 0.57 and significant at the 5-
percent level. The correlation between plant exit and growth is -0.47 and significant at the
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middle of a major recession lasting from about 1988 to 1993.
Table 2A reports the mean values of the main pre-displacement variables
for diﬀerent worker categories. Overall, the observable diﬀerences between
the various groups are small. This is what we want to obtain by our sample
selection procedure, conditioning on workers being in the labour force and
not displaced from their jobs in the three years prior to our base year 1991.
Displaced workers are slightly younger and more educated than non-displaced
workers, and they have 1.3 year shorter tenure. Furthermore, displaced work-
ers earn slightly more than non-displaced workers both one and three years
prior to displacement. Exit-layoﬀs seem slightly more “senior” than downsiz-
ing separators and early-leavers. Among the non-displaced workers, stayers
are more senior than separators.
Table 2B gives plant level descriptive statistics. We see that the average
plant size in the sample, 42 workers, is small. This reflects the general indus-
try structure in Norway consisting mostly of small and medium size firms.
Exiting and downsizing plants are somewhat smaller than other plants, hav-
ing on average 31 and 37 workers respectively. Average tenure is 2.1 year
shorter in exiting plants and 1.1 year shorter in downsizing plants compared
to the overall average. Both of these patterns are consistent with many of
the exiting plants being young. On average, however, exiting plants are as
old as 16 years, and downsizing plants are 18 years old. Other plants are on
average 20 years old.
10-percent level. The correlation between displacement and growth is -0.23. The correla-
tion between plant exit and change in the unemployment rate is 0.54 and significant at the




We start our analysis by investigating the eﬀect of displacement on the prob-
ability of being permanently out of the labour force14 one and seven years
after displacement. We use the following probit specification:
P (Ei) = Φ (Xiβ + Ziγ +Diδ) (1)
E (exit) is a dummy variable for being out of the labour force, X is a vector
of observable pre-and post-displacement worker characteristics. Z is a vector
of plant characteristics and local labour market characteristics identifying
“twin plants” and D is a dummy variable for having been displaced. We
expand specification (1) by distinguishing between the three subcategories of
displaced workers, exit-layoﬀs, early leavers and downsizing separators.
Having explored how displacement aﬀects labour force participation, we
exclude workers that are permanently out of the labour force15 from our
sample before analyzing the average eﬀect of displacement on months of
employment and earnings for those in the labor force. If not restricting the
sample in this way, our estimates would be averages across workers in and
out of the labour force, something that would not be particularly interesting
figures. We want to establish the probability that a worker is pushed out of
the labour force in the aftermath of a displacement incident, and the average
eﬀect on employment and earnings for those that are not pushed out.
Analyzing this second question, our main specification is
Yit = Xitβ + Zitγ +
7X
j=−3
Dit−jδj + τ t + αi + it. (2)
14By permanently out of the labour force we mean that a worker is never again observed
in the labour force within the time horizon of our panel. One year after displacement, this
horizon is seven years. Seven years after displacement, therefore, we cannot distinguish
between workers permanently and temporarily out of the labour force.
15I.e. we exclude workers not in the labour force at year t+ 7.
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Y is labour market outcome, either months of employment or the natural
logarithm of annual taxable labour income. X and Z are, as above, vectors of
observable worker and firm characteristics. Time dummies, τ , are included,
and in some specifications also individual fixed eﬀects, αi. The variables
of main interest are the displacement variables, Dit−j. These are dummy
variables indicating whether a displacement occurs at time t − j, t being
the observation year. Job loss is allowed to aﬀect labour market outcomes
four years before its occurrence and seven years after its occurrence, hence
j = −3..., 0, ...7. The treatment group is workers who were working at t = 0,
and were displaced from their jobs between t = 0 and t = 1. The control
group is workers who were working at t = 0, and did not separate due to their
plant closing down or downsizing between t = 0 and t = 1. Hence, the control
group includes both stayers and other separators. “Other separators” is a
mixture of workers laid oﬀ for cause, workers temporarily leaving the labour
force, e.g. due to bad health or to take more education, and voluntary quits
such as ordinary job-to-job mobility.
In order to explore heterogeneity in the displacement eﬀects, we expand
equation (2) by including dummies for diﬀerent displacement categories, cf.
equation (3) below, and interactions between the displacement dummies and
variables in the X and Z vectors. Next, we explore business cycle eﬀects by
varying the base year. The number of displacement dummies included before
and after the displacement incident is then adjusted to fit the longest time
span possible.
6 Selection issues
To what extent displacement, as defined in our analysis, is really exogenous,
is obviously a key issue. Separations which result from plants closing down
or downsizing is likely to be close to exogenous job losses since it is the result
of an operational response of the employer to some exogenous shock. Indi-
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vidual worker characteristics are unlikely to be major determinants of plant
shut downs or large scale employment reductions. We do acknowledge, how-
ever, that none of our displacement categories can be though as a generated
by purely randomized experiments. There are two main reasons for this.
First, there is selection of plants into exiting plants and downsizing plants.
Such plants will be concentrated in industries, occupations and local labour
markets experiencing reduced labour demand. This again is likely to aﬀect
the future employment conditions of the workers of these plants since their
human capital is specific to troubled sectors or occupations. These workers
have a high probability of becoming displaced, and as such they constitute
a group for which the consequences of displacement is particularly policy
relevant. It is, however, critical to compare their labour market outcome
after displacement with non-displaced workers having similar characteristics.
We hope to achieve this by including a rich set of control variables in the
regressions. In addition we estimate the regressions with individual fixed
eﬀects. This means that we can control for non-time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity between individuals.
A second selection issue is related to what happens within plants dur-
ing a downsizing period. Downsizing-plant-separators and early-leavers may
be a non-random sample of the plants’ employees. Troubled plants have
an obvious incentive to get rid of less productive workers, or more precisely
workers that receive high compensation relative to their productivity. This
may cause us to overestimate the cost of displacement. On the other hand,
workers with relatively better external market opportunities and lower pro-
portion of firm-specific human capital may be more likely to quit when their
employment relationship becomes uncertain. These semi-voluntary quitters
cannot be distinguished from the displaced workers, and this may cause us
to underestimate the cost of displacement. Thus, the direction of the overall
bias is ambiguous. Since a plant closing is often preceded by a period of sig-
nificant downsizing this has ramifications also for the exit-layoﬀs. If workers
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leaving during a downsizing period is a selected sample, then workers who
stay until the end will also be a selected group.16 In order to explore possible
diﬀerences between the three displacement categories17, we estimate a model
where the displacement eﬀect is allowed to diﬀer between the groups, i.e.










DOWNit−jνj + τ t + αi + it (3)
where EXITit−j, EARLYit−j and DOWNit−j are dummy variables indicat-
ing whether a worker was displaced due to plant closure, separated from an
exiting plant in the period before the closure or separated from downsizing
plant. The dependent variable and the other covariates are identical to those
in equation (2). We estimate the equation both with and without fixed eﬀects
(αi).
7 Descriptive evidence
Figure 2A describes the share of employed workers among displaced workers,
stayers and non-displaced workers from t − 3 to t + 7.18 Clearly, the eﬀect
of displacement seems much stronger when comparing displaced workers to
16Lengermann et al. (2002) study the employment flows from plants prior to the plant
closing down. They find important diﬀerences between the quality-composition of work-
ers who leave the plant before it closes down and those who stay until end. Cf. also
Hamermesh and Pfann (2001).
17Workers re-employment wages between diﬀerent separation categories might also diﬀer
if market infers that workers in diﬀerent displacement categories are oﬀ diﬀerent ability.
See Gibbons and Katz (1991).
18A worker is defined as employed if working full time for at least part of the year. All
workers were full time employed in our base year 1991. Non-displaced workers comprise
both stayers and non-displaced separators.
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stayers than when comparing them to all non-displaced.19 Note also that
stayers have a better employment history than displaced workers prior to
displacement. This suggests that the stayers is a selected sample of workers
and not a valid control group. In the following analysis we use all the non-
displaced workers as a control group for displaced workers.
Figure 3A describes the share of employed workers in the years following
and preceding displacement for the three diﬀerent categories of displaced
workers. We find that exit-layoﬀs seem to have a higher probability of being
re-employed in the short run as compared to the two other displacement
categories, but a lower probability in the long run. Early leavers have the
lowest employment rate in the short run, but the highest employment rate
in the long run.
In Figure 2B and 3B the outcome variable is average annual earnings.
Again, we find diﬀerences between the three groups, but somewhat surpris-
ingly displaced workers do better than the non-displaced workers prior to
displacement, while stayers are at the bottom of the earnings distribution.
Note, however, that these findings are not robust to changes in the base year,
cf. Figure 5A and 5B. We will return to this issue towards the end of our
analysis when discussing business cycle eﬀects.
There is a clear “dip” in earnings after displacement, lasting for about
four years. There is, however, no evidence suggesting that the earnings of
the displaced workers start to decrease before the displacement occurs. This
will change in the regression analysis below, when we condition on worker
characteristics. Then we find results more in line with the previous literature
also on this point.
Table 3 give numbers for the employment status of workers one and seven
years after separation.20 From the upper part of the table we see that 81 per-
19Cf. e.g. Jacobson et al. (1993) for a study that uses only stayers as comparison group.
20More precisely in May 1992 and November 1998 for workers separating between May
1991 and May 1992.
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cent of displaced workers are reemployed within one year.21 For workers who
are displaced because their plant closes down, the reemployment rate is as
high as 88 percent. As noticed in Figure 3A, early leavers, i.e. workers
separating from plants that will exit in the near future and workers from
downsizing plants are worse oﬀ. 59 and 77 percent of these workers, re-
spectively, are re-employed within one year. This lower reemployment rate
could be because they hope to be recalled and therefore are more reluctant
to accept new jobs. It could also be due to selection, i.e. workers with low
productivity being laid oﬀ first. The last column shows that among other
workers, i.e. the non-displaced, 3 percent are not working one year later.
The lower part of Table 3 focuses on long term eﬀects. We see that reem-
ployment of workers displaced from plants that close down happens mainly
in the first year after displacement. Seven years after displacement, employ-
ment has actually fallen by eleven percentage points, to 76 percent. This is
also evident from Figure 2A, showing that employment peaks four years af-
ter displacement. Interestingly, Table 3 shows that employment among early
leavers seven years after displacement is higher than employment among exit
layoﬀs. Downsizing separators are still in between the two other groups. The
improved position of early-leavers and downsizing plant separators is consis-
tent with their higher non-employment rate one year after displacement being
due to a hope for recall rather than selection. Such an explanation is plausi-
ble as labour unions demand that workers are laid oﬀ according to seniority.
This makes it diﬃcult for troubled firms to systematically lay oﬀ “lemons”.
We also see that laid oﬀ workers do have a realistic hope of being recalled.
As many as 20 percent of workers laid of from plants that do not exit in
the meantime are back at the same plant five years after the displacement
incident. About 2 percent of the displaced workers are unemployed seven
years later and about 18 percent is outside the labour force. This compares
21If separations are equally distributed throughout the year, the average worker was
displaced six months ago. Some workers, obviously, will have been displaced quite recently.
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to 2 percent unemployed and 8 percent out of the labour force among other
workers, suggesting that the long term eﬀect of displacement is mainly a
significantly higher probability of permanent job loss. 31 percent of the dis-
placed workers are still working in the same 2-digit industry. 9 percent are
in a diﬀerent 2 digit manufacturing industry while 25 percent are working in
the private service sector and 5 percent are in the public sector. The relative
share of employed workers changing industry is far higher among displaced
workers than among other workers suggesting that displacement is a forceful
vehicle for industry restructuring.
8 Regression results
The descriptive evidence discussed above do not control for observable diﬀer-
ences between displaced and non-displaced workers that may be correlated
with employment and earnings. In this section such control variables is taken
into account by analyzing the costs of displacement within a regression frame-
work. We first look at the eﬀect of displacement on the probability of leaving
the labor force. Then we analyze the eﬀect of displacement on employment
and earnings contingent on being in the labour force.
8.1 The eﬀect of displacement on the probability of
leaving the labour force
Table 4 reports probit estimates for how displacement aﬀects the probability
of being permanently out of the labour force already one year after displace-
ment. From Model 1 we see that displacement significantly increases this
probability. Worker’s tenure and schooling decreases this probability, but
very slightly. Model 2 allows the displacement eﬀect vary by type of dis-
placement. We see that workers who are displaced in plant closing down,
or from downsizing plant, are more likely to be pushed permanently out-
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side labour force after displacement than workers who separated from dying
plants in the period before the closure occurred.
Table 5 reports probit estimates for how displacement aﬀects the proba-
bility of being out of the labour force seven years after displacement. These
workers include both the ones who were pushed permanently outside labour
force after the initial separation, and those who have been in labour force
between t and t+7. The latter group might consist of workers who were
re-employed but were not able to find good job matches after the initial dis-
placement. Results indicate that displaced workers have significantly higher
probability of being outside labour force seven years after the displacement
occurred. Workers with more schooling, and tenure, and those who were
displaced from big plants are less likely to be outside labour force. Model
2 shows that workers displaced in plant closing down or from downsizing
plants are more likely to be outside labour force in the seventh year after
displacement than early-leavers from dying plants.
8.2 Average eﬀects of displacement on employment
and earnings for workers in the labour force
Table 6A reports of the eﬀect of displacement happening between May 1991
and May 1992 on months of full time employment in the years 1988 through
1998. The OLS specification in the first column control for workers’ age, age
squared, years of schooling, years of tenure in the base year, whether married
or not in the base year, plant size in the base year measured by number of
employees, size of the regional labour market in the base year measured
by number of employees, the regional unemployment rate and dummies for
region, two digit ISIC industry and year. The specification does not control
for displacement happening after May 1992. Hence, to the extent that the
treatment group experience more displacements in the years 1992 to 1998, it
will be considered a causal eﬀect of the displacement in 1991.
Note that if displacements happen evenly throughout the year, the “av-
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erage” displacement will happen in November 1991. Since the average dis-
placement date is towards the end of the year, we will expect to see at least as
strong eﬀect in the calendar year 1992 as in 1991. The eﬀect for the calendar
year 1992 is picked up by the dummy variable “Displaced at t− 1” (Dt−1).
The coeﬃcients on the variable Dt, represents the eﬀect in 1991. Given that
all job relationships last at least until May that year it will pick up both the
eﬀect of working for a troubled firm at the verge of closure or downsizing,
and some immediate eﬀects of displacement. The coeﬃcients on the variables
Dt+1, Dt+2 and Dt+3 are pure pre-displacement eﬀects. The coeﬃcients on
the variables Dt−2 to Dt−7 are long time eﬀects of having been displaced 1-2
years ago and up to 6-7 years ago.
The OLS estimates indicate a negative and significant employment ef-
fect for all years before and after displacement.22 This is consistent with
findings from previous studies. Workers who are displaced work on average
2.0 months less in the following year as compared to similar non-displaced
workers. It is only in the first 3 years after displacement that the average
employment reduction is more than one month per year. Seven year after
displacement, displaced workers work on average 0.2 months less than the
non-displaced workers. Three years before the displacement, the eﬀect is
negative 0.1 months.
If there are more low productivity workers among the displaced workers
than in the control group, the OLS results will be biased and overstate the
negative eﬀect of displacement. One way to correct for this potential selection
bias, is to include individual specific fixed eﬀects controlling for unobserved
worker characteristics. Doing this we see that the eﬀects of displacement
becomes slightly smaller. The first year eﬀect is reduced from 2.0 months
to 1.9 month, and the seventh year eﬀect is reduced from 0.2 months to
22A large share of the workers will work 12 or 0 months, hence our dependent variable is
limited and not normally distributed. Given our large sample, this should not invalidate
the OLS results, but as a robustness check, we have also used a Tobit specification. The
qualitative results are the same.
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essentially zero. Note, that the fixed eﬀects specification simply measures the
eﬀect relative to employment three years before the displacement incident as
this displacement dummy is removed in order to avoid perfect colinearity.
The OLS specification without fixed eﬀects suggests that there is an early
negative eﬀect of displacement already at that time, of about 0.1 months.
This corresponds to the diﬀerence between the OLS and the fixed eﬀects
results. Without tracing the workers’ employment histories further back in
time, we cannot identify whether this coeﬃcient reflects selection or the eﬀect
of working for a troubled firm. Remember that Jacobson et al. (1993) report
that the eﬀect of displacements start to show up in their data about three
years prior to displacement. In any case, the pre-displacement eﬀects in the
fixed eﬀects specification should be interpreted as “troubled firm” eﬀects.
These eﬀects are slightly more than 0.1 month. Hence, the pre-displacement
eﬀects are very small in magnitude, although fairly precisely estimated.
Having examined the eﬀect of displacement on employment, we look in
Table 6B at the eﬀect on earnings. We find evidence of a negative and
significant earnings eﬀects. In the year immediately after job loss displaced
workers’ earnings are reduced by 5 percent according to the OLS specification
and by 2 percent according to the fixed eﬀects specification. The eﬀect
decreases slowly, and is according to the OLS specification 2 percent seven
year after displacement. According to the fixed eﬀects specification there is
hardly any earnings eﬀect at all in the long run. The pre-displacement eﬀect
on earnings is roughly constant in the OLS specification, around 3 percent,
and consequently zero in the fixed eﬀects specification. This suggest that
the pre-displacement earnings diﬀerence between the two groups are due to
selection, rather than working for a troubled firm. The lack of an earnings
eﬀect associated with working for a troubled firmmake sense as the estimated
average employment eﬀect in the preceding years is at most one week, and
the workers will receive unemployment benefits close to their actual wage.
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8.3 Eﬀects of displacement by displacement category
Our treatment group consists of three diﬀerent sub categories, exit-layoﬀs,
early-leavers and downsizing plant separators. Various potential selection
biases could pertain to these groups, as explained in section 6. In order to
investigate this, we allow the displacement eﬀect to diﬀer between the groups,
as described by equation (3).
The OLS results in Table 7A confirm negative employment eﬀects for all
displacement categories. The short run negative eﬀect is, however, weaker for
workers that were displaced by plant exit than for the other two categories.
Exit-layoﬀs work on average 1.3 months less in the year immediately following
displacement as compared to workers that were not displaced. Workers who
left exiting plants in the period before it closed down, work on average 4.0
months less in the year immediately following displacement, and downsizing-
plant-separators work on average 2.3 months less. This could indicate that
workers who stay on until the end are indeed more productive than those
laid oﬀ earlier, but the diﬀerences could as well reflect diﬀerences in search
behavior as discussed previously. The long run eﬀects are quite similar across
the diﬀerent groups, and this points to diﬀerences in search behavior as the
more likely explanation for diﬀerences in the short run. The FE results
reported in the right hand side of Table 7A is largely in accordance with the
OLS results although the magnitude is somewhat smaller.
Table 7B reports the earnings regressions. Looking at the OLS results
we do not find any systematic diﬀerence between the three groups with re-
spect to earnings after displacement. There are, however, diﬀerences in post-
displacement earnings making the fixed eﬀects specification look a bit diﬀer-
ent. When controlling for earnings diﬀerences present at t − 3, we see that
early leavers and to some extent downsizing plant separators experience a
significantly higher earnings loss in the short term than exit-layoﬀs. In the
long run none of the groups seem to face any reductions in earnings. This is
consistent with the employment eﬀects.
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To sum up, we find that the average eﬀect of displacement on workers
employment and earnings are negative and significant, but overall fairly mod-
est. There are some short term diﬀerences between those displaced by plant
exit and those displaced from troubled firms. These diﬀerences may have to
do with the latter group hoping to be recalled and therefore searching less
intensely for a new job.
8.4 Heterogeneity in the eﬀects of displacement
In section 8.2, we found significant, but fairly modest average eﬀects of dis-
placement. It is not obvious, however, that the eﬀect of displacement is
equally distributed across workers with diﬀerent characteristics. For exam-
ple, if the earnings loss for displaced workers are explained by the loss in
firm-specific human capital, workers with long pre-displacement job tenure
should suﬀer more severe reductions in their earnings than workers with
short pre-displacement job tenure. If, on the other hand, the earnings and
employment reduction reflects that workers in exiting and downsizing firms
are situated in labour markets which are doing badly, the losses should diﬀer
according to the characteristics of the local labour markets. Heterogeneity
in the eﬀects of displacement is an important policy issue. If certain types
of workers, displaced from certain types of firms in certain types of labour
markets, are more likely to suﬀer severe losses after displacement, we may
target employment policies directly towards these groups.
In order to investigate potential heterogeneity in the displacement eﬀects,
we interact the displacement dummies with various pre-displacement worker
and plants characteristics. We use a high/low dichotomy, e.g. old vs. young
workers, as reported in Table 8A and 8B. Old workers are defined as workers
between 45 and 55 years at the time of the displacement incident while young
workers are those between 25 and 44 years. Conventional wisdom suggests
that it is more diﬃcult for old workers than for young workers to find new
employment. There is little support for this view in our data. There is
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no short term diﬀerence between young and old workers, and only a very
small diﬀerence, about 0.15 months, seven years after displacement. Note
however, that workers that have been permanently pushed out of the labour
force are not included in the sample. Table 8B reports the eﬀect on earnings
broken down by age. Here the results suggest that old workers experience a
somewhat larger wage loss, particularly in the long run.
As mentioned above, one reason why old workers face larger problems
after a displacement incident may be that they have more firm specific human
capital than young workers. This is explored in Table 9A and 9B. Table 9A
reports the eﬀects of displacement on months of full time employment by
pre-displacement job tenure. Low tenure is defined as tenure less than three
years. We find a picture that resembles the age eﬀect. There is no short term
diﬀerence between high and low tenured workers, but high tenured workers
are employed about 0.5 months less than low tenured workers seven years
after displacement. Actually, it is only high tenured workers that seem to
face any negative consequences in the long run.
Table 9B reports the eﬀects of displacement on annual earnings. Ac-
cording to the fixed eﬀects specification the diﬀerence between high and low
tenured workers is very small. The OLS specification, on the other hand,
suggests that workers with long tenure have about a two percentage points
lower earnings.
In Table 10A and 10B we investigate the eﬀects of displacement by edu-
cational length. Highly educated workers should have more general human
capital and be more flexible in the labour market. Our data clearly confirm
this hypothesis, both with respect to earnings, and employment. Workers
with 10 or less years of schooling work about 2.5 months less than similar
non-displaced workers in first years after displacement and about 0.2 months
less seven years after displacement. Workers with more than 10 years of
schooling work about 1.5 months less than similar non-displaced workers in
first years after displacement and do not appear to have any long term em-
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ployment reduction. With respect to earnings, workers with 10 or less years
of schooling face an average earnings reduction around 6-923 percent in first
years after displacement and an earnings reduction around 5 percent seven
years after displacement. Workers with more than 10 years of schooling face
an earnings reduction of 0-5 percent in the short run, and they do not seem
to face any earnings reduction in the long run. This is consistent with the
findings by Stevens (1997) and Kletzer (1989). They argue that those em-
ployed in white collar jobs have more transferable human capital and so may
loose less from displacement and recover more rapidly.
Table 11A and 11B reports the eﬀects of displacement by plant size. Our
hypothesis is that large plants will be both in a better position to help their
workers transfer into new jobs and under more pressure from special interest
groups. Our data clearly supports this hypothesis. Table 11A shows that
workers displaced from plants with more than 100 employees are employed
two months more in the first year after displacement as compared to workers
from smaller plants. The diﬀerence disappears gradually over the next seven
years. The earnings eﬀect goes in the same direction. Workers from plants
with less than 100 employees face a larger earnings reduction both in the
short and in long run.
Finding a suitable new job is easier in a large than in a small labour mar-
ket. Table 12A and 12B report the eﬀects of displacement by labour mar-
ket size, and we see that the hypothesis is supported by the data although
the eﬀect is not particularly strong. In the short run workers displaced in
labour markets with a population smaller than 50 000 are employed about
0.4 months less than workers displaced in larger labour markets. The diﬀer-
ence disappears gradually. With respect to earnings, the diﬀerence is only
noticeable in the fixed eﬀects specification.
Our final analysis in this section looks at whether there are diﬀerences
in the eﬀects of displacement between workers displaced from “sunset indus-
23Depending on whether one looks at the OLS or the fixed eﬀects results.
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tries” and other industries. "Sunset industries" are defined as industries at
the five digit level with 15 percent or more decline in relative employment
between 1980 and 1990. The results are reported in Table 13A and 13B.
As expected, workers displaced from sunset industries face somewhat larger
problems than other displaced workers. On average workers displaced from
sunset industries are unemployed for about 0.5 month more during the first
year after displacement, and about 0.1 months more per year in the long run.
There is a corresponding diﬀerence in earnings.
8.5 Varying the base year
So far, we have only analyzed eﬀects of displacements happening in 1991.
By redoing the main analysis on displacements happening in other years, we
can check how robust our results are with respect to changes in the sample
and the time period analyzed. We are in particular interested in seeing
whether there are systematic diﬀerences in the eﬀects of displacement over
the business cycle.
Figure 4A and 4B show eﬀects of displacement on employment for dis-
placements happening in each of the years the 1988 through 1994. We see
that the shape is pretty similar across diﬀerent years, although the level
varies a bit. Figure 5A and 5B have earnings as the outcome variable. It
appears as if workers displaced in 1988 and 1989, the very beginning of the
economic downturn, are lower paid than non-displaced workers before their
displacement, and that the earnings loss is particularly large and long lasting
for these workers. Further into the downturn, displaced workers seem much
more similar to non-displaced workers, cf. the results in our main analysis
using 1991 as base year. There are, however, also year to year changes in the
earnings curves that are hard to relate to changes in the business cycles. It
looks, e.g. as if the first year earnings loss is particularly small in 1991.
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9 Conclusions
We have examined the impact of displacement on workers’ employment and
earnings using a large panel with linked employer-employee data from Nor-
way. We have focused on workers displaced by plant closings and workers
separating from downsizing plants. We find that 88 percent of workers who
are displaced because their plant closes down are re-employed within one
year after the separation occurs. Early leavers, i.e. workers separating from
plants that will exit in the near future and workers from downsizing plants
are somewhat worse oﬀ. Reemployment of workers displaced from plants
that close down happens mainly in the first year after displacement. Seven
years after displacement, employment has actually fallen to about 76 percent.
Employment among early leavers and downsizing separators seven years after
displacement is higher than employment among exit layoﬀs. This is consis-
tent with the higher unemployment rate among early leavers and downsizing
separators one year after displacement being due to a hope for recall rather
than selection. As many as 20 percent of workers laid of from plants that
do not exit in the meantime are back at the same plant five years after the
displacement incident. 2.3 percent of the displaced workers are unemployed
seven years later and 17.7 percent is outside the labour force. This compares
to 1.7 percent unemployed and 7.7 percent out of the labour force among
other workers, suggesting that displacement strongly increases the probabil-
ity of permanent job loss. The relative share of employed workers changing
industry is far higher among displaced workers than among other workers
suggesting that displacement is a forceful vehicle for industry restructuring.
A significant share of workers displaced from the manufacturing industry find
a new job in the service sector.
Using a regression framework, we find that workers who are displaced
and not pushed out of the labour force work on average 2 months less in the
following year as compared to similar non-displaced workers. It is only in
the first 3 years after displacement that the average employment reduction
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is more than one month per year. Seven year after displacement, displaced
workers work on average only a few days less than the non-displaced workers
per year. In the years prior to displacement, future displaced workers look
very much like the non-displaced group. This finding, however, is not robust
to changing the base year of the analysis. It appears that early in an economic
downturn, displaced workers are more “marginal” than non-displaced work-
ers. When analyzing earnings, we find that in the year immediately after the
job loss displaced workers’ earnings are reduced by 2-5 percent. The eﬀect
decreases slowly, and is about 1-2 percent seven years after displacement.
When investigating heterogeneity in the eﬀects of displacement, we find
that workers with 10 or less years of schooling perform worse than work-
ers with more education. This is consistent with educated workers having
more general human capital and therefore being more flexible in the labour
market. We also find that workers displaced from small plants are more vul-
nerable. When looking at young vs. old workers, workers with high and low
tenure, workers displaced from small and large labour markets and workers
displaced from sunset industries vs. other industries we find surprisingly
small diﬀerences, although the diﬀerences we find tend to go in the expected
direction.
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 APPENDIX TO SECTION IV 
 
Figure 1  Business cycle indicators, plant exit rate and share of displaced workers  









1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Unemployment rate Gdp growth rate Exit-rate Share of displaced workers  
 
Cf. subtext to Table 1 for details.
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The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in 1991 (year 0), who were in the labour 
force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous three years. 
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The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in 1991 (year 0), who were in the labour 
force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous three years. 
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The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in 1991 (year 0), who were in the labour 
force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous three years. 
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The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in year 0, who were not displaced from 
their jobs in the previous two years. 
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The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in year 0, who were not displaced from 
their jobs in the previous two years. 
 
125
   
Figure 5A  Average annual earnings of displaced, non-displaced and stayers by  
















































The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in year 0, who were not displaced from 
their jobs in the previous two years. Average annual earnings in thousand NOK. 
 
Figure 5B  Average annual earnings of displaced, non-displaced and stayers by  
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The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in year 0, who were not displaced from 




Table 1 Business cycle indicators and the share of full time workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants 1986-1998 
 
Year Unemployment rate 
Change in the 
unemployment 
rate 
Growth rate Plant exit rate 
Share of full 
time workers 
displaced 
Share of full 
time workers 
displaced due to 
plant exits 











1986 2.0 -0.60 3.54 3.23 6.87 1.98 1.26 3.63 
1987 2.1 0.10 2.03 4.96 9.25 3.35 1.37 4.52 
1988 3.2 1.10 -0.04 6.22 7.43 2.26 0.85 4.31 
1989 4.9 1.70 0.95 4.32 5.96 1.55 0.81 3.61 
1990 5.2 0.30 2.06 3.99 6.33 2.10 0.86 3.37 
1991 5.5 0.30 3.55 5.75 9.12 4.03 0.62 4.47 
1992 5.9 0.40 3.25 4.18 6.74 2.61 0.59 3.54 
1993 6.0 0.10 2.69 3.95 4.94 1.85 0.46 2.64 
1994 5.4 -0.60 5.12 3.66 6.11 1.38 1.03 3.70 
1995 4.9 -0.50 4.27 4.48 8.52 3.74 0.74 4.04 
1996 4.8 -0.10 5.12 4.60 5.35 2.22 0.53 2.60 
1997 4.0 -0.80 5.06 3.67 4.85 1.43 1.03 2.39 
1998 3.2 -0.80 2.60 3.93 6.83 1.76 2.02 3.04 
 
The growth rate is the percent change in GDP from year t-1 to t. A plant is defined as an exiting plant if it is present at t, but absent at t+1 and t+2 (and later if that is possible to 
check). The displacement rate is the share of  workers who were displaced from their jobs between t and t+1 among workers who were working full time in plants with at least 5 
employees in period t.  The displaced workers can be divided into three sub categories:  Workers who separated between t and t+1 from plants that exited between t and t+1 (exit-
layoffs), workers who separated between t and t+1 from plants that exited between t+1 and t+2 (early-leavers), and workers who separated between t and t+1 from plants that 




Table 2A  Sample means of selected pre-displacement worker characteristics by displacement status 
 













Age at t 39.21 38.83 39.04 38.35 38.70 39.24 39.42 36.98 
Education at t 10.75 11.13 11.29 10.89 11.02 10.72 10.69 11.11 
Tenure at t 7.36 6.08 6.61 5.78 5.65 7.48 7.67 5.14 
Married at t 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.58 
Earnings at t-1 237238 240205 243684 225939 238897 236975 237352 232280 
Earnings at t-3 200823 202338 205363 198510 200087 200689 200837 198839 
No. of observations 103240 8427 3756 537 4134 94813 87759 7054 
 
Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in 1991 (year t), who were in 
the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous three years. 
 
 
Table 2B  Sample means of selected pre-displacement plant characteristics by plant categories  
 
 All plants Exiting plants Downsizing plants Other plants 
Employment at t 41.90 30.88 36.67 43.08 
Employment at t-1 41.67 31.30 36.68 42.79 
Average worker age at t 39.72 39.34 39.46 39.77 
Average tenure at t 5.52 3.65 4.59 5.73 
Average schooling at t 10.29 10.39 10.18 10.30 
Share of female at t 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.28 
Share of married at t 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.59 
Plant age at t 19.34 15.86 17.77 19.56 
Employment growth, t-1 to t 0.17  0.14 0.21 0.17 
Employment growth, t to t+1 0.00 -1.00 -0.51 0.05 
No. of observations 6330 333 531 5466 
 
The sample consists of manufacturing plants with more than five employees in 1991 (year t). The plants are categorized based on what happens with employment from year t to 
t+1. Plant age is censored at 26.  
128
  
Table 3 Percentage of workers employed one and seven years after displacement by displacement type  
 
One year after All displaced Exit -Layoffs Early-Leavers Downsizing separators Other workers 
Employed 80.79 87.99 58.66 77.12 97.22 
   same plant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.56 
   same industry, different plant 43.69 63.79 30.17 27.19 1.92 
   other manufacturing industry 11.55 4.10 8.01 18.77 0.57 
   private service 23.51 19.12 17.88 28.23 1.86 
   public service 2.04 0.99 2.61 2.93 0.31 
Not-employed 19.21 12.01 41.34 22.88 2.78 
   Registered as unemployed 14.87 8.63 32.40 18.26 2.00 
   temporarily outside the labour force 3.74 2.80 8.57 3.97 0.67 
   permanently outside the labour force 0.61 0.59 0.37 0.65 0.11 
      
Seven years after All displaced Exit -Layoffs Early-Leavers Downsizing separators Other workers 
Employed 80.00 76.20 87.71 82.46 90.65 
   same plant 9.99 0.00 0.00 20.37 59.95 
   same industry, different plant 30.82 44.54 30.35 18.41 12.03 
   other manufacturing industry 8.98 7.29 14.53 9.80 3.48 
   private service 25.39 18.21 37.62 30.33 13.56 
   public service 4.82 6.15 5.21 3.56 1.63 
Not-employed 20.00 23.80 12.29 17.54 9.35 
   Registered as unemployed 2.28 2.10 2.42 2.42 1.66 
   outside the labour force 17.72 21.70 9.87 15.12 7.70 
No. of observations 8427 3756 537 4134 94813 
 
Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the 




Table 4  The effect of displacement on the probability of being permanently out of the labour force in the first year after 
displacement  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Age ∈ {35, 44} 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Age ≥ 45 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Years of schooling -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 
Tenure when displaced -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
Marital status when displaced 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Plant size when displaced -0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.000) 
Size of the regional labour market when displaced 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Regional rate of unemployment -0.029 (0.020) -0.028 (0.019) 
Displaced 0.004 (0.001)   
Type of displacement:     
Exit-layoff    0.005 (0.001) 
Early-leaver   0.002 (0.002) 
Downsizing plant separator   0.005 (0.001) 
No. of observations 103240 103240 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0709 0.0713 
 
Probit estimates. The sample year is 1992. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992.The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in 
manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous three years. The coefficients are marginal effects, i.e. d[P(Y=1)]/dX. 
Permanently outside the labour force means outside the labour force at least until the seventh year after displacement. Years of schooling, tenure, plant size and regiol labour 




Table 5  The effect of displacement on the probability of being out of the labour force in the seventh year after displacement 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Age ∈ {35, 44} -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 
Age ≥ 45 0.008 (0.003) 0.007 (0.003) 
Years of schooling -0.078 (0.041) -0.078 (0.039) 
Tenure when displaced -0.055 (0.017) -0.054 (0.017) 
Marital status when displaced -0.007 (0.002) -0.007 (0.002) 
Plant size when displaced 0.004 (0.014) 0.004 (0.000) 
Size of the regional labour market when displaced 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Regional rate of unemployment 0.117 (0.354) 0.148 (0.345) 
Displaced 0.062 (0.004)   
Type of displacement:     
Exit-layoff    0.056 (0.006) 
Early-leaver   0.033 (0.014) 
Downsizing plant separator   0.075 (0.006) 
No. of observations 103240 103240 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0518 0.0713 
 
Probit estimates. The sample year is 1998. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992.The sample consists of 25-55 year old male workers full time employed in 
manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous three years. The coefficients are marginal effects, i.e. d[P(Y=1)]/dX.  Years 
of schooling, tenure, plant size and regiol labour market size variables are divided by 100. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 6A The effect of displacement on employment 
 
 OLS FE 
Age 0.078 (0.004) 0.070 (0.003) 
Age squared -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.036 (0.002)   
Tenure when displaced 0.040 (0.001)   
Marital status when displaced 0.228 (0.009)   
Plant size when displaced 0.020 (0.001)   
Size of the regional labour market when displaced 0.000 (0.000)   
Regional rate of unemployment -16.308 (0.672) -19.395 (0.477) 
Displaced at t+3 -0.131 (0.024)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.256 (0.027) -0.127 (0.032) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.276 (0.024) -0.144 (0.032) 
Displaced at t -0.346 (0.015) -0.212 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-1 -2.020 (0.054) -1.884 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-2 -1.431 (0.050) -1.294 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.128 (0.047) -0.991 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.775 (0.043) -0.638 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.612 (0.041) -0.474 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.360 (0.035) -0.223 (0.032) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.155 (0.029) -0.019 (0.032) 







The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The specification without individual fixed effects contains region and industry 






Table 6B The effect of displacement on earnings 
 
 OLS FE 
Age 0.041 (0.001) 0.054 (0.000) 
Age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.059 (0.000)   
Tenure when displaced 0.002 (0.000)   
Marital status when displaced 0.083 (0.002)   
Plant size when displaced 0.006 (0.000)   
Size of the regional labour market when displaced 0.000 (0.000)   
Regional rate of unemployment -1.732 (0.117) -1.343 (0.055) 
Displaced at t+3 -0.031 (0.004)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.032 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.029 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 
Displaced at t -0.034 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.053 (0.004) -0.023 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.070 (0.005) -0.040 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.062 (0.005 -0.032 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.062 (0.005) -0.032 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.040 (0.005) -0.010 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.039 (0.005) -0.009 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.022 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004) 







The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The specification without individual fixed effects contains region and industry 





Table 7A  The effect of displacement on employment by displacement type  
 
 OLS      FE       













Displaced at t+3 -0.206 (0.039) -0.038 (0.088) -0.080 (0.032)       
Displaced at t+2 -0.290 (0.042) -0.137 (0.101) -0.242 (0.036) -0.085 (0.048) -0.097 (0.116) -0.167 (0.044) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.250 (0.034) -0.163 (0.095) -0.312 (0.035) -0.042 (0.048) -0.120 (0.116) -0.234 (0.044) 
Displaced at t -0.294 (0.022) -0.397 (0.064) -0.382 (0.020) -0.084 (0.048) -0.352 (0.116) -0.301 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-1 -1.341 (0.072) -4.035 (0.241) -2.311 (0.079) -1.129 (0.048) -3.987 (0.116) -2.227 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-2 -1.153 (0.072) -2.763 (0.230) -1.480 (0.070) -0.939 (0.048) -2.715 (0.116) -1.396 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.948 (0.068) -1.772 (0.203) -1.190 (0.067) -0.734 (0.048) -1.726 (0.116) -1.105 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.648 (0.062) -1.151 (0.180) -0.829 (0.061) -0.435 (0.048) -1.107 (0.116) -0.743 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.494 (0.060) -0.680 (0.157) -0.700 (0.060) -0.281 (0.048) -0.636 (0.116) -0.613 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.291 (0.052) -0.362 (0.136) -0.418 (0.050) -0.078 (0.048) -0.317 (0.116) -0.333 (0.044) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.162 (0.044) 0.068 (0.093) -0.180 (0.040) 0.050 (0.048) 0.113 (0.116) -0.095 (0.044) 
No. of observations 1038972      1038972      
R-squared      0.0477      0.0217      
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared, 
regional rate of unemployment and time dummies. The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when displaced, 




Table 7B The effect of displacement on earnings by displacement type 
 
 OLS      FE       













Displaced at t+3 -0.037 (0.006) 0.001 (0.015) -0.031 (0.006)       
Displaced at t+2 -0.031 (0.006) 0.007 (0.013) -0.038 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.013) -0.007 (0.005) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.028 (0.005) -0.019 (0.011) -0.031 (0.006) 0.008 (0.006) -0.021 (0.013) 0.000 (0.005) 
Displaced at t -0.036 (0.005 -0.030 (0.013) -0.033 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006) -0.032 (0.013) -0.003 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.044 (0.006) -0.058 (0.017) -0.061 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) -0.060 (0.013) -0.030 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.061 (0.006) -0.103 (0.020) -0.073 (0.007) -0.026 (0.006) -0.105 (0.013) -0.043 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.055 (0.006) -0.077 (0.020) -0.065 (0.007) -0.020 (0.006) -0.079 (0.013) -0.035 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.054 (0.007) -0.070 (0.022) -0.069 (0.008) -0.019 (0.006) -0.072 (0.013) -0.038 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.043 (0.007) -0.038 (0.019) -0.037 (0.007) -0.007 (0.006) -0.040 (0.013) -0.007 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.044 (0.008) -0.029 (0.020) -0.036 (0.007) -0.009 (0.006) -0.031 (0.013) -0.005 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.028 (0.008) 0.009 (0.015) -0.022 (0.008) 0.008 (0.006) 0.006 (0.013) 0.008 (0.005) 
No. of observations 1038972      1038972      
R-squared      0.2640      0.0743      
 
The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared, 
regional rate of unemployment and time dummies. The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when displaced, 




Table 8A  The effect of displacement on employment by pre-displacement age  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Age < 45  Age ≥ 45  Age < 45  Age ≥ 45  
Displaced at t+3 -0.145 (0.031) -0.094 (0.030)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.283 (0.034) -0.185 (0.037) -0.140 (0.037) -0.095 (0.058) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.319 (0.031) -0.163 (0.028) -0.173 (0.037) -0.071 (0.058) 
Displaced at t -0.332 (0.018) -0.383 (0.025) -0.182 (0.037) -0.290 (0.058) 
Displaced at t-1 -2.061 (0.064) -1.917 (0.098) -1.908 (0.037) -1.823 (0.058) 
Displaced at t-2 -1.486 (0.059) -1.289 (0.089) -1.333 (0.037) -1.195 (0.058) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.181 (0.056) -0.994 (0.084) -1.026 (0.037) -0.899 (0.059) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.795 (0.051) -0.725 (0.077) -0.639 (0.037) -0.632 (0.059) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.642 (0.049) -0.536 (0.073) -0.486 (0.037) -0.444 (0.059) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.322 (0.041) -0.461 (0.068) -0.166 (0.037) -0.371 (0.059) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.113 (0.032) -0.265 (0.058) 0.043 (0.037) -0.178 (0.059) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2641   0.0743 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 8B  The effect of displacement on earnings by pre-displacement age  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Age < 45  Age ≥ 45  Age < 45  Age ≥ 45  
Displaced at t+3 -0.028 (0.005) -0.038 (0.007)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.026 (0.004) -0.047 (0.007) 0.002 (0.004) -0.009 (0.007) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.023 (0.004) -0.044 (0.007) 0.005 (0.004) -0.006 (0.007) 
Displaced at t -0.026 (0.004) -0.054 (0.007) 0.001 (0.004) -0.016 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.047 (0.005) -0.069 (0.008) -0.020 (0.004) -0.031 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.066 (0.006) -0.081 (0.008) -0.038 (0.004) -0.044 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.056 (0.006) -0.077 (0.009) -0.029 (0.004) -0.039 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.059 (0.007) -0.071 (0.009) -0.032 (0.004) -0.033 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.031 (0.006) -0.061 (0.010) -0.004 (0.004) -0.023 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.029 (0.006) -0.064 (0.010) -0.002 (0.004) -0.027 (0.007) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.005 (0.006) -0.067 (0.011) 0.022 (0.004) -0.029 (0.007) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2641   0.0743 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 9A  The effect of displacement on employment by pre-displacement tenure  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Tenure < 3  Tenure ≥ 3  Tenure < 3  Tenure ≥ 3  
Displaced at t+3 0.001 (0.055) -0.093 (0.019)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.452 (0.064) -0.014 (0.014) -0.457 (0.050) 0.077 (0.040) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.269 (0.057) -0.160 (0.015) -0.272 (0.050) -0.065 (0.040) 
Displaced at t -0.028 (0.029) -0.424 (0.016) -0.031 (0.050) -0.325 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-1 -1.896 (0.091) -1.979 (0.066) -1.895 (0.050) -1.878 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-2 -1.472 (0.087) -1.286 (0.060) -1.469 (0.050) -1.186 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.335 (0.087) -0.881 (0.053) -1.333 (0.050) -0.779 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.707 (0.078) -0.698 (0.049) -0.704 (0.050) -0.597 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.445 (0.074) -0.596 (0.048) -0.442 (0.050) -0.494 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.127 (0.065) -0.386 (0.040) -0.126 (0.050) -0.284 (0.040) 
Displaced at t-7 0.228 (0.052) -0.273 (0.033) 0.228 (0.050) -0.173 (0.040) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.0536   0.0209 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 9B  The effect of displacement on earnings by pre-displacement tenure  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Tenure < 3  Tenure ≥ 3  Tenure < 3  Tenure ≥ 3  
Displaced at t+3 -0.012 (0.007) -0.035 (0.005)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.023 (0.007) -0.030 (0.004) -0.011 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.016 (0.007) -0.030 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) 0.006 (0.005) 
Displaced at t -0.011 (0.006) -0.042 (0.005) 0.002 (0.006) -0.007 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.035 (0.007) -0.057 (0.006) -0.023 (0.006) -0.023 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.063 (0.008) -0.068 (0.006) -0.051 (0.006) -0.033 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.056 (0.009) -0.059 (0.006) -0.044 (0.006) -0.024 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.047 (0.009) -0.065 (0.007) -0.036 (0.006) -0.030 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.033 (0.008) -0.037 (0.006) -0.021 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.026 (0.009) -0.040 (0.006) -0.014 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.008 (0.009) -0.024 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006) 0.010 (0.005) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2647   0.036 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 10A  The effect of displacement on employment by education 
 
 OLS   FE   
 Education ≤ 10  Education > 10  Education ≤ 10  Education > 10  
Displaced at t+3 -0.090 (0.036) -0.162 (0.032)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.277 (0.041) -0.233 (0.034) -0.191 (0.046) -0.073 (0.043) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.254 (0.035) -0.290 (0.032) -0.166 (0.046) -0.125 (0.043) 
Displaced at t -0.411 (0.024) -0.286 (0.018) -0.322 (0.046) -0.118 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-1 -2.496 (0.084) -1.605 (0.068) -2.404 (0.046) -1.434 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-2 -1.987 (0.080) -0.945 (0.060) -1.893 (0.046) -0.775 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.465 (0.074) -0.832 (0.058) -1.372 (0.046) -0.660 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-4 -1.004 (0.067) -0.572 (0.054) -0.911 (0.046) -0.400 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.828 (0.065) -0.420 (0.051) -0.735 (0.046) -0.247 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.534 (0.057) -0.206 (0.043) -0.442 (0.046) -0.034 (0.043) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.255 (0.048) -0.065 (0.033) -0.164 (0.046) 0.107 (0.043) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.0477   0.0212 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 10B  The effect of displacement on earnings by education 
 
 OLS   FE   
 Education ≤ 10  Education > 10  Education ≤ 10  Education > 10  
Displaced at t+3 -0.007 (0.005) -0.052 (0.006)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.022 (0.005) -0.041 (0.005) -0.015 (0.005) 0.011 (0.005) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.022 (0.006) -0.035 (0.005) -0.015 (0.005) 0.017 (0.005) 
Displaced at t -0.033 (0.005) -0.036 (0.005) -0.026 (0.005) 0.015 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.067 (0.006) -0.042 (0.006) -0.060 (0.005) 0.009 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.093 (0.007) -0.051 (0.006) -0.086 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.081 (0.007) -0.046 (0.006) -0.074 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.081 (0.008) -0.047 (0.007) -0.074 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.061 (0.007) -0.021 (0.006) -0.054 (0.005) 0.029 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.064 (0.008) -0.018 (0.007) -0.056 (0.005) 0.033 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.052 (0.008) 0.003 (0.007) -0.045 (0.005) 0.053 (0.005) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2648   0.0746 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 
1988 to 1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the 
previous three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age 
squared and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies. The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 





Table 11A  The effect of displacement on employment by pre-displacement plant size  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Pl.size < 100  Pl.size ≥ 100  Pl.size < 100  Pl.size ≥ 100  
Displaced at t+3 -0.153 (0.044) -0.079 (0.026)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.332 (0.048) -0.163 (0.029) -0.177 (0.047) -0.090 (0.042) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.287 (0.043) -0.232 (0.027) -0.134 (0.047) -0.152 (0.042) 
Displaced at t -0.373 (0.026) -0.291 (0.017) -0.218 (0.047) -0.207 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-1 -3.173 (0.094) -1.097 (0.058) -3.018 (0.047) -1.008 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-2 -2.262 (0.087) -0.755 (0.055) -2.107 (0.047) -0.665 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.547 (0.080) -0.771 (0.055) -1.393 (0.047) -0.678 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-4 -1.044 (0.072) -0.533 (0.050) -0.890 (0.047) -0.441 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.776 (0.069) -0.450 (0.049) -0.622 (0.047) -0.358 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.406 (0.059) -0.291 (0.042) -0.251 (0.047) -0.200 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.108 (0.048) -0.157 (0.034) 0.047 (0.047) -0.069 (0.042) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.0495   0.0230 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 




Table 11B  The effect of displacement on earnings by pre-displacement plant size  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Pl. size < 100  Pl.size ≥ 100  Pl.size < 100  Pl.size ≥ 100  
Displaced at t+3 -0.007 (0.007) -0.044 (0.005)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.017 (0.006) -0.038 (0.005) -0.010 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.012 (0.007) -0.036 (0.004) -0.005 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 
Displaced at t -0.040 (0.006) -0.025 (0.004) -0.033 (0.005) 0.019 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.059 (0.008) -0.043 (0.005) -0.053 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.084 (0.008) -0.054 (0.005) -0.078 (0.005) -0.010 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.069 (0.008) -0.051 (0.006) -0.062 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.072 (0.009) -0.050 (0.006) -0.066 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.050 (0.008) -0.026 (0.006) -0.044 (0.005) 0.017 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.046 (0.008) -0.028 (0.006) -0.040 (0.005) 0.016 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.027 (0.008) -0.014 (0.007) -0.020 (0.005) 0.030 (0.005) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2649   0.0744 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 
1988 to 1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the 
previous three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age 
squared and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 




Table 12A  The effect of displacement on employment by pre-displacement labour market size  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Lab.m. size < 50 000  Lab.m. size ≥ 50 000  Lab.m. size < 50 000  Lab.m. size ≥ 50 000  
Displaced at t+3 -0.101 (0.039) -0.155 (0.031)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.229 (0.041) -0.279 (0.035) -0.136 (0.047) -0.121 (0.042) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.259 (0.035) -0.289 (0.033) -0.169 (0.047) -0.125 (0.042) 
Displaced at t -0.335 (0.023) -0.355 (0.019) -0.242 (0.047) -0.188 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-1 -2.252 (0.083) -1.835 (0.070) -2.159 (0.047) -1.664 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-2 -1.628 (0.077) -1.273 (0.064) -1.533 (0.047) -1.102 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.172 (0.072) -1.092 (0.062) -1.078 (0.047) -0.920 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.782 (0.065) -0.768 (0.057) -0.686 (0.047) -0.598 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.616 (0.062) -0.608 (0.055) -0.519 (0.047) -0.437 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.310 (0.052) -0.400 (0.048) -0.215 (0.047) -0.229 (0.042) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.144 (0.043) -0.164 (0.038) -0.049 (0.047) 0.005 (0.042) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.0466   0.0206 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies. The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 




Table 12B  The effect of displacement on earnings by pre-displacement labour market size  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Lab.m. size < 50 000  Lab.m. size ≥ 50 000  Lab.m. size < 50 000  Lab.m. size ≥ 50 000  
Displaced at t+3 -0.010 (0.005) -0.048 (0.006)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.014 (0.005) -0.047 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.012 (0.005) -0.043 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 
Displaced at t -0.020 (0.005) -0.046 (0.005) -0.009 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.054 (0.006) -0.052 (0.006) -0.042 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.064 (0.007) -0.074 (0.007) -0.053 (0.005) -0.029 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.052 (0.007) -0.069 (0.007) -0.041 (0.005) -0.025 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.057 (0.007) -0.066 (0.008) -0.047 (0.005) -0.021 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.032 (0.007) -0.045 (0.007) -0.021 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.035 (0.008) -0.041 (0.007) -0.024 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.017 (0.007) -0.027 (0.008) -0.005 (0.005) 0.018 (0.005) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2643   0.0743 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 




Table 13A  The effect of displacement on employment by growth of the pre-displacement industry  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Sunset  Other  Sunset  Other  
Displaced at t+3 0.033 (0.042) -0.208 (0.029)   
Displaced at t+2 -0.063 (0.045) -0.347 (0.033) -0.097 (0.055) -0.142 (0.038) 
Displaced at t+1 -0.156 (0.041) -0.332 (0.030) -0.190 (0.055) -0.122 (0.038) 
Displaced at t -0.337 (0.028) -0.350 (0.017) -0.369 (0.055) -0.138 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-1 -2.413 (0.101) -1.833 (0.063) -2.444 (0.055) -1.618 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-2 -2.003 (0.096) -1.159 (0.057) -2.034 (0.055) -0.943 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-3 -1.540 (0.091) -0.932 (0.054) -1.572 (0.055) -0.715 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-4 -1.062 (0.083) -0.638 (0.049) -1.093 (0.055) -0.421 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.845 (0.079) -0.500 (0.047) -0.875 (0.055) -0.283 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.473 (0.069) -0.306 (0.040) -0.503 (0.055) -0.090 (0.038) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.239 (0.058) -0.114 (0.032) -0.269 (0.055) 0.100 (0.038) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.0472   0.0211 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is months of employment. Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation. The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies. The sunset industries are 5 digit-industries with 15 percent 









Table 13B  The effect of displacement on earnings by growth of the pre-displacement industry  
 
 OLS   FE   
 Sunset  Other  Sunset  Other  
Displaced at t+3 0.018 (0.006) -0.057 (0.005)   
Displaced at t+2 0.002 (0.006) -0.051 (0.005) -0.016 (0.006) 0.006 (0.004) 
Displaced at t+1 0.000 (0.006) -0.045 (0.005) -0.019 (0.006) 0.012 (0.004) 
Displaced at t -0.017 (0.006) -0.045 (0.005) -0.035 (0.006) 0.011 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-1 -0.058 (0.007) -0.054 (0.005) -0.076 (0.006) 0.002 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-2 -0.085 (0.009) -0.066 (0.006) -0.103 (0.006) -0.010 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-3 -0.071 (0.009) -0.060 (0.006) -0.089 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-4 -0.081 (0.010) -0.057 (0.006) -0.099 (0.006) -0.001 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-5 -0.055 (0.009) -0.035 (0.006) -0.073 (0.006) 0.021 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-6 -0.049 (0.009) -0.037 (0.006) -0.068 (0.006) 0.019 (0.004) 
Displaced at t-7 -0.034 (0.009) -0.020 (0.007) -0.053 (0.006) 0.036 (0.004) 
No. of observations 1038972   1038972   
R-squared      0.2676   0.0746 (within)  
 
The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). Displacements happened between May 1991 and May 1992. t is the year of the observation.  The sample covers the years 1988 to 
1998, and consists of 25-55 year old male workers, full time employed in manufacturing in 1991, who were in the labour force and not displaced from their jobs in the previous 
three years, and who were in the labour force in the last observed post displacement year, 1998. The following control variables are included, but not reported: Age, age squared 
and regional rate of unemployment and time dummies.  The specification without fixed effects also includes years of schooling, tenure when displaced, marital status when 
displaced, plant size when displaced, size of the regional labour market when displaced, industry and region dummies. The sunset industries are 5 digit-industries with 15 percent 




VWorker Turnover in Dying Plants and
Re-employment Wages
Abstract
This paper examines worker turnover in dying plants. The hypoth-
esis is that the knowledge of future economic distress will influence
both firm’s hiring and firing decisions, as well as the workers’ quitting
decisions. As a result, workers’ post-displacement earning losses are
likely to diﬀer between workers who leave the dying firm in diﬀerent
stages. The results using matched employer-employee panel data from
Norway show that there are significant changes in workforce skill mix
before the plant closure. Workers who decide to leave the dying plants
early suﬀer no wage losses in their re-employment jobs, while the ones
who stay until the end suﬀer significant earning losses. On the other
hand, workers who are laid oﬀ in the period before the plant’s death
suﬀer even more severe earnings reductions.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between job tenure and wages has been subject of consid-
erable interest in empirical labour economics for decades1. A well-known
challenge in these studies is the possible endogeneity of worker mobility, and
thus of the job tenure. As high ability workers are likely to have better job
matches, they are also less likely to leave the firm or to be fired, and hence
end up with more tenure. A popular strategy to overcome this diﬃculty has
been to focus on workers who loose their jobs due to plant closure2. The
argument in these studies is that plant closure is an result of an exogenous
shock, which results in a separation of all plant’s workers. Thus, workers
who were displaced by plant closure are random sample of workforce and not
selected on the basis of their past choice.
This argument relies on assumption that plant closure happens instantly
and cannot be predicted. It is, however, more realistic to assume that both
workers and firm have time to react before the actual closing down occurs.
Previous empirical findings support this assumption: a plant closure is of-
ten preceded by a period of significant downsizing3. Given the knowledge
of future economic distress, both firm and workers might engage in strategic
behavior to minimize the costs associated with this event. When troubled
firm is forced to layoﬀ a share of its workers, it gets rid of the least productive
ones. In addition, the workers with relatively better external market oppor-
tunities are more likely to quit voluntarily from these plants. The remaining
sample of workers is thus a selected sample of the workers who are aﬀected
by the shock that lead to plant closing down.
This paper examines empirically whether there is a selective turnover of
workers in a plant before its closure, and whether this influences the post-
1See e.g. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991).
2See e.g. Gibbons and Katz (1992) and Dustman and Meghir (2005).
3It is also well-established finding that dying plants have lower levels and growth rates
of productivy several years before the death occurs. This is the "shadow of death eﬀect"
(see e.g. Griliches and Regev, 1995).
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displacement earning losses. The hypothesis is that the knowledge of future
economic distress will influence both firm’s hiring and firing decisions, as well
as the workers’ quitting decisions. The firm chooses to retain its most pro-
ductive workers, while workers with relatively better external market oppor-
tunities and lower proportion of firm-specific human capital are more likely
to quit. As a result of this selection process, workers’ re-employment wages
and post-displacement earning losses are likely to diﬀer between workers who
leave the dying firm in diﬀerent stages. Workers who decided to leave earlier
are assumed to have smaller post-displacement earning losses, than the ones
who decide to stay. On the other hand, workers that are laid oﬀ before the
closure occurs are expected to suﬀer more severe reductions in their post-
displacement earnings than the ones who remain with their employer until
the end.
The empirical analysis can be divided into two parts. First, we examine
whether there are significant changes in the workforce skill distribution before
the plant closure and whether workers who leave the dying plants in diﬀer-
ent stages diﬀer significantly by their observable characteristics. Second, we
examine whether there are significant diﬀerences in the post-displacement
earning losses of workers who leave the dying plant in diﬀerent stages. This
allows us to study whether this selection process in dying plants aﬀects the
magnitude of post-displacement earnings losses.
Our analysis is based on matched employee-employer panel data from
Norway for 1988-2000. The results are consistent with the theoretical pre-
dictions. There are significant changes in the workforce skill mix before the
plant closure. Workers who decide to leave the dying plants early suﬀer no
wage losses in their re-employment jobs, while the ones who stay until the
end suﬀer significant earning losses. On the other hand, workers who are laid
oﬀ in the period before the plant’s death suﬀer even more severe earnings
reductions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the theoret-
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ical framework for our analysis and summaries the main predictions. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the statistical methodology used in
this paper. Section 5 reports the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Discussion and Previous Evi-
dence
2.1 Theoretical Discussion
The basic job search model serves as an adequate framework for discussing
the eﬀect of future plant closure on worker’s behavior (see e.g. Mortensen,
1986)4. In such model, workers maximize the expected present value of their
future income stream. While on-the-job they receive wage oﬀers, ω, from
prospective employers. The location of the wage oﬀer distribution depends
on worker’s characteristics (human capital)5. The worker accepts ω if and
only if it exceed the reservation wage ωr. A knowledge of future closure
lowers the value of employment in a given firm, since the likelihood of end-
ing into unemployment increases6. This lowers worker’s reservation wages,
increases worker’s search intensity, and as a consequence increases the num-
ber of job oﬀers he receives. Workers with better outside opportunities, e.g.
higher share of general human capital, will engage in on-the-job-search more
intensively than the ones with lower share of general human capital. As
4The search framework is typically used in studies which examine the eﬀect of advance
notice of job displacement on post-displacement outcomes. See e.g. Addison and Portugal
(1987), Ruhm (1994) and Friesen (1997).
5It thus diﬀers among individuals and may also shift during workers career as general
human capital accumulates. see e.g. Topel et Ward, 1992
6We assume that all the plant’s workers receive simultaneously the knowledge of future
plant closure. It might be, however, that diﬀerent type of workers are more likely to be
informed. E.g. if employers are concerned that best workers leave more easily, then they
might try to withold this information from them. Thus, those workers who are most likely
to find and take new jobs before the scheduled layoﬀ may be least likely to be notified (see
Fallick, 1994). On the otherhand, as stated in Ruhm (1997), when entire plant is being
closed, it will be more diﬃcult to to selectively inform workers of impending displacement.
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a consequence, workers with high share of general human capital are more
likely to receive and accept wage oﬀers. Thus, the knowledge of future shock
increases disproportionately the quit rates of these workers.
Firm is assumed to maximizes its expected net present value of profits. A
negative shock leads to reductions in the level of demand for firm’s product,
and consequently reductions in demand for labour. Firm’s decision whom
to fire depends on adjustment costs and on worker’s productivity. Workers
with low firing costs and low expected productivity growth are more likely
to be laid oﬀ. The firm is indiﬀerent between two ways it can get rid of the
worker: it can lay oﬀ the worker, or it can induce worker to quit by oﬀering
less than a market wage.
Following the literature on asymmetric information on labour market
(Gibbons and Katz, 1991, Laing, 1993), we assume that worker’s current
employer is better informed about his or her ability than alternative employ-
ers. This is because part of worker’s ability is privately learned by the firm
(and workers) after a period of employment. The prospective employers infer
worker quality from the publicly observable actions taken by the firm7. The
market infers that laid-oﬀ workers are of low ability and so oﬀers them low
wages in their next jobs. We assume, as in Gibbons and Katz, (1991), that
workers displaced by plant closing suﬀer from no such adverse inference and
so receive higher re-employment wages from labour market.
These theoretical considerations provides some prediction that are rele-
vant to this analysis. First, in the period before the plant is shut down there
are significant changes in the workforce skill distribution: Worker’s with high-
est share of general human capital, i.e. observable skills such as education
and general experience, are more likely to quit voluntarily, and employer is
more likely to fire the least productive ones, i.e. the ones with low share
7Farber and Gibbons (1996) call this "private learning", i.e. a case where only worker
and the current employer observe performance outcomes, but other market participants
draw appropriate inference from the observed actions of the worker and the current em-
ployer.
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of both observable and non-observable skills. The remaining workers should
have higher share of firm-specific human capital, i.e. more tenure and unob-
servable skills. Second, workers’ re-employment wages and pre-displacement
earning losses depend on the mode of separation: Workers who quit volun-
tarily should suﬀer less severe reduction (or bigger increase) in their earnings,
than the ones who decide to stay until the plant closure. On the other hand,
workers who are laid-oﬀ in the period before the closure should suﬀer bigger
reduction in their wages than the ones who are displaced at the moment
plant was shut down.
2.2 Previous evidence
Very few studies have examined empirically whether there is indeed a se-
lection process within plants before their death, and whether this has an
implications to post-displacement earning losses. The main reason for this
is data limitations. In order to fully explore the question both data on firms
and workers before and after the separation is needed. To our knowledge
only three previous papers have addressed this question directly. Lenger-
mann and Vilhuber (2002) examine the changes in the composition of job
and worker flows prior to "mass-layoﬀ event" (plant closure or significant
downsizing) using on quarterly earning records of workers in the state of
Maryland. The quantile regression analysis reveal that there are significant
changes in the distribution of worker quality8 in separation flows prior to
plant shut down. Compared to job flows from non-distressed firms the dis-
tribution of skill in worker flows from dying and downsizing firms has much
higher variance, indicating that both the best and worst workers leave the
firm before the actual closure or mass layoﬀ event. Bowlus and Vilhuber
(2002) examine whether the workers who leave before the actual mass-layoﬀ
event, will on average have higher accepted wages than workers who are dis-
8The measure for worker quality or skill is derived from person fixed eﬀects estimated
using the wage regression techniques pioneered by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).
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placed during the mass-layoﬀ event (plant closing down). They use data
from US universal wage records to test this hypothesis. They findings sug-
gest that workers leaving a firm that will close down or downsize significantly
have higher re-employment wages than workers who stay with this firm until
the mass layoﬀ event. Hamermesh and Pfann (2001) construct a dynamic
model of two-sided learning between firm and workers in the presence of neg-
ative shocks. They test the implications of the model using data from one
big Dutch company, Fokker Aircraft. The results imply that the firm learn
which employees are likely to quit, and alters its layoﬀ decisions accordingly.
The data reveal that there is important selection process going on in the firm
before the bankruptcy, and that workers staying with the firm until its clo-
sure are disproportionately male, married, technically educated, have longer
tenure, and more internal training courses.
3 Data
3.1 Description of the data source
The base data set for this study come from administrative registers and pre-
pared for research by Statistics Norway. It covers all 16-74 year old Norwe-
gians in the years 1986-2000. The data provides information about ongoing
employment relations such as starting and stopping date of employment re-
lation, taxable income, educational attainment, labour market status, and
a set of demographic variables. The main demographic variables used in
this analysis are annual income (both from main employer and from other
sources), tenure, which is calculated in years on the basis of starting and
stopping date information, worker’s age, years of schooling and marital sta-
tus.
Each of the workers and their employers, and their municipalities have
a unique identification code that can be used to merge in additional infor-
mation from other sources, such as information on worker’s health, family
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background, local labor market characteristic. The unique identification code
allows us to follow workers where ever they go in Norwegian economy. The
unique plant code allows us to identify each worker’s plants and examine e.g.
whether they go trough a significant downsizing or close down. We use plant
codes to define worker’s separation status. Worker is a separator at time t if
at time t+1 he no longer has the same plant identification number.
3.2 Sample Construction
The sample of workers analyzed in this article is constructed as follows. From
the overall data base, we first draw a 10 % random sample of plants observed
in (base) year 1995, and which had been in the data set at least 3 years
before (i.e. in years 1992-1994). Thus each plant is in the sample at least 4
years. Plants are divided into exiting plants and non-exiting plants. Plant is
an exiting plant in year t if it is present in year t but absent in t+ 1, t+ 2,
t+3 and t+4. The whole base year sample consists of 7621 plants with 120
453 workers in 1995 (see table 1). The number of exiting plants in 1995 is
415 and the number of workers in these plants is 4226.
Next we form two diﬀerent data sets using this base year sample. In order
to examine the pre-exit turnover we match these plants to the information
on their workers in years 1992-1995. That is, we follow the workers who
were employed in these plants in four diﬀerent pre-exit years. Consequently
we have a panel of workers who were working in these plants in any of the
years 1992-1995. We have thus information on both the workers who were
continuously employed in these plants until the base year 1995, and the
workers who left these plants before the base year.
In addition, we form a balanced panel matching the workers who were
employed in these plants in the base year (1995) to their information on
both pre-and post-exit years to examine the evaluation of pre- and post-
displacement wages. This gives us a balanced panel of workers from 1992-
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1998 with 795 094 observations9.
Workers in exiting plants are divided into four diﬀerent categories accord-
ing to their separation status. First we define two main categories. We label
a worker as a stayer (or an exit-layoﬀ) if he was working in an exiting plant
at the moment the plant was last observed (t). Thus, exit-layoﬀs separated
from the exiting plant in the period when the plant closed down, i.e. between
t and t+ 1. Workers who leave the dying plant before are labeled as leavers
(or early-leavers). Worker is an early-leaver if he separated between t − 1
and t from a plant that exited between t and t+ 1.
Both of these two main categories are further divided into two subcate-
gories. Worker is a job-to-job mover at t if he separated from a plant between
t and t+1, is attached to a new plant in period t+1, and did not experience
any unemployment spells in either t or t+1. These workers are considered as
the voluntary separators. Consequently, separators who do not fulfill these
criteria are labeled as not-job-to-job movers. Thus, all together we have five
diﬀerent worker categories: 1. stayers in exiting plants who moved directly
to new jobs: job-to-job exit-layoﬀs, 2. stayers in exiting plants who may not
have moved directly to new job: not-job-to-job exit-layoﬀs, 3. workers who
are expected to leave the dying plant voluntarily in the period before the
closure: job-to-job early-leavers, 4. workers who were expected to be laid oﬀ
in the period before the plant closed down: not-to-job early-leavers, and 5.
other workers, which include both stayers and separators from continuous
plants.
4 Empirical framework
The object of this study is to examine empirically whether there is evidence
of selective turnover in the plants before the closure occurs. The empirical
9This is after dropping the observations that do not have information on all the relevant
characteristics.
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framework consists of two diﬀerent steps. First we examine whether there
are significant changes in the distribution of worker quality before the plant
closure and whether workers who leave a dying plant in diﬀerent stages diﬀer
by their observable characteristics. Second, we analyze whether this selection
process implies that there are diﬀerences in the re-employment wages of the
workers who leave the firm in diﬀerent periods.
4.1 Examining the pre-closure turnover
The aim in this section is to examine whether there is significant turnover
in plants before the closure and whether this turnover changes the skill mix
of workers within the plants. We use diﬀerent measures for worker quality
(or skill), such as, years of education, age, tenure and logarithm of annual
earnings. We provide descriptive information to examine whether the skill
distribution of workers change in plants when the closure approaches. It
might be that the future closure has an eﬀect on the shape of the skill dis-
tribution, but not necessary on its location. Thus, in addition on providing
information on how the mean of these variables changes we also look how
does the entire distribution change within exiting plants.
The fact that skill mix within dying plants is changing as compared to
continuing plants can be result of diﬀerent phenomena. Troubled plants are
likely to reduce the number of their employees by firing the workers with
lowest productivity/pay relation and lowest firing costs. It might also be
that troubled firms stop recruiting, and that the average age and tenure are
increasing simply because existing workforce is getting older. Dying plants
might also continue recruiting and try to prevent possible closure replac-
ing their existing workers with new employees, and generally improving the
"quality" of their workforce. In order to distinguish between these possibili-
ties we examine the composition of worker flows from the plants in diﬀerent
pre-closure years.
Finally, we examine in more detail whether workers with certain charac-
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teristics are more likely to leave the dying plants before the closure by esti-
mating a standard probit model. The probability of leaving a dying plant
in a period before the closure occurs can be written as a following standard
probit model
P (yi,t = 1|xi,t) = Φ (xi,tβ) (1)
where yi,t is an indicator variable describing whether worker i separated
between time t − 1 and t from a plant that died between t and t + 1, and
xi,t is a vector of factors that aﬀect this probability. These factors include
both worker, plant, industry and local labour market characteristics, as well
as common time specific factors.
4.2 Estimating post-displacement earning losses
In the second stage we estimate the eﬀect of job displacement on workers re-
employment wages. The estimated equation follows the specifications used
in previous studies (e.g. Jacobson et al. 1993, Stevens, 1997) with some
important extensions:






EARLYi,t−jγj + µi,t (2)
where log(W )i,t is the logarithm of annual earnings in period t, X is a vector
of observable pre-and post displacement worker-, plant-, and labour market-
characteristics, EXITi,t−j is a dummy variable indicating whether worker
separated from a plant at time the closure occurred, t− j, and EARLYi,t−j,
is a dummy variable indicating whether worker separated at time t− j from
a plant that died at time t + 1 − j. The full set of displacement dummies,
Di,t−j, j = −m,−m + 1, 0, ...k indicate that job loss is allowed to aﬀect the
158
outcome m years before its occurrence until k years after its occurrence10.
As a comparison group we use workers in continuing plants. The vector of
observables, X, is assumed to capture both factors that aﬀect the earnings
in current year, and the factors that might influence the selection of worker’s
into diﬀerent displacement categories. The specification might also include
worker specific fixed eﬀects, αi, in order to control for the unobservable non-
time-varying heterogeneity between workers11.
In addition, we allow the eﬀect of job loss depend on the fact whether
worker moved directly to a new job or whether he experienced some un-
employment spells at the time of separation. As described in section 3.2.
we divide workers into 5 diﬀerent categories according to their separations
status: 1. job-to-job exit-layoﬀs., 2. not-job-job exit-layoﬀs, 3. job-to-job
early-leavers, 4. not-job-to-job early-leavers, and 5. other workers. We es-
timate the eﬀect of job loss on post-displacement earnings, and allow this
eﬀect to vary for four diﬀerent displacement categories. Workers in the final
group (5) are used as a comparison group.
5 Results
The results are reported in appendix. We begin by reporting descriptive
information on workers in exiting and non-exiting plants. The sample consist
of workers, who were employed in 1995 in plants that had survived from 1992
until 1995. Year 1995 is marked as year t = 0. Plants that exited between
1995 and 1996 are labeled as exiting plants.
10Various studies have found that the earnings of displaced workers start to decrease
already in the years before the displacement occurs (e.g. Jacobson et al. 1993).
11Note however, that since our model compares exiting plant workers to non-exiting
plant workers, when we include the worker specific fixed eﬀects we can no longer identify
the eﬀect of "being an exiting plant worker" (or loosing a job in plant closure). The only
way to do this, is to assume that the possible closure does not have eﬀect on wages on the
first observation year (t-3).
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5.1 Eﬀect of future closure on worker turnover
Table 2 describes the average worker characteristics of exiting and non-exiting
plants in the sample in pre-exit years12. As expected, the results indicate
that exiting plants are shrinking in pre-exit years. Their workforce seem to
become older, and have more tenure as the closure approaches. The increase
in average tenure and age is faster in exiting plants than in non-exiting plants.
This might indicate that dying plants reduce recruiting before the closure
and exiting workforce is thus getting older more rapidly than workforce in
continuing plants. Compared with non-exiting plants, exiting plants are in
average smaller, employ in average younger workers, and workers with less
tenure and education. The smaller tenure (and average age) might indicate
that these plants are in average younger than non-exiting plants. The exiting
plants also employ less females, and less married people.
In order to look whether the future closure aﬀects workforce skill distribu-
tion, we match the plants from the 1995 base year sample to the information
of their workers in diﬀerent pre-exit years. The variables that are used to
describe worker quality or skills are: worker’s age, years of schooling, tenure,
and logarithm of annual earnings. Table 3 reports the mean, and 0.1, 0.5
and 0.9 percentiles of these variables for exiting and non-exiting plant work-
ers in diﬀerent pre-exit years. Table also shows the diﬀerence in the level
and growth of these measures between exiting and non-exiting plant work-
ers. The idea is to look whether the distribution of worker characteristics
diﬀers significantly between exiting and non-exiting plants, and whether the
distribution changes significantly as the closure approaches.
Table 3 shows that workers in exiting plants are in average younger than
non-exiting plant workers in all pre-exit years. Surprisingly, the workforce
in exiting plants seems to become in average slightly younger as the closure
12This table is produced using plant-level data. That is, we match the information
on the 1995 base sample plants with the information of these plants’ average worker
characteristics in diﬀerent pre-exit years.
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approaches13. This might be driven by the possibility that the oldest workers
separate (e.g. to retirement) from these plants, since the diﬀerence holds
only in the higher tail of the age distribution. Workers in exiting plants
seem to have in average less education than workers in non-exiting plants.
The diﬀerence becomes stronger as the closure approaches even tough the
average level of schooling in exiting plants slightly rises. There is an increase
in average tenure of exiting plant workers just before the closure occurs. This
indicates that during the period just before the closure, i.e. between -1 and
0, the low tenure workers are more likely to leave.
Final rows report the level and the diﬀerence of annual earnings of workers
in exiting-and non-exiting plants in diﬀerent pre-closure years. Surprisingly,
it seems that in our sample the workers in exiting plants earn in average more
than workers in non-exiting plants. In addition, their wage growth during the
whole period (from -3 to 0) is stronger than that of non exiting plant workers.
However, when comparing the earnings growth just before the closure, i.e.
between years -1 and 0, the earnings of exiting plant workers grow less rapidly
than those of non-exiting plant workers. This might indicate either that the
shock that leads to the closure aﬀects workers earnings in these plants, or that
the workers with higher wages (and productivity) leave from these plants just
before the closure. Lower earnings of exiting plants in the year just before
closure might also be explained by the possibility that the closure occurs
already in the end of that year and thus aﬀects the average annual earning.
By looking at the changes in average worker characteristics within plants,
we cannot know whether these changes reflect changes in the characteristics
of existing workforce or whether the possible firm death changes firm’s re-
cruitment policies and workers’ leaving probabilities. Next we study whether
13It is important to note that this results diﬀers from the result with plant level data
in table 2. One reason for the diﬀerence might be that the averages in table 1 are weigted
by number of plants, not by number of workers. The results also diﬀer significantly from
the results in section 5.2., which indicate that the stayers in exiting plants are in average
older than the leavers.
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the composition of separators from plant change before the closure occurs.
Table 4 reports average characteristics of stayers and separators in exiting
and non-exiting plants in diﬀerent pre-exit years. Separators from both ex-
iting and non-exiting plants are in average younger and have less tenure.
Consequently (perhaps) their earnings are at lower level than the earnings of
the workers who stay with they employer that period. Separators seem to be
slightly more educated than stayers, and this diﬀerence is bigger for exiting
plant workers. Interestingly, workers who stay with the plant until the end,
i.e. workers who leave the plant at the period (t-0) when the closure occurs,
are younger and slightly more educated than stayers of these plants in earlier
periods. This indicates that the dying plant is recruiting younger and more
educated workers just before the closure occurs.
Next we examine in more detail whether workers who leave the dying
plant in the period before closure (t-1) occurs diﬀer by their observable char-
acteristics from the stayers. Table 5 reports the average characteristics of the
workers in diﬀerent separation categories in the year t-1. The exiting plant
workers are workers whose plant closed down between t and t+1. Stayers
stayed with these plants until the period t (i.e. did not separate between t-1
and t). Early-leavers left from these plants between t-1 and t. The results
indicate that there are significant diﬀerences in the observable characteristics
of these workers. Exiting plant workers are younger and have less tenure and
education than non-exiting plant workers. They also have higher wages but
slower wage growth. They come from bigger labour markets, are more often
males and less likely to be married than non-exiting plant workers.
Compared with other workers in exiting plants, workers who stay with
their plant until the end, stayers, are significantly older and have more
tenure. They also have in average higher earnings and higher wage growth.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that these workers have significantly
more firm-specific human capital. In addition the stayers have slightly less
schooling and they are more likely to be married. They also come from
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slightly smaller labour markets than the workers who separate from the dy-
ing plants before the closure occurs, which might indicate that they have
smaller changes of getting job oﬀers while on-the-job.
Within the early-leavers category, the ones who are more likely to move
voluntarily, job-to-job movers, are younger, have more tenure, more education
and are more likely to be married than not-job-to-job movers, i.e. the workers
who were more likely to be laid-oﬀ during the period. In addition, the job-
to-job movers have higher earnings but lower earnings growth. They also
come from bigger labour market. All these factors are consistent with the
expectation that worker’s decision to leave voluntarily from a dying plants
is related to his outside opportunities, i.e. to the probability of receiving a
wage oﬀer while still on-the-job.
Next we examine how much these factors aﬀect the probability of being
in diﬀerent layoﬀ categories. Table 6. reports the estimation results of a
standard probit model. First columns explains the factors that aﬀect the
probability of being an exiting plant worker. The results indicate that exiting
plant workers are slightly older, have less tenure, less education, are less
likely to be married, and are more often males than similar workers in the
same industry and labour market. They also seem to have higher wages
than similar workers in the same industry and labour market. It also seems
that once taken into account the other observable characteristics, workers
in labour market with higher unemployment rate are less likely to work in
exiting plants. This is a bit puzzling result, but it is important to remember
that but this information is from year t-1, while exit occurs between t and
t+1.
Next columns report the probability of leaving an exiting plant in period
before its closure occurs14. The sample used in the estimation consists now
only of the exiting plant workers, and thus we estimate the probability of
14This group is likely to consists both of the voluntary movers and of the workers who
were laid oﬀ during this period. One way to distinguish between these two groups is by
separating this category to job-to-job movers and not-job-to-job movers.
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separating from a dying plant in the period before the closure occurs, con-
ditional on being an exiting plant worker. The results show that worker is
more likely to separate from an exiting plant if he is younger and have less
tenure. This might indicate that these workers have less firm specific human
capital and are thus willing to search more intensively for new jobs. Workers
working in exiting plants located in labour market with high unemployment
rate are less likely to separate early. This makes sense since these workers
are less likely to get oﬀers from prospective employers. Wage or wage growth
seem to have negative but not significant eﬀect on the leaving probability.
5.2 Post-displacement earnings losses
In the final part of the empirical analysis we estimate an earning regression
(4) to evaluate the eﬀect of displacement that results from plant closure on
pre- and post-displacement earnings. The coeﬃcient on displacement eﬀect
is allowed to vary by displacement categories. Table 7 reports the results
of the earnings regressions, where workers are divided into two categories
according to their separation status: exit-layoﬀs and early-leavers. The first
column in table 7 reports the results of pooled OLS regression. The reported
coeﬃcients belongs to a dummy variable that indicates displacement that
occurs between t and t+1. The displacement that occurred between t and
t+1 is allowed to aﬀect workers earnings from periods t-3 to t+3. The model
controls for age, age squared, education, gender (female dummy), marital
status, pre-displacement job tenure, plant size, and for the size of local labour
market. In addition the specification includes dummies to control for fixed
time, industry and regional eﬀects.
The estimation results imply that there are significant diﬀerences in the
post-and pre-displacement earnings of workers who leave dying plant in dif-
ferent stages. Compared with similar workers in the same industry and
labour market the earnings of workers who were laid oﬀ in plant closings be-
tween t and t+1, exit-layoﬀs, are actually at higher level in all pre-and post-
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displacement years. On the other hand, early-leavers from dying plants, i.e.
workers who separated during this period (between t and t+1) from plants
that die in the next period (between t+1 and t+2), earn significantly less
than similar workers in continuing plants in the same industry and same
labour market. This might indicate that the early-leavers group consists
mainly of "lemons", i.e. of those who are kicked out first when the plant gets
into trouble.
It might be, however, that these diﬀerences in earnings are not due to
workers displacement status, but on some other (unobservable) characteris-
tics that might aﬀect the selection into diﬀerent displacement categories. In
order to control for such heterogeneity between diﬀerent type of workers we
estimate the model with individual-specific fixed eﬀects. We use the earnings
in year t-3 as the comparison year, and thus drop this years displacement
dummy from the regression. This is necessary since the model compares
workers who were displaced in plant closure to workers who were not dis-
placed in plant closure, and thus the displacement eﬀect could otherwise not
be identified when the worker fixed eﬀects are introduced. It is important to
note, however, that the model relies on assumption that earnings at t-3 are
not influenced by the future displacement event15.
The results indicate that when controlling for the unobservable hetero-
geneity, it seems that workers who stay with their plant until the end, exit-
layoﬀs, suﬀer significant earning reductions after the displacement, while no
such observation is found for early-leavers. Contrary to pooled OLS results,
this indicates that the early-leavers group consists mainly of voluntary early-
leavers and not of layoﬀs.
In order to distinguish between these two groups we divide the dis-
placement categories to two subcategories: job-to-job movers and not-job-
to movers as described in section 3.2. Job-to-job movers are assumed to
15The period t-3 means that the actual displacement will occur 3 to 4 years from that
moment. Jacobson et al. (1993) find out that earnings do not start to decrease earlier
than 3 years before the actual closing down occurs.
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separate voluntarily from these plants, while the not-job-to job movers are
more likely to be laid-oﬀ. Table 8 reports the estimation results of earning
regression where the displacement eﬀect is allowed to vary between all these
categories. The upper panel reports the results of OLS regression without
individual-specific fixed eﬀects. As expected, the workers who loose their
jobs in plant closings and manage to move directly to new jobs seem to be
no worse oﬀ than similar workers in continuing plants. This holds for both
the exit-layoﬀs and for the early-leavers. On the other hand, workers who
experience some unemployment around displacement are clearly worse oﬀ
than workers in continuing plants. The negative eﬀect is much stronger for
workers who were laid oﬀ in the period before the closure occurs. This might
indicate that these workers are of lower quality, and that there are some
unobservable factors that explain their lower earnings capacity.
The lower panel in table 8 report the results of fixed eﬀects regressions.
The result indicate now that workers who loose their jobs in the period
when the closure occurs suﬀer some post-displacement earnings reductions
regardless of the fact whether their move directly to new jobs or not. For
early-leavers the results are very clear: the ones who manage to move to
new jobs directly, i.e. the voluntary early-leavers, suﬀer no earning reduc-
tions in their post-displacement jobs, while workers who do experience some
unemployment around displacement suﬀer significant post-displacement job
losses. This indicates, that there is significant heterogeneity between workers
who separate the dying plants during the period before the closure. Workers
who stay with the dying plant until the end are more homogenous group of
workers.
To sum up, the results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
Workers who voluntarily leave the dying plant in the period before the closure
occurs do not suﬀer any earnings reductions in their post-displacement jobs.
Moreover, workers who were laid oﬀ in the period before the closure occurs,
suﬀer much more severe earning reductions than workers who were laid oﬀ
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during the period when the plant was shut down.
6 Conclusions
This paper had two objects. First, we wanted to examine whether there is a
selective turnover of workers in dying plants before the closure. The hypothe-
sis is that the knowledge of future economic distress will influence both firm’s
hiring and firing decisions, as workers’ quitting decisions. This is assumed to
change the workforce skill distribution within firms. Second, we aimed to ex-
amine whether this selection process implies that there are diﬀerences in the
re-employment wages of the workers who leave the firm in diﬀerent stages.
The results using matched employer-employee panel data from Norway are
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Workers who decide to leave the
dying plants early suﬀer no wage losses in their re-employment jobs, while
the ones who stay until the end suﬀer significant earning losses. On the other
hand, workers who are laid oﬀ in the period before the plant’s death suﬀer
even more severe earnings reductions, than the ones who were laid oﬀ during
the period when the closure occurred.
References
[1] Abowd, John M., Francis Kramarz and David N. Margolis (1999): High
Wage Workers and High Wage Firms, Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 2.
(Mar., 1999), pp. 251-333.
[2] Addison J T, Portugal P (1987): The eﬀect of advance notification of
plant closings on unemployment, Industrial and Labor Relations Review
41(1) 3-16
[3] Altonji, Joseph G. and Shatkoko, Robert A (1987): Do Wages Rise with
Seniority, Review of Economic Studies, 54, pp. 437-459.
167
[4] Bowlus, Audra and Lars Vilhuber, (2002): Displaced workers, early
leavers, and re-employment wages, LEHD Technical Working Paper,
2002-18.
[5] Fallick, Bruce C. (1994): The Endogeneity of Advance Notice and Fear
of Destructive Attrition, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 76 pp.
378-84.
[6] Farber, Henry S. and Robert Gibbons (1996): Learning and Wage Dy-
namics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, pp. 1007-47
[7] Friesen, Jane (1997): Mandatory Notice and the Jobless Durations of
Displaced Workers, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 50, No.
4. pp.652-666.
[8] Gibbons, Robert and Lawrence F. Katz (1991): Layoﬀs and Lemons,
Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 9, No. 4.pp. 351-380.
[9] Gibbons, Robert and Lawrence F. Katz (1992): Does Unmeasured
Ability Explain Inter-industry Wage Diﬀerentials?, Review of Economic
Studies, 59,515-535.
[10] Griliches, Zvi and Haim Regev (1995): Firm Productivity in Israeli
Industry 1979-1988, Journal of Econometrics, 65, pp. 175-203.
[11] Hamermesh, Daniel, and Gerard A, Pfann (2001): Two-Sided Learning,
Labor Turnover and Worker Displacement, IZA Discussion Paper No.
308
[12] Louis S. Jacobson; Robert J. LaLonde; Daniel G. Sullivan (1993): Earn-
ings Losses of Displaced Workers, American Economic Review, Vol. 83,
No. 4. (Sep., 1993), pp. 685-709.
168
[13] Laing, Derek (1993): Involuntary Layoﬀs in Model with Asymmetric
Information Concerning Worker Ability, Review of Economic Studies,
61, (2), pp. 375-92
[14] Lengermann, Paul A. and Lars Vilhuber (2002): Abandoning the Sink-
ing Ship: The Composition of Worker Flows Prior to Displacement ,
LEHD Technical Working Paper No. TP-2002-11
[15] Mortensen, Dale T. (1986): Job Search and Labour Market Analysis,
in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds., Handbook of Labour Economics,
Amsterdam: Elsevier Scince Publishers, 1986.
[16] Ruhm, Christopher J. (1994): Advance Notice, Job Search, and Post-
displacement Earnings", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1,
pp. 1-28.
[17] Topel, Robert H. (1991): Specific Capital, Mobility and Wages: Wages
Rise with Job Seniority, Journal of Political Economy, vol.99, pp.145-
176.
[18] Topel, Robert H. and Ward, Michael P (1992): Job Mobility and the
Careers of Young Men, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), pp.
439-79.
A Appendix
A.1 Notification rules in Norway
The general notification time before laying oﬀ people in Norway is 1 month.
However, this depends on the tenure in the job. For workers with more than
5 year tenure it is 2 months and for workers with more than 10 year tenure it
is 3 months or more depending on age. It is 4 months if the worker is older
than 50 year, 5 months if the worker is older than 55 year and 6 months if
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the worker is older than 60 year. People can be laid oﬀ immediately if for a
strong cause (serious misbehavior) or with 2 week notice if the firm has to
close due to a disaster like fire. Workers can be laid oﬀ temporarily with 2
week notice.
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APPENDIX TO SECTION V 
 
Table 1 Information on the 1995 sample  
 
 Number of plants at t=0 Percent Number of workers at t=0 Percent 
Non-exitors  7 206 94.55 116 227 96.49 
Exitors 415 5.45 4 226 3.51 
Total 7 621 100 120 453 100 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive information of the average characteristics of exiting and non-exiting plants in the pre-exit years 
 
Time  -3 -2 -1 0
Exiting plants 
Plant size 13.02 11.86 11.87 10.18
Average age  38.68 39.36 39.95 40.84
Average tenure 4.68 5.26 5.68 6.26
Average years of schooling 10.80 10.87 10.92 10.94
Share of females 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.42
Share of married 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.54
Non-exiting plants 
Plant size 16.07 16.04 16.41 16.13
Average age  39.43 39.87 40.14 40.39
Average tenure 5.23 5.68 6.04 6.38
Average years of schooling 10.98 11.03 11.09 11.15
Share of females 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Share of married 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57
Difference between exiting and non-exiting plants 
Plant size -3.04 -4.18 -4.55 -5.95
Average age  -0.76 -0.51 -0.19 0.45
Average tenure -0.55 -0.42 -0.36 -0.12
Average years of schooling -0.19 -0.17 -0.18 -0.21
Share of females -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
Share of married -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
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Table 3 Mean and 0.1, 0.5 (median), and 0.9 quantiles of main variables from pre-exit years for exiting and non-exiting plant 
workers  
 
Exiting plant workers Exiting plant workers Non-exiting plant workers Difference btw. exiting and non-ex.  
Variable:  Mean 0.1 0.5 0.9 Mean 0.1 0.5 0.9 Mean 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Age              
Time -3 38.96 24 37 57 40.05 24 39 58 -1.09 0 -2 -1 
 -2 39.08 24 38 57 40.29 24 40 58 -1.21 0 -2 -1 
 -1 38.83 24 37 56 40.30 24 40 57 -1.48 0 -3 -1 
 0 38.76 24 38 56 40.33 24 40 57 -1.57 0 -2 -1 
Difference from -3 – 0 -0.20 0.00 1.00 -1.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 -1.00 -0.48 0 0 0 
 -1 – 0 -0.07 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0 1 0 
Education     
Time -3 11.07 8 11 14 11.32 8 11 15 -0.25 0 0 -1 
 -2 11.12 8 11 14 11.41 8 11 15 -0.29 0 0 -1 
 -1 11.15 8 11 14 11.49 8 11 16 -0.34 0 0 -2 
 0 11.21 9 11 14 11.54 9 11 16 -0.32 0 0 -2 
Difference from -3 – 0 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.07 0 0 -1 
 -1 – 0 0.06 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0 0 0 
Tenure     
Time -3 5.07 0 4 12 5.93 1 4 14 -0.86 -1 0 -2 
 -2 5.04 0 4 13 6.17 1 5 15 -1.13 -1 -1 -2 
 -1 5.00 0 3 13 6.31 1 5 16 -1.31 -1 -2 -3 
 0 5.38 0 3 14 6.53 1 5 17 -1.15 -1 -2 -3 
Difference from -3 – 0 0.32 0.00 -1.00 2.00 0.60 0.00 1.00 3.00 -0.28 0 -2 -1 
 -1 – 0 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 0 0 0 
log(Wage)     
Time -3 12.11 11.26 12.27 12.87 12.08 11.32 12.23 12.74 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.13 
 -2 12.13 11.32 12.27 12.84 12.09 11.33 12.23 12.74 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.10 
 -1 12.17 11.40 12.31 12.86 12.11 11.35 12.25 12.75 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.10 
 0 12.16 11.42 12.29 12.82 12.13 11.39 12.27 12.78 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Difference from -3 – 0 0.05 0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.02 -0.09 
 -1 – 0 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 
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Table 4 Average characteristics of workers in exiting and non-exiting plants according to separation status in different pre-
exit years 
 
 Exiting plant workers Non-exiting plant workers 
Period/Variable: Stayers Separators Stayers Separators 
t-3     
Age 39.70 37.05 41.01 36.06 
Education 10.95 11.37 11.31 11.38 
Tenure 5.66 3.55 6.39 4.03 
Log. wage 12.15 12.02 12.16 11.76 
t-2     
Age 39.44 38.01 41.13 36.35 
Education 11.08 11.25 11.39 11.49 
Tenure 5.47 3.78 6.68 3.84 
Log. wage 12.18 12.00 12.16 11.74 
t-1     
Age 39.77 37.20 41.28 36.89 
Education 11.09 11.24 11.42 11.73 
Tenure 5.86 3.52 6.88 4.33 
Log. wage 12.22 12.10 12.18 11.84 
t-0     
Age  38.76 41.62 36.87 
Education  11.21 11.49 11.65 
Tenure  5.38 7.26 4.57 
Log. wage  12.16 12.20 11.95 





Table 5 Average characteristics of workers in exiting and non-exiting plants according to separation status  
 
 Exiting plants     
Non-exiting 
plants 
 All Stayers (Early)-Leavers All 
  All All Job-to-job Not-job-to-job  
       
Age 38.83 39.77 37.20 36.86 37.66 40.30 
Tenure 5.00 5.86 3.52 3.63 3.37 6.31 
Education 11.15 11.09 11.24 11.35 11.09 11.49 
Female (=1) 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.43 0.49 
Marital status 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.58 
Earnings at t=-1 236329 243884 223366 253913 181707 213837 
Earnings at t=-2 222429 231179 207432 230526 176018 203693 
Earnings at t=-3 204713 209430 196584 220262 163902 191872 
Earnings growth btw -2 -1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.36 
Av. Earn. growth btw -3 -1 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.22 0.52 0.38 
Region unemp. rate 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Size of l. market 139227 133084 149768 176652 113105 116433 
0bservations 4924 3111 1813 1046 767 118273 
% 100.00 63.18 36.82 21.24 15.58  
The information on the average characteristics are from year -1 (1994). Exiting plant workers are workers who worked in 1994 at plant that exited btw 1995 and 
1996. These workers are divided into stayers and early-leavers.  Early-leavers are the workers who separated from these plants in previous period, i.e. btw. 1994 
and 1995.  Note, the new hires by exiting plants btw 1994 and 1995 are not in this figure. This is why the number of exiting plant workers does not sum to 4226 
(100%) which is the number of exiting plant workers in 1995. These include stayers, 3111 (73.62%) and number of new hires 1115 (26.38%). 
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Table 6 The effect of different pre-displacement characteristics on the probability of being an exiting plant worker and on the 
probability of leaving the exiting plant in the period before the closure occurs. 
 
Variable: Probability of being exiting plant worker Early-leaving probability for exiting plant workers 
 dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z 
Age  0.004 0.005 0.71 0.475 -0.307 0.089 -3.46 0.001
Tenure -0.002 0.000 -14.56 0.000 -0.016 0.002 -7.67 0.000
Education -0.002 0.000 -8.14 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.30 0.765
Married* -0.004 0.001 -3.76 0.000 -0.009 0.018 -0.53 0.599
Female*  -0.015 0.001 -12.31 0.000 -0.008 0.020 -0.41 0.683
Log(wage) at 94   0.005 0.001 5.13 0.000 -0.011 0.015 -0.78 0.433
Wage change 94-93 0.000 0.000 -0.20 0.841 0.000 0.002 0.02 0.984
Local unemp. Rate -0.132 0.083 -1.59 0.111 -8.553 1.531 -5.59 0.000
Size of local l.market  0.000 0.000 13.02 0.000 -0.307 0.089 -3.46 0.001
2-digit ind dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 106217 4200 
LR chi2 2941.59 1149.37 
Pseudo R-sq.  0.0831 0.2287 
ML-probit marginal effect estimates. These are two separate probit regressions. The latter one is estimated using only the sample of exiting plant workers (for 




Table 7  Effect of job displacement that results from plant closure on post-and pre-displacement earnings 
 
 Model 1 (pooled OLS) Model 2 (Fe) 
 Type of displacement: Type of displacement: 
Effect displacement  Exit-layoff Early-leaver Exit-layoff Early-leaver 
on wages at: Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Pre-displacement years:         
t-3 0.059 (0.014) -0.055 (0.028)   
t-2 0.072 (0.013) -0.057 (0.027) 0.003 (0.012) 0.004 (0.025)
t-1 0.092 (0.011) -0.063 (0.023) 0.014 (0.012) -0.004 (0.025)
t-0 0.099 (0.010) -0.028 (0.019) 0.014 (0.012) 0.021 (0.025)
Post-displacement years:   
t+1 0.075 (0.011) -0.054 (0.024) -0.016 (0.012) -0.011 (0.025)
t+2 0.074 (0.013) -0.029 (0.029) -0.027 (0.012) -0.006 (0.025)
t+3 0.052 (0.013) 0.023 (0.030) -0.051 (0.012) 0.035 (0.025)
Individual fixed effects No    Yes    
Industry fixed effects Yes    No    
Region fixed effects Yes    Yes    
Year fixed effects Yes    Yes    
R-sq 0.358 0.147 (within) 
Observations 795094 795094 
The data are a balanced panel of workers for years 1992-1998. The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). The following control variables are included, but 
not reported: Age, age squared, regional rate of unemployment, time and area dummies.  The model 1 controls also for sex, marital status and various pre-
displacement characteristics such as: job tenure, plant size, size of the local labor market. The coefficient belongs to a dummy variable that indicates 




Table 8 Effect of job displacement that results from plant closure on post-and pre-displacement earnings for job-to-job 
movers and not-job-to-job movers  
 
Model 1 (pooled OLS) Exit-layoff Early-leaver 
Type of displacement: Job-to-job Not-job-to-job Job-to-job Not-job-to-job 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
t-3 0.143 (0.014) -0.097 (0.029) 0.032 (0.031) -0.167 (0.049)
t-2 0.149 (0.013) -0.073 (0.026) 0.072 (0.026) -0.222 (0.051)
t-1 0.160 (0.010) -0.030 (0.022) 0.005 (0.028) -0.148 (0.039)
t-0 0.141 (0.010) 0.026 (0.019) 0.032 (0.022) -0.103 (0.033)
t+1 0.146 (0.011) -0.057 (0.024) 0.098 (0.021) -0.259 (0.046)
t+2 0.147 (0.012) -0.070 (0.028) 0.143 (0.025) -0.275 (0.057)
t+3 0.102 (0.014) -0.044 (0.028) 0.149 (0.031) -0.162 (0.057)
Individual fixed effects No        
R-sq 0.359        
Observations 795094        
Model 2 (Fe) Exit-layoff Early-leaver 
Type of displacement: Job-to-job Not-job-to-job Job-to-job Not-job-to-job 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
t-3         
t-2 -0.006 (0.015) 0.019 (0.020) 0.041 (0.033) -0.045 (0.038)
t-1 -0.011 (0.015) 0.061 (0.020) -0.029 (0.033) 0.024 (0.037)
t-0 -0.035 (0.015) 0.107 (0.020) -0.013 (0.033) 0.061 (0.037)
t+1 -0.029 (0.015) 0.010 (0.020) 0.054 (0.033) -0.103 (0.038)
t+2 -0.028 (0.015) -0.028 (0.021) 0.099 (0.033) -0.160 (0.039)
t+3 -0.068 (0.015) -0.018 (0.021) 0.102 (0.033) -0.065 (0.040)
Individual fixed effects Yes        
R-sq (within) 0.147  
Observations 795094  
The data are a balanced panel of workers for years 1992-1998. The dependent variable is ln(annual earnings). The following control variables are included, but 
not reported: Age, age squared, regional rate of unemployment, time and area dummies.  The model 1 controls also for sex, marital status and various pre-
displacement characteristics such as: job tenure, plant size, size of the local labor market. The coefficient belongs to a dummy variable that indicates 
displacement that occurs between t and t+1. The coefficient is allowed to vary by type of displacement.  
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